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III 
Car qu 'est-ce que penser - si ce n 'est a autre chose? C'est Ie cours qui est 
beau, oui, c'est Ie cours, et son murmure qui chemine hors du boucan du 
monde. Que l'on tache d'arreter la pensee pour en exprimer Ie contenu au 
grand jour, on aura, comment dire, comment ne pas dire plutat, pour 
preserver Ie tremble ouvert des contours insaisissables, on n 'aura rien, de 
l'eau entre Ie doigts, quelques gouttes videes de grace bnllees dans la 
lumiere. C'etat la nuit maintenant dans nwn esprit, j'etais seul dans la 
penombre de la cabine et je pensais, apaise des tourments du dehors. Les 
conditions les plus douces pour penser, en ejfet, les moment ou la pensee se 
laisse Ie plus volontiers couler dans les meandres reguliers de son cours, sont 
precisbnent les moment ou, ayant provisoirement renonce ase mesurer aune 
realite qui semble inepuisable, les tensions commencent adecroitre peu apeu, 
to utes les tensions accumulees pour se garder des blessures qui menacent - et 
j'en savais des infimes -, et que, seul dans un endroit clos, seul et suivant Ie 
cours de ses pensees dans Ie soulagement naissant, on passe progressivement 
de la dijficulte de vivre au desespoir d'are 
-JEAN-PHILIPPE TOl'SSAIKT 
L 'appareil ph010 
Words are very unnecessar.,', 
They can only do hann 
-DEPECHE MODE 
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This dissertation has three alms. First, the establishment of the theoretical 
foundations of deconstruction and its appropriation by literary criticism. Sec­
ond, the application of deconstruction to the novels of Nabokov; it has to be 
stressed that this application is not itself a deconstructive reading, rather that 
deconstruction offers the interpretative horizon for an analysis of the inner 
logic of self-reflexivity in the novels in question. which is defined with de 
Man and against Derrida as a procedure of textual self-deconstruction. The 
procedure, evident in the proliferation of textual strategies in Nabokov's 
work, marks the point at which literary modernism transforms itself through 
the radicalisation of the critique of narrative, subject and meaning into a 
postmodern aesthetics of deconstruction. The interpretation of the novels then 
serves thirdly to pose the question of the value of the theory of deconstruction 
for the task of interpretation, or more generally. the value of deconstruction 
for literary theory. 
The interpretation of Nabokov's novels reveals a paradox: self­
deconstructive literature does not require a deconstructive reading. On the 
contrary, the textual deconstruction of meaning and reference requires the 
non-deconstructive standpoint of a coherent literary analysis for its demon­
stration. Comparably and conversely, a deconstructive reading presupposes a 
text and/or an author committed to the intention of a meaningful whole (how­
ever ambiguous). 
The author's distinction between deconstruction as a method of interpre­
tation and as a literary theory thus points to the limitations of deconstruction 
as interpretative method in relation to modern and postmodern texts precisely 
because of their metafictional affinity to deconstruction. Beyond this, how­
ever, deconstruction's treatment of the text as pretext for its own operations, 
taken to its logical conclusion, would dissolve the very cognitive object and 




This dissertation combines an interpretative interest with a question of literary criticism. On the 
theoretical side, I will be discussing 'deconstruction' as the French philosopher Jacques Derrida 
has developed it, while the literary anchor point will be a critical reading of a selection of Vla­
dimir Nabokov's novels. I will thus attempt to link a relatively recent philosophical and text­
theoretical school of thought that, with its global attack on the history of traditional western 
philosophy, brings up against itself Neomarxists as much as defenders of the established Ameri­
can literary criticism, with the work of an author that is marked by a proliferation of textual 
strategies. 
Reading Nabokov's novels it is interesting to detect an increasing aspect of reflexivity. this 
development, in fact, commands the aesthetic evolution of his entire novelistic work. Reflexiv­
ity here at first only means that the subject of Nabokov's writing is writing, or maybe language 
itself. Thus, he radicalises the concept of the modern novel, which stands for the loss of world 
and a subsequent tendency toward language. I believe, however, that with the application of 
'subversive' narrative techniques that deconstruct both narrator-subject and meaningful dis­
courses. Nabokov's novels not only make the fullest use of the aesthetics of the modern novel 
but also eventually surpass it. The proposition of this dissertation is therefore that Nabokov' s 
non-mimetic literature is an expression of aesthetic self-deconstruction. 
The reaction to extremely reflexive literature is generally characterised by interpretative 
helplessness: in Anglo-American literary criticism Nabokov ranks among the most-critiqued 
authors of the twentieth century. The extensive history of the reception of N abokov' s work must 
thus draw attention to the limitations of a traditional literary criticism that is still operating with 
clear-cut concepts of 'meaning' that result from the generally felt loss of mimetic relationship 
between work and world. 
The aspect of reflexivity links literature to the theory of deconstruction. Point of departure 
for the textual analysis is the assumption that the formal construction of Nabokov's novels is 
highly reminiscent of the theory of deconstruction. It is this dissertation's theory that subjectiv­
ity. mimetics and meaning are deconstructed in Nabokov's texts. 
Deconstructive theory, critically examined, will thus be the interpretative background 
against which I will read Nabokov's novels. His critique of the traditional concepts of linguistic 
meaning and of subjectivity as the origin and centre of meaning will be captured through the ap­
plication of this theory. The subversive narrative techniques in his novels can be understood as 
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the methods of textual self-deconstruction which were developed by Paul de Man: a rupturing, 
non-identifying reflexivity contained within literary texts. 
This analysis of Nabokov' s novels will therefore not be a deconstructive reading but will 
examine aesthetically realised deconstructive strategies; deconstruction will not be applied to the 
novels in question but will instead be located within the poetic texts themselves. 
With the departure from the poetics of mimetics in favour of a radically rupturing reflexiv­
ity. Nabokov surpasses philosophical modernism; his aesthetics (in contrast to his decidedly 
metaphysical concept of art in general) practises what Derrida and de Man theoretically postu­
lale. 
Deconstruction in theory and in the novel marks the point at which modernism exceeds it­
sel l' through an act of reflexivi ty. Tentatively, one could define Nahokov' s position with the pair 
of modernism and postmodernism. It is especially the subversive deconstruction of the genre's 
traditional values and-with regard to deconstruction-of the dominance of presence in western 
philosophy respectively that suggest that postmodernism can be thought only in relation to mod­
ernism and not in isolation. 
The term 'postmodernism' requires further elucidation as situating Nabokov hypothetically 
only indicates his philosophical and theoretical standpoint. Concerning aesthetics, though, we 
have to recognise that already literary modernity aesthetically and critically reflected on the 
categories of history! and subjectivity. 2 It remains therefore vague what exactly it is that marks 
literary and aesthetic postmodernism. 3 Here, the critical literature argues controversially; my 
assumption is that the conception of postmodernism is only tenable if we choose to understand it 
as the aesthetic radicalisation of modernism, of which it has always already been an inherent 
quality. With the concept of literary self-deconstruction a postmodern aesthetics, which goes 
heyond the reflexive critique of modernism, is conceivable. This hypothesis, however, will have 
to admit that a rigorous systematic separation of the two concepts is problematic. 
From the confrontation of literary texts and theory follows, that deconstruction, as a liter­
ary and interpretative theory, requires a metatheoretical reflection. With the novels' readings, 
cleconstructive theory will be examined retrospectively for its significance as a possible inter­
pretative theory or method; what can deconstruction accomplish that goes beyond the other 
critical techniques' achievements which are criticised by it? Moreover: does it have any signifi­
cance as a literalY theory? The Anglo-American discussion of this theory was centrally inter­
ested in the radical challenges of deconstruction. 4 In the controversy about deconstruction's 
lOne example would be Joyce's rehabilitation of mythos in Ulysses. 
2 Roben Musil's Man Wirhout Qualities is a paradigm for a refiexive critique of subjectivity as an 
unifying instance of experiencing the world. 
, The eclectic aesthetics of especially postmodern architecture, i,e. the haphazard citation of pre­
modern forms, will be omitted from this dissertation . 
.j Cf. I. t. I. The 'Concept' of Deconstruction 
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dominance within the range of literary techniques (and this is deconstruction's claim for univer­
sality), the supporters of deconstruction were confronted only with defenders of traditional criti­
cal 'values' - the advocates of the New Criticism and of reception aesthetics (supported by 
Stanley Fish). 
In this conflict, the fundamental methodological reflection, i.e. whether the 'philosophical 
school' of deconstruction is generally applicable to literary criticism was entirely lost. I A dis­
cussion about deconstructive theory will however only make sense if we first systematise the ba­
sic principles of this theory which completely eludes the demands of I scientific discourse' -con­
sistency and comprehension-to examine it for its relevance in literary theory in a subsequent 
step. 
According to the dual perspective of this dissertation-deconstruction and Nabokov-, I 
will begin the first part with a systematic introduction to the theory of deconstruction. 2 Consid­
ering the complexity of the topic, this dissertation cannot possibly hope to present a comprehen­
sive introduction; the exposition will therefore focus on relevant aspects. Among these are Der­
rida's critique of the classical concept of the sign as well as of the I traditional' concepts of sub­
jectivity and meaning. Here I will refer mainly to Derrida's texts up to 1972 as they are com­
posed most systematically and are therefore conducive for a discussion from a literary theory 
viewpoint. Later writings, like for example The Truth in Painting (1978) and The Post Card 
(1980) are too complex and too coded in their argumentative strategies and their philosophical 
allusions that an analysis would exceed the limited frame of this dissertation. 
Following the introduction of the basic principles of deconstruction, I will discuss the 
American deconstructive literary theory, especially of the American Romance scholar and com­
paratist Paul de Man. Following this theoretical preparation, a discussion about the possibility 
of typological and historical definition of reflexive and self-decollstructive novels will ensue. 
Almost like a provisional appraisal I will then attempt a first metatheoretical positioning of de­
construction in relation to postmodernism. 
In the second part, I will analyse Vladimir Nabokov' s novels, with focus on The Real Life 
of Sebastian Knight, Lolita, Pnin, Pale Fire and Ada. or Ardor in chronological order after a 
brief introduction to Nabokov' s aesthetics. The selection of these novels follows the representa­
tion of an increasing radicalisation of reflexive and self-deconstructive narrative strategies. I 
will not deal with Nabokov's late prose in detail as it does not seem to present any further inno­
vation concerning the evolution of reflexivity in his reuvre. My interpretation of this fact is that 
I Gasche ("Deconstruction as Criticism") seems to be the first to mention this deficit in the recent 
past a vast amount of publications about Derrida has discussed single aspects of his theory without either 
establishing its theoretical significance for literary theory nor testing its application as an interpretative 
method. 
2 For which I will make use of the seminal works of Culler (On Deconstruction), Gasche (The Tain 
of the Mirror) and Frank (What is Neoslructuralism?). 
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these texts are ultimately expressions of an aesthetic stagnation which, however, IS In accor­
dance with the immanent logic of reflexive texts and thus unavoidable (Here I am referring to 
Transparent Things and Look at the Harlequins!.) 
In the third and final part I will summarise the whole field 'deconstruction in the novel' and 
will contextualise it with the debate around postmodernism. The aim of the concluding meta­
theoretical contemplation is to provide a small contribution to the discussion about the signifi­




A poetry exists whose sole object is the relation between the ideal and 
the real, lvhich one should therefore call, by analogy with the technical 
language of philosophy, transcendental poet!}: [ ... ]. No doubt a tran­
scendental philosophy would not have much credibility if it were not 
critical, if it did not represent the producer as well as the product, if it 
did not contain. in its system of transcendental thought, a characteristic 
of the act of transcendental thought. The same is true for this poetry. 
Thus it should combine material of a transcendental nature, and the ex­
ercise that lays the groundwork for a poetic theory of the literary faculty 
(which one finds quite frequently in modem writers), with artistic re-
flexion and the fine self-reflex ion that is at work in Pindar, in Greek 
lyric fragments. in the elegies of the antiquity, and. amongst the mod­
ems, in Goethe it should represent itself in each of its representations, 
and throughout be both poetry and poet!)' ofpoetry. 
-FRIEDRICH SCHLEGEL 
Athenaeum fragment 238 
1.1. PRINCIPLES OF DECONSTRUCTION 
1. 1. 1. The "Concept" of Deconstruction 
In spite of the widespread reception of Jacques Derrida's work by Anglo-American criticism 
there is still much disagreement about the question what exactly 'deconstruction' actually is. 
The secretive dark cloak with which this poststructuralist theory seems to wrap itself is not only 
incentive for numerous bitter polemics' but it also nourishes parodistic portrayals of its idiosyn­
cratic attitude toward language2 as well as of its far-reaching effects on academia in general. 
A tentative definition of deconstruction is, indeed, at first easiest achieved with a sequence 
of eliminations, or negative descriptions, as Rodolphe Gasche demonstrates: 
Deconstruction is not to be mistaken for a nihilism, nor for a metaphysics of absence, nor for a 
negative theology. It is not a demolition and a dismantling to be opposed by or calling for a re­
building and a reconstruction. It is not to be taken for what Heidegger calls destruction. 
(Gasche, "Deconstruction as Criticism": 180) 
This, however, determines neither the concept of deconstruction nor its theoretical status. Yet 
this very uncertainty, which has been multiplied since deconstruction's annexation by Anglo­
American literary criticism, is an inherent quality of the theory itself: 3 radically refusing the 
possibility of techno-scientific domination in its field of interest, it likewise refuses self­
definition.4 
Thus the concept of deconstruction is by now laden with a double equivocation: an intrinsic 
part of the deconstructive endeavour is the intentional elusion of its own fixation into a concept;5 
apart from that-possibly because of deconstruction's relatively early transition to the field of 
literary theory-a methodological legitimatisation has generally been neglected. The reception of 
deconstructive theory was then further tainted by the divergent academic socialisations in An­
glO-America and Europe respectively. 
I The Austin/Searle vs. Derrida debate about speech act theory or the Woollen VS. Derrida affair 
about Heidegger might be named here as examples. 
2 Cf. Italo Calvino's /fOn A Winter'S Night A Traveller. 
3 Cf. Gasche's critique of the reception of Derrida's works ("Deconstruction as Criticism". The Tain 
of the Mirror), and concerning the situation in German academia, see Forget (Text und Interpretation: 
20). 
4 Cf. especially Gasche's work - I will later focus on this problematic of definition. 
S Cf. especially Gasche's critique ("Deconstruction as Criticism"; "'Setzung' and 'Ubersetzung': 
Notes on de Man" and "Joining the Text"). 
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In accordance with recent writings on this topic we can come, however, to a preliminary defini­
tion of the concept and the location of deconstructive theory. Following Culler, there are three 
discernible areas of application of deconstruction: as philosophy it aims to be fundamental cri­
tique of Western metaphysics, as interpretation method it attempts a subversive reading of texts, 
and as a specifically poststructuralist theory it develops a concept of the sign and of structure 
which transcends the taxonomic structuralism (Culler, On Deconstruction: 154). 
These three areas of application have a common theoretical foundation: the point of depar­
ture of deconstruction, as philosophical or linguistic school or as reading strategy is-in corre­
spondence with classical structuralism and the analytical philosophy of language1-the paradigm 
shift from the priority of (self-) consciousness, or the subject, toward the signification system of 
language. Frank sums this up: 
It is no longer consciousness that is the transcendental place of the "condition of possibility" for 
meaning, significance, and reference, rather it is the sign. Transcendental philosophy is trans­
formed or dissolved into semiology, i.e. in the theory of signs. (Frank, \¥hat is Neostructural­
ism?: 217) 
Here, with the turning away from the subject, Derrida takes up Ferdinand de Saussure's 
thoughts: language (langue) as a system of differences exists prior to all individual meaning and 
is therefore never to be understood as an expression of pre-semiotic or pre-linguistic concep­
tions. Deconstruction is thus situated after the linguistic turn. 
With this we have implicitly mentioned two of Derrida's fundamental thoughts: first, the 
exclusively social character of language with its priority over the individual (with this notion 
Derrida places himself, without emphasis, into the tradition of hermeneutics),2 and, second, the 
linguistic character of all relations between subject and world and the subject's perception of it­
self. The autonomy of a thinking and meaning-endowing individual consciousness is subordi­
nated to the trans-individual system of language. In fact, language itself becomes both centre 
and model of the Human Sciences in general. 3 
Situating deconstruction after the paradigm shift of the linguistic turn seems to imply a 
radical new beginning of thought. This, however, requires some limitations if one does not want 
to deprive Derrida of his anchor points in the historical tradition. Especially Anglo-American 
criticism, in its attempt to determine and conceptually fixate deconstruction, has-probably be­
1 Frank renders these correspondences precisely as, first, the break with metaphysics, second, re­
course to language and third, the rejection of the representational model of language (\¥hal is Neoslruc­
turalism?) . 
2 Cf. Frank's substantiation of correspondences between deconstruction's language theory and her­
meneutics (\¥hat is Neostructuralism?). 
J The heuristic value of such transition is demonstrated by Levi-Strauss and his structural anthropol­
ogy, which is based on the assumption that the structure of social systems is organised analogously [0 the 
structure of language. 
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cause of its methodological past that is chiefly text immanent-emphasised the aspect of discon­
tinuity, of rupture, much more strongly than Derrida himself; I he in fact explicitly relativises 
the radical new approach of Saussure (of whom he considers himself a successor) by showing 
that there were contradictions already in Rousseau's conception of language which indicate the 
arbitrariness of the sign. Consequently. he re-Iocates and relativises aspects of the epistemologi­
cal break historically into the past. This is why Derrida does not accept the term linguistic turn 
as a demarcation of a linguistic presence that completely breaks with its non-linguistic past. In­
stead, he presumes an all-encompassing tradition of a phonocentric and metaphysical philosophy 
of presence that increasingly undermines itself. 
When Manfred Frank, who is probably the most prominent German critic of French post­
structuralism,2 claims that the linguistic mediation of all world experience and the impossibility 
of 'catching up' with meaning were already integral components of Friedrich Schleiermacher's 
hermeneutics, with which he then challenges poststructuralism,3 his critique applies more to 
Derrida's adepts and interpreters than to Derrida himself. It has to be admitted that Derrida ap­
parently never explicitly expressed his special links to German Romanticism and Idealism; Der­
rida's frequent historical associations, however, clearly indicate his indebtedness to the philo­
sophical tradition. 
In the many threads of textual recourses, with which Derrida tries to expose the various 
motives of metaphysical-Iogocentric Western philosophy and its immanent rupturing force, he 
always comes back to three authors as crucial supporters of his theory about the end of meta­
physics: Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger. 
For Derrida, each of these three philosophers represents a specific turning point in the con­
clusion of the era of metaphysics, or of a beginning of a post-metaphysical, post-logocentric 
era. Nietzsche is seen as the one who overcame the longing for the absent origin, i.e. for truth, 
and who in fact affirms this 'origin-Iessness'. Freud is interpreted by Derrida as the thinker of 
the trace and the supplement and is therefore seen as support in his, Derrida's, attack against the 
idealistic philosophy of the subject. Finally, with the deconstruction of the metaphysics of pres­
ence, Derrida takes up Heidegger's critique of onto-theology (i.e. metaphysics). Just like him, 
Heidegger, according to Derrida, views the philosophical tradition with a dual perspective: the 
veiling of the truth of Being in the history of ontology on the one hand, and at the same time the 
J An exception are Gasche's studies of Derrida which refer especially to Derrida's relations with 
Heidegger and Husserl, and Rorty's classification of deconstruction as following in the tradition of 
Hegel, Heidegger and Gadamer ("Philosophy as a Kind of Writing"). (The affinity to Gadamer, how­
ever, seems to be more than problematic, as the controversy between Forget and Rorty demonstrates 
[Forget, Text und Interpretation]). 
2 For Frank, poststructuralism is a continuation of, rather than a rupture from structuralism. Hence 
his term Neostrukturalismus. 
3 Cf. Frank (Das Sagbare und das Unsagbare; What is Neostructuralism? and Die Unhinter­
gehbarkeir von Individualitiit). - cf. 1. 1.7. Subjectivity and Meaning. 
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emergence of the hidden on the other hand. The function of Heidegger's destruction is to lay 
bare the origins of the truth of being. In destruction, says Derrida in his paper on Heidegger, 
Being is revealed. 
Following from Heidegger's thinking, which, according to Derrida, is still tied up with 
fundamental ontology and metaphysics, Derrida develops his conception of deconstruction 
which is, even more than Heidegger's destruction, marked by an inclusion of what it is eventu­
ally trying to overcome. l 
Derrida's ambivalent relation to the philosophical tradition, here only briefly mentioned, 
indicates first, a historical perspective and second, his understanding of reading as critique. 
This critical reading, however, does not aim to posit an oppositional other but rather emphasises 
the extrapolation of inherent contradictions within the text. 
Significant for a preliminary definition of deconstruction, with which I will be working in 
this dissertation, is therefore deconstruction's position after, or in context with, the linguistic 
{urn, the double or ambivalent relationship with the philosophical tradition, and the emphatic in­
sistence on the possibility of critique. 2 In the following, I will try to substantiate this basis with 
an analysis of deconstruction's theoretical foundations and strategic methods. 
1.1.2. Differance and Temporality 
Deconstruction's critique is aimed at the paradigms of philosophy as weII as of language and 
sign theory; the basis for this enterprise is a concept that is common to both and which works as 
a counter model: difftdrance. 3 
Derrida's neologism combines a double semantic: 'to differ' and 'to defer'. Differance is 
the radicalised product of a new reading of Saussure's structuralism; simultaneously, Derrida 
About the development of the word' deconstruction', cf. Leitch (Deconstructive Criticism: 63f[), 
and Frank (What is Neostructuralism?: 216f). - Harari criticises Derrida's choice of the word because of 
its alleged connotation of a falling back upon an old, fixed order (" Critical Factions/Critical Fictions": 
36f). As an alternative he proposes 'de-sedimentation' denominating a "technique of de-sedimenting the 
text in order to allow what was always already inscribed in its texture to resurface" (ibid.: 37). It remains 
unclear in what ways his alternative suggestion is different to Heidegger's 'destruction'. If one remem­
bers that Derrida, with his concept of displacement, tries to counter the connotation that Harari suspects 
(cf. 1.1.3. The Deconstructive Method), then Harari's disagreement does not seem justified. 
2 To me, this point seems to be of significance because especially in the course of the critique that 
claims deconstruction's neoconservatism the accusation was voiced that with the epistemological and the 
language theoretical premises, deconstruction was not able to analyse society critically (cf. Habermas, 
The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity). See also 1.1.8. Text and Textuality. 
3 I will keep the French term of Derrida's neologism, i.e. differance, in order to mark the distinction 
to the classical 'difference'. 
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falls back on Heidegger, Freud and Bataille (in Writing and Difference) to introduce temporality 
as the second condition for the constitution of meaning and consciousness in general. 
The French philosopher's argument, which in fact has been broadly accepted even by op­
ponents to deconstruction, I runs roughly as follows: meaning, as a meaningful presence, con­
stitutes itself, according to Saussure, only through a system of differences, in an endless process 
of ever-deferring signs. Exclusively its relation to all other elements of the system generates the 
value of a sign (Derrida, Of Grammatology: chap. 2). However, if meaning is not generated by 
the pure synchronicity of differences but in the temporal succession of the play of deferraL then 
every linguistic expression always contains a moment of deferral: the place of presence of 
meaning (and consciousness alike) is taken up by an original absence - the present is thus al­
ways already belated. Temporality is therefore fundamental for all understanding and meaning. 
Derrida's differance is not located on the same level as the oppositions that he detects in the 
history of philosophy but it is as a neither active nor passive, neither perceptual nor intelligible 
force the very basis of these oppositions; differance is the "constitutive, productive, and origi­
nary causality, the process of scission and division which would produce or constitute different 
things or differences" (Derrida, Margins of Philosophy: 9).2 He often describes differance visu­
ally as a gap or an interval with which it possesses a spatial as well as a temporal dimension. 
Contrary to a static modeL the French philosopher sees-in a definitely poststructuralist 
view-the differential operation as a three dimensional play, namely on the levels of langue and 
parole, and in the exchange between these two levels (Derrida, Writing and Difference: 17f). 
But its is only the bilateral co-operation between language system and language that provides for 
a theory explaining subjective understanding of meaning and for the innovative production of 
signification (which then can establish themselves in the language structure), in short: for the 
historical evolution of language. 
With this explication we therefore come across two crucial aspects of deconstruction with 
which Derrida goes beyond structuralism: the lack of subject in the production of meaning, i.e. 
the auto-production of language, and the concept of historicity, i.e. the temporality of language. 
The innovative character of deconstruction, however, is not yet explained by the radicalisa­
tion of the meaning generation exclusively through differences. There are indeed similar ideas 
to be found in, for example, Peirce's (to whom Derrida explicitly refers) and later in Eco's 
writings (A Theory of Semiotics). Deconstruction's speciality is not exhausted in the coupling of 
meaning-generation and deferral. On the contrary: from this combination Derrida develops a 
wholly new concept of language and ultimately questions, via the aspect of temporality, the very 
possibility of self-consciousness. 
For a further critique of the classical concept of the sign. cf. 1.1.4. Dissemination, for the sign­
theoretical relevance of differance, cf. Norris (Deconstrnction) and Frank (lVhat is Neostructuralism?). 
2 Cf. the representations of Eagleton (Literary Theory) and Ryan ("Self-Evidence"). 
I 
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The development of the notion of differance is an exemplary model for Derrida's critique of a 
philosophy that presumes origin and presence, which he understands as a categorical, funda­
mental critique. 
He introduces differance as a cluster l to avoid its classification as either a word or a con­
cept and to situate it instead on a quasi-transcendental level that allows thinking in concepts and 
oppositions. The cluster, says Derrida, means that differance cannot posit itself outside the to­
tality of the global semantic field, and that it has an intrinsic "strategy without finality" which 
protects it from any kind of dichotomization into coincidence and necessity (Derrida, "Oif­
ferance": 6 f) . 
The very fact that the neologism is created on a graphematic level, indiscernible to the ear, 
is crucial for Oerrida' s semantic operation. The graphematic modification (' difference' becomes 
'differance' )--the play of difference that remains silent-repeats in itself what is the most im­
portant aspect of differance: the gap divides two elements that paradoxically are only perceptible 
because of the silent differential interval (ibid.: 4). In a typical doubling, Derrida's innovation 
marks on the one hand the transition of difference, on the other the implicit inversion of the tra­
ditional prioritisation of speech and writing. Thus, the 'cluster' differance already hints at the 
deconstructive strategy as well as at the core of its critical endeavour: the emancipation of writ­
mg. 
Oerrida posits differance against the whole tradition of ontological thought when he states 
programmatically, "that it has neither existence nor essence. It derives from no category of be­
ing, whether present or absent" (ibid.: 6). Differance is therefore, in contrast to Culler's as­
sumption, not identical with a non-deceivable dialectics between presence and absence, but in 
fact it is what produces this opposition in the first place (Derrida, Of Grammatology: 46f). 
As a further category, whose separation from differance is difficult, Derrida introduces the 
arche-trace which marks the asymmetrical state of uncertainty between presence and absence, 
the integral movement of an in itself divided present: 
An interval must separate the present from what it is not in order for the present to be itself. 
but this interval that constitutes it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and 
of itself, thereby also dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on the basis of 
the present, that is, in our metaphysical language, every being, and singularly substance or the 
subject. In constituting itself, in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might be 
called spacing, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space (temporization). 
(Derrida, "Differance": 13) 
Taking up Husserl, Oerrida calls such "traces of protention and retention" (ibid.: 13) which ex­
plode a present that is thought as an isolated presence, arche-trace or arche-writing. 
Cf. Derrida ("Differance": 12n). I 
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If, in the conventional understanding of time, past appears as a modified presence, i.e. an expe­
rienced present, then with the concept of the trace Derrida starts even before the hierarchic op­
position of present and derived past: 
The concepts present, past and future, everything in the concepts of time and history which im­
plies evidence of them--the metaphysical concept of time in general--cannot adequately de­
scribe the structure of the trace. (Derrida, Of Grammatology: 67) 
As a part of the deconstructive undermining of the scientific variant of the thinking of presence. 
narnely the semantic static of terms, Derrida never offers a precise rendering of the concept; he 
thinks the (arche-)traee as an underlying movement, as the generating momentum of the Other, 
as the irreducible absence and the arbitrariness of the sign (ibid.: 46f). The separation from dif­
jeranee is, however, kept indistinct; in some places, Derrida seems to use both notions synony­
mously. j Elsewhere he calls the arehe-traee explicitly a 'concept' which exceeds the Ursprung­
sphilosophie, the philosophy of origin: "[ ... ] the trace is neither a ground, nor a foundation, nor 
an origin, and [ ... ] in no case can it provide for a manifest or disguised onto-theology ... 
This rejection, though, seems rather strangely more like an incantation of what Derrida 
hilllself in fact fails to do. Whether he, with his arehe-traee, can ultimately escape recourse to 
transcendental principles~an origin~remains questionable. 
The critique~that Derrida does not transcend an Ursprungsphilosophie~has been voiced 
several times; it is especially Habermas who criticises Derrida's uninhibited falling back on ar­
ehe-writing in the sense of a philosophy of origin and concludes: 
Against his will, he lays bare the inverted foundational ism of this thought [Heidegger's] by 
once again going beyond the ontological difference and Being to the difference proper to writ­
ing, which puts an origin already set in motion yet one level deeper. (Habermas, The Philo­
sophical Discourse on Modernity: 181) 
Habermas' critique is in so far legitimate as the status that the arehe-traee (as distinct from dif­
,terance) takes up in Derrida's theory of deconstruction remains blurred. Furthermore, the pro­
claimed parting from the thinking of an origin occurs predominantly rhetorically and is not de­
veloped systematically. Gasche, in contrast, attempts to systematise the arehe-traee within Der­
rida's thinking: 
The primordial structure of the arche-trace with its three functions is that which determines the 
scope and significance of deconstruction. This threefold structure simultaneously accounts for 
the possibility (and impossibility) of the self-presence of the present, of lime, and of sense. De­
construction aims at nothing less than producing such a primordial threefold structure that can 
I This fragility in Derrida' s conception of the arche-trace is partly mirrored by the critical literature: 
Culler and Norris, for example, accept the synonymous use of differance and arche-trace without ques­
tioning a deficiency in their differentiation. 
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account for the exteriority constitutive of three fundamental and interrelated topoi of Western 
Metaphysics: presence, time, and sense. Since Western Metaphysics conceives of these three 
concepts or ideas as generating themselves in a movement of unmediated auto-affection, the 
primordial structure of the arche-trace assumes the role of reinscribing them back into the non­
reflexive and non-present exteriority of the absolute other of the arche-trace. (Gasche, "Decon­
struction as Criticism": 194 f) 
The Other-non-identical and non-present-is not to be found in writing, or in the text (this is, 
according to Gasche, a common misunderstanding of superficial interpretations of Derrida): the 
arche-trace will therefore never 'come out' in a phenomenology (Derrida, Of Grammatology: 
61ff; Gasche, "Deconstruction as Criticism": 194f). It is defined as the irreducible, non­
phenomenal structure through which, with the dialectics of presence and absence, the opposition 
of empiricism and transcendentality I ideality is produced: 
[ ... J deconstruction begins when a concept that designates a real, empirically apprehensible ex­
perience and the concept of its "ideal" and phenomenal opposite that vouches for a transcen­
dental experience are explained by means of an irreducible non-phenomenal structure that ac­
counts for the difference under examination. [ ... ] Thus pointing out blanks, pauses, punctua­
tions, intervals, etc. that is to say negatives without which there is no signification, or in shon. 
establishing the textuality of a discourse, is not yet deconstruction. (Gasche, "Deconstruction as 
Criticism": 203) 
But with this, and this is Gasche critique of the notion's corruption in Anglo-American literary 
criticism, deconstruction as a method cannot be identical with merely detecting the disruptions 
of the Other which means that the argument would remain within the given frame of meta­
physics, or to be more precise, within the frame of the dialectical school of thought which Der­
rida tries to transcend. 
Concluding, we can characterise the arche-trace as the foundation of a theory that attempts 
to shift the traditional oppositions of philosophical thought, while at the same it describes their 
necessity as 'effect' of the movement of the arche-trace: the historical era of metaphysics and 
the thinking of presence is therefore the manifestation of just that movement that eventually mo­
tivates its transcendence the deconstruction of its constituting oppositions. Just as the arche­
trace is fundamental to the differential movement, it is in Derrida' s conception the basic mecha­
nism of the process of temporisation and spatialisation as principles of meaning and conscious­
ness in general. 
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1.1.3. The Deconstructive Method 
Derrida sees his conceptions of differance and arche-trace in fundamental oppOSItion to the 
logocentric and phonocentric thinking of the metaphysical era. In this global approach, "the 
metaphysical era" alludes rather imprecisely to the belief in the existence of a supersensory 
world, to thinking in principles, and to knowledge as a means of domination. The attribute 
'logocentric' then designates any kind of thinking that reverts to a point of reference system ex­
ternal to the system. Hence these conceptions are not used in the sense of scholarly periodisation 
but they rather indicate, following Ryan, "a permanent function of a kind of thinking which 
overlooks (that is, theorizes it away) its own historicity, differentiality, and materiality ( ... ]" 
(Ryan, Marxism and Deconstruction: 117). 
Within the general perspective on Derridean critique, further historical differentiation---in 
the sense of the shaping of metaphysical-Iogocentric thinking specific to the era--is required 
which Derrida delivers with his analyses of individual texts and authors of different eras. 
Distilling these studies about the idiosyncratic semantics of individual texts, we can per­
ceive a basic pattern of a rigorously kept twofold deconstructive procedure, which is also taken 
up--more or less rigidly-by the Yale Critics. Manfred Frank, explaining Derrida' s technique. 
says that 
he [Derrida] does it such a way that he estranges his subject matter by means of an interpretive 
procedure that goes against the grain. a procedure that from the standpoint of phenomenology 
appears to be a distortion, but which from the perspective of diagnostics, however, seems to 
divulge profitable new recognitions. (Frank, lVhat is Neostructuralism?: 222) 
Frank calls the deconstructive task "a tearing-down of the philosophical system and its recon­
struction on rearranged foundations" (ibid.: 6). The strategic procedure does therefore not aim 
at a substitution of a philosophical school by another, but at an inversion and displacement of an 
inherent structural order of concept that manifests itself in fixed hierarchic oppositions. 
Consequently, the method of deconstruction presents itself as an immanent critique. Gasche 
explains this critique's philosophical legitimisation: 
Deconstruction does not operate from an empirically present outside of philosophy since that 
outside is only the outside of philosophy. Deconstruction does not proceed from a phenomenol­
ogical existing exteriority (like literature, for instance) that would claim to represent the truth 
of philosophy, because that truth is only the truth of philosophy itself. In order to shake the 
heritage to which concepts belong, all the inherited concepts have, on the contrary, to be mo­
bilized. They are all indispensable. (Gasche, "Deconstruction as Criticism": 196) 
Mark Krupnick elucidates that the concept displacement is a central aspect in Derrida' s theory 
insofar as it characterises the unity of theoretical conception and strategy in deconstruction: as a 
second step to inversion follows displacement. At the same time the concept displacement itself 
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functions as a counter-idea (0 the metaphysical notion of presence: following Saussure and 
Freud, it expresses the infinite deferral of wish fulfilment as a survival strategy (Derrida, Writ­
ing and Difference; Of Grammatology), as well as the condition of civilisation on the whole. 
Derrida here uses consciously the two semantic components, deferral and displacement, i.e. 
with a displacement in which the identity of the displaced is never retained (Krupnick, Dis­
placement: 6). Put to a specific reading strategy, this means that a deconstructive reading pays 
careful attention to the suppressed and the excluded. 
What remains problematic in the theoretical conception of this strategy is the equalisation of 
semantic oppositions with metaphysical thinking; this. however, can be justified-with a henl1e­
nemic perspective--frol11 the reading: that which is marginalised by an established order proves 
to be an indicator of an 'un-thought' Other, of an excluded part of a hierarchical opposition. 1 
The' crisis', the alien (i.e. the intrusion of the excluded into the hermetically sealed inside of the 
prioritising part of a conceptual opposition) is declared an 'essential possibility'. Instances are, 
for example. the quote in speech act theory (Derrida, Writing and Difference; "Limited Inc ") or 
the non-phonetic elements of language in de Saussurian linguistics (Derrida, OJ Grammatology: 
chap. 2). 
Part of the suppressed and excluded are especially, according to Derrida, semantic ambi­
guities and rhetorical figures which, even though they appear [0 be mere ornamentation, can 
undermine a whole system of thought. In them, the contrary play of an intended semantic order 
and irs evading subversive textual logic manifests itself, which is exactly what a deconstructive 
reading attempts to demonstrate. 
Similarly, Miller formulates the place of deconstruction as the controversy between argu­
ment and rhetoric, theoretical concept and narrative discourse, by saying that "there is no con­
ceptual expression without figure, and no intertwining of concepts and figure without an implied 
narrative [ ... J". He concludes that "deconstruction is an investigation of what is implied by this 
inherence in one another of figure, concept, and narrative" (Miller, "The Critic as Host": 223).2 
; Cf. Leitch (Deco/1structive Criticism: 180). 
~ Leitch's presentation emphasises even more the impetus of the semantic displacement in this proc­
ess: "Whether employing a rhetorical or conceptual method of analysis, the deconstructive interpreter 
carefully traces and repeats certain elements in the text, which may include the figures, the concepts. or 
the motifs in a work. As he or she repeats the selected documents. the critic unleashes the disruptive 
powers inherel1l in all repetition. In other words, the critic through seemingly innocem repetiIion fore­
grounds and sets in motion the operation of difference, bringing into playa disorienting chain of substi­
(Utions and displacements that ultimately destabilize and decentre the text" (Deconslruclive Crilicism: 65). 
- As a suggestive example for this method, I think of the deconslructive argumentative strategy in 
Miller's essay in which he tries to re-think the traditional hierarchic relationship between literature and 
literary criticism. To this end, he brilliantly employs the tactics of inversion ("The Critic as Host": 222). 
Simultaneously. however, it becomes increasingly obvious how the essential second step of deconstruc­
tion, the displacement, is often bogged down in a mere rhetorical-polemical exercise: he indeed fails to 
work out the semantic displacement properly. The insight gained-the understanding in the dialectical 
relation of text and recipient (ibid.: 224f)-does not provide what has not already been postulated by 
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The perspective on the rhetorical undermining of the textual logic requires that in the course of 
the deconstructive procedure logic loses its typical dominance over rhetoric. With this premise, 
philosophical texts can be read as literary ones. Furthermore, Habermas concludes, philosophi­
calor theoretical texts can no longer be judged depending on their logical consistency but only 
according to their rhetorical proficiency (Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse on Modernily: 
223D. Deconstruction transcends, according to the conception of itself, a purely cognitive en­
deavour. This is why the deconstruction of the ontological structure of metaphysics cannot be 
described as an analytical method but as a critique of style. The text's rhetorical abundance of 
meaning turns against itself: 
Thanks to their rhetorical content, texts combed against the grain contradict what they state, 
such as the explicitly asserted of the primacy of signification over the sign, of the voice in rela­
tion to writing, of tile intuitively given and immediately present over the representative and the 
postponed-postponing. (ibid.: 189) 
Although Derrida emphatically adheres to a conception of critique, an obvious displacement that 
exceeds a purely cognitive-rational foundation is undeniable. 
Two consequences for the practice of deconstructive writing follow from the practice of de­
constructive reading: first, deconstruction requires, for its own production, the background of a 
pre-text whose semantic it can extrapolate and displace. Leitch describes this: 
Deconstruction is production. It is not self-effacing repetition or doubling commentary, al­
though it uses such methods along the way. It always works within the text and the intenext. 
But there it produces the imperceptible: the traces of the supplement, ror example. (Leitch, De­
constructive Criticism: 178) 
Second, Derrida' s way of writing is an interpretation of his concept of text; in this he increas­
ingly distances himself from his earlier scholarly/scientific style, as in Writing and Dzfference or 
in Of Grammatology, and tends toward a practice of delimited semantics which tries to situate 
its own discourse outside the logocentric system, e.g. in Tympan or Glass. 
Part of this is the play with semantic ambiguities and etymological derivations and the re­
fusal of clear definitions. Thus Derrida's changing use of words 'pharmacon' (Dissemination: 
Of Grw!1l/latology), and 'supplement' (Margins of Philosophy; Writing and Difference; Of 
Grmlllllatology) can be understood as attempts to evade semantic fixation: the words mean si­
multaneously the inside and the outside, deficiency and excess. In Spurs: The Styles of 
Nietzsche, Derrida reflects upon this mode of thinking and writing. He quotes Heidegger's in­
terpretation of Kietzsche's text History of an Error in Twilight of the Idols, "How the 'True 
'traditional' litcrary theories, such as hermeneutics or reception aesthetics. Considering deconstruction's 
radical claim, Miller's attack falls short and, at best, only assaults its most vulnerable opponent, the New 
Criticism. 
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World' Finally Became a Fable," as a paradigm of a text in which the transcendence of, in con­
trast to a simple retreat from, the conceptual oppositions is accomplished: 
In his consideration of the problematic of Umdrehung Heidegger emphasises the very strongest 
of torsions, that in which the opposition which has been submitted to reversal is itself sup­
pressed [,..]. What must occur then is not merely a suppression of all hierarchy. for an-archy 
only consolidates just as surely the established order of a metaphysical hierarchy: nor is it a 
simple change or reversal in the terms of any given hierarchy. Rather. the Umdrehung must be 
a transformation of the hierarchical structure itself. (Derrida, Spurs: 81) 
But if it is important to avoid the fixation of hierarchies, or an 'origin' (which, for instance, 
would be the development of a new concept of truth) respectively, the writing practice has to be 
one of heterogeneity, and Derrida' s discourse proves this: 
For the reversaL if it is not accompanied by a discrete parody, a strategy of writing, or differ­
ence or deviation in quills, if there is no style, no grand style, this is finally bur the same thing, 
nothing more than a clamorous declaration of the antithesis. (ibid.: 95) 
However. Derrida's usage of language is especially due to the imitations of his followers in 
"danger of becoming another form of accepted signification and thus falling into the very trap it 
denounces" (Harari, "Critical Factions": 36). 
The possibility of a new re-inscription of linguistic fixations is also considered by Derrida, 
even if he is probably not concerned with the reduced copies of his own writings in the dis­
courses of his adepts; this re-inscription is named as the essential aporia of the deconstructive 
method on the whole: even in its own practice of a 'close reading' deconstruction is not capable 
to free itself from all oppositions; even when displaced it necessarily re-inscribes them. 
This contradiction is inherent to the method of immanent critique, of handicraft work, I.e. 
an operation of concepts whose truth-value is disputed. In this, Habermas sees a relation to 
Adorno's negative dialectics: "The tools of thought, which miss the 'dimension of non-identity' 
are nevertheless the only available means for uncovering their own insufficiency'" (Habermas, 
Tile Philosophical Discourse on Modernity: 185). One has to be careful, though, to stress that 
this relationship lies rather in the strategy of thinking, namely to dissolve fixed conceptual bar­
riers, than in the argument from the point of view of content. I 
The 'infiniteness' of the deconstructive process is therefore generated by the paradox of the 
attempt to use language to deconstruct linguistic constructs, i.e. to try to find it guilty of its 
metaphysical presumptions. 
lOne could maintain, though, that formal ('immanent critique') as well as contents parallels exist: 
whether Derrida' s dijJerance can be set equal to Adorno's nOIl-idelllical is a question which would have 
to be more closely examined than this dissertation allows for. 
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The aporia that is postulated by Derrida is far-reaching insofar as it theoretically establishes the 
dialectics of language scepticism also of other (post)modern discourses: articulated language 
scepticism itself requires a self-deconstructive discourse which, due of its semantic deferral 
character, concludes in an infinite spiral. 
1.1.4. Dissemination - Language as Decentred Structure 
In his early essay "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" (deliv­
ered as a lecture in 1966), Derrida programmatically announces his departure from structural­
ism. especially from Levi-Strauss' structural anthropology. He later refined his argument's lin­
guistic basis ("Limited Inc"; Writing and Phenomenon; OJ Grammato[ogy). 
As Derrida sees himself in so far as a productive recipient of Levi-Strauss, and elsewhere 
of Saussure, as he attempts not only to invalidate their theories but to free them from their 
metaphysical rudiments and to thus radicalise them (c1'. Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play": 
282). His multi-levelled critical approach is directed in particular at Levi-Strauss' structural 
modeL at Saussure and Husserl' s concept of the sign, and at the dominance of speech over 
writing with which both linguistics and pragmatist theories of understanding customarily work. 
The sketching of Derrida' s different threads of argument will serve, in the following. as 
evidence that the development of his poststructuralist theory of the sign and of language is 
roored in the philosophical tradition. 
As a representative of taxonomic structuralism, Levi-Strauss is positioned"on the edges of 
the passing episteme" (Leitch, Deconstructive Criticism: 32) of metaphysical thinking: although 
his structural thought is based on the notion of differentiality, Levi-Strauss is unable to rid him­
self of the idea of an organising centre or of a structural origin, says Derrida (Derrida. Writing 
and D{lference: 281). This, being ultimately trapped in a philosophy of origin, leads Levi­
Strauss. according to Derrida, to deduce the binary oppositions 'nature vs. civilisation' and, 
analogously. 'speech vs. writing' (ibid.: 279ff; OJ Grarmnatology: 10 It). 
Derrida. in contrast, defines his notion of structure with the features 'decentred' and 
'structural openness', without recurring to underlying principles of order or universal rules. It is 
only by his departure from Levi-Strauss (and, similarly. from Saussure) that Derrida can de­
velop a conception of himself as a poststructuralist, so that any undertaking to differentiate be­
tween structuralism and poststructuralism will have to start at this very point. I 
Harari. in contrast, sees the split between structuralism and poststructuralism in the transcending 
or the representative model of language while the deconstructive critique of the notion of subject had al­
rcady been introduced by structuralism (" Critical Factions": 29). However, he does not acknowledge the 
i 
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Norris, in turn, sees the difference between structuralism and poststructuralism not so much in 
the transcendence of the dualistic concept of the sign or of the notion of a centred structure, but 
predominantly in the transformation of the ontological notion of structure into a methodological 
one. 1 While especially the conservative variant of structuralism operates with the equalisation of 
structure and mental competence or reality, 2 poststructuralism no longer infers this correspon­
dence of theoretical model and (psychological) reality (Norris, Deconstruction: I). Deconstruc­
tion, Norris concludes, negates the "assumed correspondence between mind, meaning and the 
concept of method which claims to unite them" (ibid.: 3). 
This view is contradicted by Levi-Strauss' emphasis on the hypothetical character of his 
conceptions. The problem of the ontological versus the methodological approach marks, to a 
certain degree, both structuralist and poststructuralist concepts. Even if Derrida himself avoids 
ontological concepts, the literary criticism variant of poststructuralism is indeed principally con­
cerned with the critique of the concept of structure as centred, non-individual and invariable (cf. 
Barthes, S/Z), as for example when criticising narratology (as reconstruction of trans-individual 
textual structures); the problem of a concept of structure's purely heuristic function is nonethe­
less never the focus of its reflections. 
Levi-Strauss' thinking of origins, which contradicts his concept of structure (in which the 
identity of its elements is only constituted by the relation to other elements) is, according to 
Derrida's comprehensive argument, comparable to Saussure' s adherence to the classical dualis­
tic concept of the sign. 
In contrast to Saussure' s theory of the arbitrariness of the sign and the indivisibility of its 
two components3 , the integration of the classical concept of the sign already implies the division 
of signifier and signified, say Derrida. To talk about a dualistic concept of the sign would come 
close to a tautology (Derrida, Of Grammatology: 13). The assumed totality is actually a hetero­
geneity in which the order of the signified is never simultaneous with the order of the signifier. 
Saussure's entanglement with the implications of a metaphysical concept of the sign neces­
sarily demands, following Derrida--in spite of Saussure's original intention-, first, the priori­
tisation of the signified (the intelligible) over the signifier (the material) and second, the privi­
leging of the sign's phonetic aspect which, in contrast to writing, keeps a close proximity to the 
logos. Temporality is always implied4-the sign refers to a no-Ionger-present-while the classi­
fact that the latter, with its phonocentric foundations, firmly embraces the concept of a speaking subject: 
even though structuralism is situated after the 'linguistic turn' it does not surpass the metaphysical think­
ing of a subject, as Derrida proves in his reading of Saussure. 
I am referring here to Eco's discussion of 'ontological' vs. 'methodological' structuralism (A The­
ory of Semiotics). 
2 Norris sees, for example, Culler as a representative (Deconstruction: 7). 
3 Saussure compares' signifier' and' signified' as the two sides of the same leaf. 
4 Cf. Samuel Weber's contention that Saussure's theory of language includes temporality as an indi­
visible dimension of synchronicity ("Closure and Exclusion": 39f). 
I 
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cal conception subsumes the supplement as 'derived' under an absolute presence (Derrida, Mar­
gins oj Philosophy; OJ Grammatology: chap. 2). 
Derrida interprets this pattern of thinking as the core of metaphysical thought by accusing 
Saussure's concept of the sign of falling back upon a notion of the absolute: "The sign and di­
vinity have the same place and time of birth. The age of the sign is essentially theological" 
(Derrida, OJ Grammatology: 14). 
Derrida explains that in the era of rationalism the notion of the divine as absolute presence, 
or as the presence of the absolute, becomes the subject's phonocentric self-presence for which 
the linguistic expression itself is in fact only secondary, i.e. merely a medium for the subject's 
desire for a primarily ideal expression. The notion of the voice's self-affection in the immediate 
articulation of speech mirrors the telos of an unbroken self-presence therefore the prioritisa­
tion of the phonic aspect of the sign (Derrida, "Signature, Event, Context"; "Limited Inc"; 
Speech and Phenomenon; OJ Grammatology). 
The separation of the sign into a mere material exteriorisation of sound and an immediate 
meaning that is derived from a present subjectivity is also the underlying principle of Husserl's 
differentiation between 'expression' as a pure carrier of meaning devoid of communicative 
function which assumes the identity of meaning, and exterior 'Anzeichen' or indicative sign 
(Derrida, Speech and Phenomenon: 17, 32ft). Yet meaning and expression are, in Husserl' s 
idealistic understanding, transformations of a pre-expressive intentionality. I 
The concept of the sign is therefore based on a metaphysical notion of a pre-linguistic self­
realisation that in itself is rooted in the supposition of a presence as a point in the moment 
(ibid.: 62). 
However, in attempting to explain the pre-expression of the intentional acts and their rela­
tion to the linguistic expression, Husser! cannot maintain the supposition of a sphere of a pure 
consciousness that is independent of linguistic communication without contradicting himself: 2 as 
the expression in linguistic communication has to realise itself in the Anzeichen, the indicative 
sign, Husser! has to suspend the communicative function of language - in favour of a concep­
tion of a fulfilled expression in monologic speech. To avoid that Ausdruck, expression, is sepa­
rated from the subject's immediate self-presence by mixing it with the function of the indicative 
sign, 3 its communicative dimension is truncated. Derrida concludes that with this move Husser! 
implicitly abandons his sign concept's differentiation in Ausdruck and Anzeichen: 
1 I am referring here to the comprehensive presentations of Derrida's critique of Husserl in Haber­
mas (The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity: 167ff) and Gasche ("Deconstruction as Criticism'" 
189ft). 
2 Cf. Habermas' critique of Husserl (The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity: 167ff). 
3 Derrida interprets the differentiation of Ausdruck and Anzeichen, which remains diffuse in 
Husserl's thought, as meant purely functional. 
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The reduction to the monologue is really a putting of the empirical worldly existence between 
brackets. In "solitary mental life" we no longer use real (wirklicJz) words, but only imagined 
(vorgestellt) words. And lived experience-about which we were wondering whether it might 
no be "indicated" to the speaking subject by himself-does not have to be so indicated because 
it is immediately certain and present to itself. While in real communication existing signs indi­
cate other existences which are only probable and mediately evoked, in the monologue, when 
expression is full, nonexistent signs show significations (BedeuTungen) that are ideal (and thus 
nonexistent) and certain (for they are presented to intuition). (ibid.: 43) 
Derrida's critique now is that Husserl's phenomenology, just like Saussure's, can only maintain 
the metaphysical separation of pre-expressive intentionality and expressive linguistic significa­
tion as a supplement of a present-presence by paying the high cost of inherent contradictions. 
The priority that Saussure concedes to speech forces him to consider any workings of writ­
ing upon speech as 'usurpation', as eruption of the outside of the inside' (Derrida, Of Gramma­
tology: 34).1 With his polemic against Saussure's evaluation and elimination of the problem of 
writing, Derrida demonstrates the affinities of the Saussurian problem as a dominant theme in 
occidental thought. 
Saussure's adherence to the notion of presence, whether conceived of as presence of 
meaning or self-affection of the voice, stands, like Levi-Strauss' organising centre, in stark 
contrast to his theory that sense and meaning are exclusively constituted by differentiality: as 
soon as the indicated has 'value' as a linguistic construct, i.e. that can be thought at all, it takes 
its place within the system, is thus no longer outside, is not a centre, but an element whose 
meaning is generated only through the difference to all other elements. The movement of differ­
entiality therefore does not manifest itself as a fixed binary opposition but as a sequence of dif­
ferences that in the play of differentiality have to undergo constant transformations. 
The deconstruction of a fixed point that would escape the influence of differentiality dis­
solves the separation of signifier and signified, of intelligibility and materiality; the production 
of meaning in the signification system is understood as an infinite process of semiosis, of the re­
ferral of one signifier to another. 2 
Derrida does not really present a semiotic foundation for his concept of meaning­
constitution, but refers explicitly to Peirce's tripartite concept of the sign and especially to the 
function of the 'interpretant' (ibid.: 48ff). In this regard, it remains unclear to what extent he 
transcends Peirce's thoughts. Derrida seems to have appropriated Peirce's theory of the concep­
tion of meaning and reduced its dimension of the object relation. In the French philosopher's 
understanding, the difference between signifier and signified is not a qualitative one but one that 
1 As an example, Derrida names Saussure's rejection of graphically registered rules of pronuncia­
tion. 
2 The prominent aspect of deferral in the meaning-constituting process finds its place in Derrida' s 
leitmOTiv of the supplemenT: the supplemenT denotes a lack while at the same time it produces, in trying to 
augment this deficiency, a surplus in this case the infinity of the linguistic system. 
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is dependent on context. Every linguistic element can function as ' interpretant', i.e. as some­
thing indicated, to which is referred to; simultaneously, it itself is indicating something that is 
not the last link: in the semantic chain, but which requires an 'interpretant' itself. It is embedded 
in an infinite, multidimensional context of referral. The dualistic concept of the sign is reduced 
to a monadic entity that confers, as Culler says, a certain 'autonomy' to the signifier (Culler, 
On Deconstruction: 189). 
The structure's radical temporisation begs the question whether a code model of language, 
to which critics of the taxonomic structuralism like Barthes and Eco adhere and which Der­
rida-with his notion of the decentred structure-only seems to modify, has to be abandoned. 
The merits of interpreting language as structure and code are becoming dubious in light of the 
increasing poststructuralist 'liquefaction'. When dealing with Eco's semiotic theory, Ray main­
tains that 
From a theoretical point of view, unlimited semiosis puts into question the pre-eminence of the 
code over the act of sign production. If the code is neither 'a natural condition of the Global 
Semantic Universe nor a stable structure underlying the complex oj links and branches of every 
semiotic process' [ ... J, but rather a momentary 'magnetization' of cultural units that arise out of 
usage, its value as the end of all semiotic is difficult to maintain - as is the objective superiority 
of such analysis over more traditional forms of inquiry. (Ray, Literary Meaning: 126) 
Derrida's deconstruction of the classical sign concept, and subsequently of the category of 
'meaning', initiated a far-reaching controversy in academic circles which was initially marked 
by accusations that he had neglected pragmatics, later by a general confusion of 'deconstruction 
of meaning' with 'negation of meaning'. The prioritisation of the signifier does in no way in­
tend a negation of content, but is instead a critique of the representative model of language. The 
latter is based on the assumption that signs are representations of elementa!"y perceptions of the 
senses or of elementary (and intrinsic) ideas of the human mind, i.e. they bestow meaning (as a 
supplement, for communicative reasons) to entities that are, by themselves and without signifi­
cation, immediate to the mind. If this were so, u1e universal rules of grammar would apply 
equally to the rules of human reason. 
Derrida does by no means get rid of the category of meaning; what he negates is the imme­
diate relation between object and linguistic sign (whether as objective reality or mental imagina­
tion). Deconstruction of meaning does therefore not imply non-reference as condition of the 
possibilzty of the function of language and infinity of the semantic play of referral. I The post­
structuralist concept of semiosis, which claims the limitless of semantic processes, does not void 
Cf. Derrida (Spurs: 134). -American deconstruction shares, in fact intensifies, Derrida's critique 
of the representative linguistic model, whereas Foucault, even if he enriches it with the dimension of re­
flexivity, is bound to it. Frank (What is Neostructuralism: 150ft) and Sloterdijk ("Michel FoucauIts 
strukturale Theorie der Geschichte": 175) have proven that Foucault cannot be called a neo- or post­
structuralist due to his conception of language. 
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language of content or meaning. On the contrary, the problem of linguistic meaning is that it is 
infinite and no longer calculable in the flow of its differential relations otherwise, it would be 
a language in which all meanings are calculated simultaneously. The problem of escaping the 
limits of language becomes, then, the problem of determining all meanings. 
If one considers that referential semantics is generally seen as having been overcome (Eco, 
A TheOl)' of Semiotics), it seems necessary to shift the discussion about the problem of meaning 
to two central implications of Derrida' s approach: first, with the abolishment of the referential 
character of language and the proof that non-literary texts also employ rhetoric, the systematic 
differentiation between literary and non-literary text can no longer be maintained. Second, the 
methodological premises of text interpretation have to shift, considering the un-limitable plural­
ity of meanings in the sense of an eventually un-controllable. or 'un-reconstructable', referential 
network. There can be no doubt that with these shifts deconstruction vigorously attacks the 
theoretical foundations of the New Criticism. However, it will have to be examined to what ex­
tent Derrida' s text-theoretical premises are reasons enough for a radical revision, if not an abo­
lition, of the hermeneutic technique. 
Beginning with the decentred conception of sign and structure, which does not require a 
transcendental signified, Derrida develops his notion of play. 
Play is the disruption of presence. The presence of an element is always a signifying and sub­
stitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences and the movement of a chain. Play is 
always play of absence and presence, but if it is to be thought radically, play must be conceived 
of before the alternative of presence and absence. (Derrida. "Structure, Sign. and Play": 292) 
This programmatic definition is crucial to a metatheoretical reflection and a historical situating 
of deconstruction. The fact that the notion of play is to represent an epistemological and semi­
otic model of a structure without centre--without transcendental signified-markS Derrida as a 
poststructuralisr. Beyond this, his definition demands (following Nietzsche) a thinking ofplayas 
the joyful affirmation of the lack of origin. 
This second dimension of play achieves the association with Lyotard' s concept of postmod­
ern ism, which centrally rests on a notion of linguistic play, or language games, too, and which 
calls for the autonomy and the lack of legitimisation of discourses (Lyotard: The Postmodem 
Condition: 79ff). It seems strange that neither the supporters of deconstruction nor the critical 
discussion of postmodernism raised this relationship. I 
With this perspective we can tentatively interpret Derrida' s notion of playas follows: with 
the shifting from an epistemological and semiotic base to a Lyotardian historical-sociological 
I An exception is Umbeno Eco who describes the analogy between his semiosis system and the 
analysis of postmodern novelistic techniques as a multidimensional labyrinth (A Theory of Semiotics; The 
Name of the Rose). However, I might be missing threads of the discussion around postmodern­
ism! deconstruc tion. 
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point of view, the affirmation of the lack of origin seems to be a specific aspect of postmodern­
ism and more or less as paradigm of socio-discursive reality. Derrida's theory of the end of the 
metaphysical era (Of Grammatology; Margins of Philosophy) can be understood, with Lyotard, 
as the entry into postmodernism (Lyotard, Postmodern Condition: I Iff). This placing of decon­
struction is possible in Lyotard' s understanding of postmodernism as the era after the loss of the 
grand emancipatory or historio-philosophical narratives which legitimise the various linguistic 
games (ibid.: 15ff). The immanent reflexive movement of discourse, as exemplified by decon­
struction, matches (on an epistemological level) Lyotard's paradigm of the postmodern dis­
course which can only itself produce its own legitimatisation: "[ ... ] the striking feature of post­
modern scientific knowledge is that the discourse on the rules validate it is (explicitly) immanent 
to it" (ibid.: 159). 
That the thinking of differance becomes possible only now appears against the background 
of the concept of postmodernism as a symptom of transformation from modernism to postmod­
ernism which has to do without a framing grand meta-discourse (e.g. the self-presence of the 
subject). (Derrida' s recourse to the philosophical tradition shows at the same time that this tran­
scendence has always already been inherent in metaphysical thought.) The loss of Enlighten­
ment's sociological 'legitimisation narratives', as Lyotard postulates, opens new ways of think­
ing beyond a discourse that has an inherent compulsion to fall back upon an organising centre. It 
is only in the era of postmodernism that structure without centre, language without subject and 
transcendental signified in general become imaginable, and can, in retrospective, be projected 
onto previous epochs. Derrida himself implicitly talks about such a historical perspective when 
claiming that the beginning of writing is only now beginning to be felt (Derrida, Of Grammatol­
ogy: 6ff; Spurs). I 
1.1.5. Iterability of the Sign and Grammar of the Text 
In his discussion of speech act theory, Derrida widens his critique of Husserl and Saussure' s 
idealistic-phonocentric sign concept. Furthermore, he develops a deconstructive conception of 
the sign that is defined by the essential possibility of the absence of an intentional conscious­
ness. 
He argues, for example, similarly in his essay "The Ends of Man". 
2 Derrida's argument about speech act theory took predominantly place in a debate with Searle that 
was published by Glyph. This debate was in turn provoked by the publication of his essay "Signature 
Event Context" which is a critique of Austin. 
2 
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From the realisation that infelicity and citation are structural possibilities of each speech act, 
Derrida develops two fundamental objections: 
The intentional consciousness that is already stricken with temporal belatedness cannot gov­
ern the pragmatic context in the moment of the expression - context is infinite. 
A further (potential) destabilisation follows from the fact that every sign can be taken out of its 
'original' context and be used in a new, unforeseen context. A moment of non-identity is thus 
always already an inherent quality of every linguistic element. 1 The danger of citation is the 
"internal and positive condition of possibility" (Derrida, "Signature Event Context": 17) of 
every speech act. Like citation, which in light of the deconstruction of intentionality and con­
textual definition informs every utterance, every understanding becomes misunderstanding in 
the sense that the 'true' meaning can never be present and neither its semantic nor its pragmatic 
embedding can ever be verifiable. 
Yet, whether Derrida would follow Culler's apodictic judgement that'" Serious' behaviour 
is a special case of role-playing" (Culler, On Deconstruction: 119) in any other way than pro­
vocatively is dubious. For Derrida argues on the level of structural conditions of the possibility 
of the production of performative utterances, and of the systematic classification of speech acts, 
"If conventions are, in fact, never entirely adequate, [ ... J if language can always 'normally' be­
come its own 'abnormal' object, does this not derive from the structural iterability of the 
mark?" (Derrida, "Limited Inc a b c": 82) 
Iterability-as structural possibility of the sign separated from its context--deconstructs the 
concept of a meaningful present intentionality; it produces the difference of the sign to itself: 
Iterability supposes a minimal remainder (as well as a minimum of idealization) in order that 
the identity of the selfsame be repeatable and identifiable in, through, and even in view of its 
alteration. For the structure of iteration--and this is another of its decisive traits-implies both 
idemity and difference (ibid.: 53). 
The notion of the marque, which Derrida wants to be understood as a counter-concept to the 
representational model of language, includes the two moments of the sign-identity and differ­
ence-; the marque restante describes that minimal remainder of the 'sign-container' without 
which the continuity of communication and of transmission would be unthinkable, yet through 
which the respective meanings are simply just welded to their 'container'. The graphematic 
structure of all signs-and nothing else is iterability--destroys the self-presence of intention as 
well as the pure ideality of meaning. It negates the perception of something that can be indi­
1 Leitch summarises this point: "Beyond the subject and his intentionality and past particular mo­
mems of tradition and history, the cited or reiterated sign breaches the border of one enclosure and gets 
(mis)read into others. Signs live on. Comexts pass away. The play of context is illimitable" (Deconstruc­
tive Criticism: 161). 
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vidually meant which would escape the structural principle of iterability (ibid.: 61 D. Derrida 
summarises his position in this debate: 
What is limited by iterability is not intentionality in general, but its character of being con­
scious or present to itself (actualized, fulfilled, and adequate), the simplicity of its features, its 
undividedness. (ibid.: 105) 
Derrida's variant of the concept of intentionality is decisive for the rejection of the category 
'authorial intention' in deconstructive criticism. 
To a certain degree, however, Derrida does not get rid of authorial intention - he merely 
questions its text-controlling status as well as its hermeneutic reconstructibility. He explains, for 
example, that the question whether Plato consciously manipulated the fluctuation of the pharma­
con's semantics is not answerable (Derrida, Dissemination: 95D. The consequence of iterability 
is therefore not the absence of intentionality but the obliteration of its wholeness and its system­
atic reconstructibility. What is true for the individual sign is likewise true for the speech act: 
communication is only possible because of the iterability of the performatives (as elements of 
the pragmatic meta-code), which then gives up the individual in favour of the general. Even the 
reference to a context does not allow a safe reconstruction of the speech act's intended meaning 
because, being structurally open, it evades the fixations of a closed regulatory system. 
Pointing out the background of his universal pragmatics, Habermas confronts Derrida that 
the process of understanding remains unproblematic as long as the communicating partners be­
lieve in the possibility of understanding. He provides, however, only a weak explanation for his 
concept of intersubjective understanding as contra-factual condition of communication: "Under 
the pressure for decisions proper to the communicative practice of everyday life, participants 
are dependent upon agreements that co-ordinate their actions. n (Habermas, The Philosophical 
Discourse on Modernity: 198). Formulated somewhat more strongly, he tries to substantiate his 
thesis: 
The interpreter does not impose this idea on his object; rather, with the performative attitude of 
a participant observer, he takes it over from the direct participants, who can act communica­
tively only under the presupposition of intersubjectively identical ascriptions of meaning" (ibid.: 
198). 
This mutual consensus of the communicating partners, namely that an all-encompassing idealis­
ing supposition is the basic condition of all language games, would be open for criticism on the 
basis of the validity claimed by Habermas (ibid.: 196ft). 
Habermas, on the other hand, seems to misunderstand the level of Derrida's argument 
which refers to the structural conditions for the possibility of the sign's functioning. As his for­
mulation of the intersubjectively identical meaning-attribution already shows, Habermas', with 
his universal-pragmatist defence of the concept of understanding, misses the core of deconstruc­
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tive critique: notwithstanding Derrida's compelling argument against the presumption of identi­
cal meanings, he still utilises exactly this notion in his counter-concept as if it did not required 
any further explication. 
Habermas' critique, which I have here sketched as a representation of the controversy! that 
is prevalent in the whole of literary criticism, suffers from its ignorance of Derrida's decon­
struction of centrally pragmatist categories, such as identity, meaning, and verifiability or recon­
structibiliry of contexts. Consequently, Habermas' critique necessarily falls short of Derrida's 
level of discussion. 
In a second step in his deconstruction of linguistic meaning and intersubjective understand­
ing, Derrida deduces from the iterability of the sign the necessity for "a certain generalization 
and a certain displacement of the concept of writing" (Derrida, "Signature Event Context": 
310). Writing is not to be understood as a secondary medium that is subordinate to speech, as it 
in fact goes beyond this special field of semantic communication. Derrida develops his thesis of 
the general graphematic character of speech (Derrida, Of Grammatology: 30ft) against Saus­
sure's exclusion of writing from linguistics, its characterisation as a 'pathological' and 'violent' 
intrusion of the outside. That which traditionally reduced writing to a supplement, namely iter­
ability and an essential functionality even with the absence of recipients, is an intrinsic quality 
of every sign (Derrida, Margins of Philosophy: 134). Iterabi lity is the structural condition of the 
possibility of the function of language in general. Derrida re-thinks writing's devaluation to a 
signifier of a signifier, when he argues 
that "signifier of the signifier" no longer defines accidental doubling and fallen secondarity. 
"Signifier of the signifier" describes on the contrary the movement of language: in its origin, to 
be sure, but one can already suspect that an origin whose structure can be expressed as "signi­
fier of the signifier" conceals and erases itself in its own production. (Derrida, Of Grammatol­
ogy: 7) 
In the potential absence of intention and reference, the semantic sign acquires its meaning solely 
through its syntactic context; this can however, and this is what the principle of iterability 
states, be doubly refracted: 
This force of rupture is due to the spacing which constitutes the written sign: the spacing which 
separates it from other elements of the internal contextual chain (the always open possibility of 
its extraction and grafting), but also from all forms of a present referent (past or to come in the 
1 An argument similar to Habermas' (if theoretically less profound) is the basis for most critical dis­
cussions of deconstruction: e.g. Abrams ("The Deconstructive Angel": 429), Norris (Deconstruction) or 
Butler (Interpretation, Deconstruction and Ideology). 
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modified form of the present past or to come) that is objective or subjective. (Derrida, "Signa­
ture Event Context": 317)1 
With the extended concept of writing, deconstruction links text theory with sign theory. On both 
levels we can find the suspension of reference; at the same time, however, both Derrida and de 
Man (in contrast to other representatives of American deconstruction) emphasise the necessity 
of illusion of reference as present meaning. 2 
De Man explains the discrepancy between referential and figurative textual modes, analo­
gously to Derrida's iterability, with its grammar, i.e. its being-bound to a fundamental code. 
Granunar is the structural condition for the possibility of textual meaning, but simultaneously, 
in the abstraction of the individual text, it suspends its referentiality. "Just as no text is conceiv­
able without grammar, no grammar is conceivable without the suspension of referential mean­
ing" (de Man, Allegories of Reading: 268f). 
If one understands text as discourse, i.e. as a linguistic structure whose smallest constitut­
109 units are sentences, then an analogy of de Man's grammar and Derrida' s iterability as 
structural quality of the sign is obvious:) as guarantor of a certain identity of meaning, both 
Derrida and de Man's concept always implies non-reference and abstraction of an individual 
generation of meaning. 
The insight into the exclusively differential and graphematic structure of all languages dou­
bly revises the concept of (intersubjective) meaning. Derrida describes the semantic exploding 
which is produced by the auto-referential, and simultaneously intertextual, movement of lan­
guage: 
A writing that refers back only to itself carries us at the same time, indefinitely and systemati­
cally, to some other writing. At the same time: this is what we must account for. A writing that 
refers only to itself and a writing that refers indefinitely (0 some other writing might appear 
noncontradictory; the reflecting screen never captures anything but writing, indefinitely, stop­
ping nowhere, and each reference still confines us within the element of reflection. Of course. 
But the difficulty arises in the relation between the medium of writing and the determination of 
each textual unit. It is necessary that while referring each time to another text, (0 another de­
terminate system, each organism only refer to itself as a determinate structure: a structure that 
is open and closed at the same time. (Derrida, Dissemination: 202) 
He speaks about a scattering of meaning--dissemination--because the differential movement of 
the text can never be fixed. 4 A text refers to itself and at the same time to other texts. The ques-
J About the origin-Iessness of language, cf. Derrida ("The Linguistic Circle of Geneva," in Derrida, 
Margins of Philosophy). 
2 Cf. Derrida (Spurs) and de Man (Allegories ofReading: 51). 
J This is not supposed to be an equation but a fundamental correspondence within the frames of the 
two respective concepts. 
4 Said defines this effect of dissemination, which replaces the concept of meaning, as "the power of 
textuality to burst through semantic horizons." It produces "the perpetual disruption of writing, maintains 
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tion about its boundaries thus becomes undecidable. For interpretation, however, this means that 
dissemination, which Derrida posits against the traditional concept of polysemie, I radically con­
tradicts every conception of the semantic totality of text. Meaning dissolves into a web of tex­
tual auto-reflexivity and intertextuality. 
1.1.6. History as Transformation of Structure 
So far, Derrida has done little to clarify the socio-historical dimension of deconstruction. In the 
following, a rough sketching of Foucault's understanding of history will show the implications 
for the global thematic field that arise from the poststructuralist concept of structure. By reject­
ing the criticism that deconstruction is ahistorical, we can thus gain a perspective that allows us 
to think about the concept of structure in terms of history and to consider which critical poten­
tial there is at the disposal of poststructuralist discourse analysis. 
As it is this dissertation's objective to link Derrida with a historical perspective, I will dis­
pense with a systematic introduction of Foucault's concepts2 as well as with a subsequent dis­
cussion of his theories' inherent contradictions. 3 In addition, I will leave out differences to Der­
rida in favour of a 'field' that is common to both philosophers. 4 
The insight into the structurality of structure requires the renunciation of any meta­
historical frame of orientation beyond that of linguistic differentiality. Thus for Foucault,5 his-
the fundamental undecidability of texts whose real power resides [ ... ] in the possibility of their infinite 
generality and multiplicity" (The World, The Text, and the Critic: 204f). 
I "If there is thus no thematic unity or overall meaning to reappropriate beyond the textual instances, 
no textual message located in some imaginary order, intentionality, or lived experience. then the text is 
no longer the expression or representation [ ... ] of any truth that would come to diffract or assemble itself 
in the polysemie of literature" (Derrida. Dissemination: 262). 
2 For funher clarifications of these, cf. Sioterdijk ("Michel Foucaults strukturale Theorie der 
Geschichte"), and Frank (What is Neoslructuralism ?). 
3 Especially Frank's question whether, or to what extent, Foucault with his retaining of the repre­
sentational model of language can be ascribed to neostructuralism. Foucault, thus goes Frank's delinea­
tion of the central contradiction of his theory, on the one hand posits 'subjectlessness' and discontinuity 
as paradigms of his non-teleological concept of history; on the other, he criticises post-classical thought. 
which he defines as the 'intrusion' of discontinuity, for it abandons the representational concept of lan­
guage (What is Neostructuralism?: 118ff). 
4 The major differences in the respective concepts of text will be discussed in 1.1.8. Text and Tex­
tuality. 
5 According to Foucault, a civilisation's communication is differentiated into three separate codes: 
under primary codes fall colloquial language and forms of manners and perceptions, under secondary 
codes he classifies world-explanations specific to epochs and civilisations. and tertiary codes subsume 
scientifically proven knowledge. The historical a prioris that are situated on a second level, are labelled 
discourse (Archaeology of Knowledge: 45) - Significant is here that Foucault does not see the organisa­
tion of the discourses constituted through the object but through the play of the rules (ibid.: chap. 2). 
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tory is a series of fortuitously connected discourse levels that are organised by the principle of 
differentiality. In discursive practice the subject ceases to exist as the supposed producer of 
meaningful totality/continuity, i.e. of history. On the contrary, Foucault claims that conscious­
ness is dependent on the discursive practices of an epoch: "[ ... ] the consciousness that begins in 
and with each use of signs is not the effect of a projection of meaning, but rather a process of 
self-reflection of this field" (Frank, What is Neostructuralism?: 95). 
Foucault develops his historical work archaeology from this concept of history, which he 
situates in the dimension of discontinuity without recourse to the sUbject. This archaeology op­
poses the interpretative practice of a teleological concept of history that explains empirical 
data-documents-in context with other facts in order to extrapolate meaning from them. Ar­
chaeology radically abstains from (re-)constructing continuity, i.e. the presumptions of tradi­
tion, development or evolution, which intrinsically assume an all-embracing, meaningful coher­
ence: 
Archaeology tries to define [ ... J discourses as practices obeying certain rules. It does not treat 
discourse as document, as a sign of something else [ ... J; it is concerned with discourse in its 
volume, as a monument. It is not an interpretative discipline: it does not seek another, better­
hidden discourse. It refuses to be 'allegorical'. (Foucault, Archaeology ofKnowledge: 138t) 
Archaeology's interest is not aimed at the hidden meaning of discourse, but at its governing 
regulatory system as the instance of meaning production specific to an epoch, e.g. the produc­
tion of cultural tradition and identity which can only function through a series of semantic ex­
clusions. I To lay bare these exclusions in the discursive practice of an epoch is what archae­
ology attempts to achieve. 
It is due to the conception of archaeology as discourse analysis that creates its ambivalent 
theoretical status, which Sloterdijk accurately calls a "Zwitterstelle zwischen Kulturgeschichte 
und Erkenntnistheorie" (Sloterdijk, "Michel Foucaults strukturale Theorie der Geschichte": 
164).2 Analogous to the structural analysis of language and speech, archaeology examines-on 
an epistemological level-how history constitutes (and is allowed to constitute) itself as product 
and object of a discourse. At the same time it requires, as Foucault demonstrates all too clearly 
in Madness and Civilisation and in The Order of Things,3 on another level, the collection of 
facts and documents in order to achieve historical differentiations. On the other hand, discourse 
analysis does not assume historical facts to be unambiguous,4 so it remains unclear how Fou-
Cf. Descombes (Modern French Philosophy: 95). 
2 "an ambiguous position between cultural history and epistemology. [my translation]" 
3 Note the voluminous accumulation of facts in Foucault (Madness and Civilisation). 
4This might be seen as a central contradiction in Foucault I s theory, as Descombes explicates (Mod­
ern French Philosophy: 110ft). 
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cault perceives the relation between the historical-documentary and the archaeological­
epistemological approach. I 
Foucault thinks that the diachronic dimension of archaeological discourse analysis is guar­
anteed by the description of transformations (Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge: 24) without 
ascribing a causal law to this movement. 2 Thus, history is defined as a transformation of a de­
centred structure that is quasi-autonomous, i.e. subject-less or not controllable by a subject. 
If the building of a theory is to be generally possible, a certain moment of static is required 
within the permanent transformation of structure, i.e. "a minimal unity and regularity" (Frank, 
What is Neostructuralism?: 174): 
Otherwise it [archaeology] would not even be a theory, but simply a conceptless ad thoughtless 
list of singularities that are not the singularities of something (for example, of a discourse). [ ... J 
If these individualities are not reducible to one single and overriding law, that does not mean 
that they are not reducible to any law at all, for example, that of the series to which they be­
long. In other words, a multiplication of the codes from which events are deducible is no prin­
cipal dismissal of the code model of classical structuralism; with this there are only many sub­
codes work instead of one global code [ ... ]" (Frank, What is Neostructuralism?: 174) 
As already shown with Derrida's model of a decentred structure (cf. 1.1.4. Dissemination) the 
contradiction of Foucault's archaeology lies in its aspiration to poststructurally abandon taxo­
nomic structuralism while, at the same time, it cannot do without a model of structure. The 
splitting into subcodes only transfers the problem to a different level whose constitutive ele­
ments are smaller; yet, it needs a momentarily fixed constellation as a 'point of reference' for 
its discourse analysis. 3 However, a radical decentralisation and historicalisation of the model of 
structure, as understood by deconstruction, would include its own abandonment and at the same 
time the desertion of the instruments of discourse analysis. Derrida achieves this overcoming of 
I See the critique in Descombes (Modern French Philosophy: 110ft). 
2 Here it seems that Foucault's critique does no follow his theoretical conception: the archaeologist's 
historical view, free from assumptions of causality or telos of history, contradicts Foucault's evaluation 
of epistemological formations (cf. Frank, What is Neostructuralism?: 150ft). - Derrida's critique of Fou­
cault goes further when he questions the compatibility of structuralism and the concept of history: "[... ] 
Without establishing, moreover, whether an event such as the creation the house of internment is a sign 
among others, whether it is a fundamental symptom or cause. This kind of question could appear exterior 
to a method that present itself precisely as structuralist, that is, a method for which everything within the 
structural totality is interdependent and circular in such a way that the classical problems of causality 
themselves would appear to stem from a misunderstanding. Perhaps. But I wonder whether, when one is 
concerned with history [ ... ], a strict structuralism is possible, and especially. whether [ ... ] such a study 
can avoid all the etiological questions, all questions bearing, shall we say, on the center of gravity of the 
structure" CCogito and the History of Madness": 43t). 
3 With respect to the concept of structure, it seems sensible to speak here about a radicalisation 
rather than an abandonment. 
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a static model with his theory and practice of dissemination more radically but at the cost of 
having largely to do without the evidence of semantic constellations specific to epochs. I 
Through the proof of its narrativity, Hayden White widens this discussion around the 
problematic of continuity and causality in traditional historiography: 
The authority of the historical narrative is the authority of reality itself: the historical account 
endows this reality with form and thereby makes it desirable, imposing upon its processes the 
formal coherency that only stories possess. (White, "The Value of Narrativity": 19) 
Beneath the form of narration-as constituent of a modern, non-postmodern or non­
poststructuralist historiography2-lies its desire for causality and totality of meaning, "a desire 
to have real events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that 
is and can only be imaginary" (ibid.: 23), which becomes subject of Derrida! s and Foucault's 
deconstruction. 
Historical condition of narrated history is, as developed by White following Hegel, the con­
ception of a ! legal subject', i.e. a subject that perceives itself within a global, social context­
the state-: 
The more historically self-conscious the writer of any form of historiography, the more the 
question of the social system and the law which sustains it, the authority of this law and its jus­
tification, and threats to the law occupy his attention. If, as Hegel suggests, historicality as a 
distinct mode of human existence is unthinkable without the presuppositions of a system of law 
in relation to which a specifically legal subject could be constituted, then, historical self­
consciousness, the kind of consciousness capable of imagining the need to represent reality as 
history, is conceivable only in terms of its interests in law, legality, legitimacy, and so on. 
(ibid.: 13) 
Going beyond the mere sequencing of events (as in annals and in chronicles), the narrative di­
mension gains the ability to interpret narratingly the occurrences from a 'moraJising'­
teleological perspective: "every historical narrative has as its latent or manifest purpose the de­
sire to moralize the events of which it treats" (ibid.: 14). 
This function of interpretative moralising introduces the plot (in contrast to story) to histo­
riography. But as the thus produced totality has to be presented as reality, the difference be­
tween the occurrence and its narrated rendition is blurred in the act of fictionalisation by pre­
tending that the organisation of plot was always already the fable: 
The historical narrative, as against the chronicle. reveals to us a world that is putatively 'fin­
ished'. done with, over, and yet not dissolved, not falling apart. In this world, reality wears the 
See about this the comparison of Derrida and Foucault's concept of text in 1.1. 8. Text and Textu­
ality. 
2 White defines annals and chronicles as non-narrative forms of historiography ("The Value of Nar­
rativity": 5). 
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mask of a meaning. the completeness and fullness of which we can only imagine, never experi­
ence. Insofar as historical stories can be completed, can be given narrative closure, can be 
shown to have had a plot all along, they give to reality the odor of the ideal. This is why the 
plot of a historical narrative is always an embarrassment and has to be presented as 'found' in 
the events rather than put there by narrative techniques. (ibid.: 20) 
With his novel interpretation of the various forms of historiography which, like Foucault's ap­
proach, does without a prioritisation of a concept of history organised by continuity, White pro­
duces a possible coupling point to the deconstructionists' discourse analysis, or deconstructive 
literary criticism. 1 In this, the moment of narrativity represents the point of intersection between 
the interpretation of historical and literary discourses: just as moralising, which aims at totality, 
is the basis of both fictional and historical discourse, the differentiation of 'fictitious' and 'real' 
is inherent to both narrated fiction and narrated history. According to White, it is only the his­
tory proper as closed narrative from which the opposition of true and fictitious event can arise: 
its truth measured only by its narratibility. White's thesis is that 
the very discussion between real and imaginary events, basic to modem discussions of both 
history and fiction, presupposes a notion of reality in which 'the true' is identified with 'the 
real' only insofar as it can be shown to possess the character of narrativity. (ibid.: 6) 
Nevertheless, as this differentiation demands that fictitious and real discourse be kept separate, 
narrating itself can become problematic. To the same extent in which the narrating subject can 
no longer conceive itself within a global, continuous, historical frame-this would be Foucault's 
frame of the grand metanarratives-the continuity of narration as interpretation of (fictional) 
events toward such totality becomes difficult. At the same time, the criteria that enable the clas­
sification into true and fictitious are withdrawn. (Referring to literature, this difference could be 
reinterpreted as mimetic or non-mimetic.) 
Against the background of White's theory of narrativity we can relate the question of the 
continuity of fables and their disintegration to the general problematic of the constitution of 
history as meaningful course toward the present moment. At the same time this provides a 
model for explaining why in (post)modernism narration necessarily becomes impossible for the 
narrating subject. White's approach can thus be productively be applied to literary analyses. 




1. 1.7. Subjectivity and Meaning 
It corresponds with Derrida' s own positioning after the linguistic turn that for the deconstruction 
of the concept of subject he centrally refers to the linguistic 'mediacy' and the 'un­
transcendability' of the supplementary character of self-consciousness. 
His critique thus quintessentially aims at the classical subject. In his outline of the history 
of philosophy-beginning with Plato and Aristotle via Hegel to Nietzsche and Heidegger-Der­
rida claims that, in spite of all their terminological variants, they all have the underlying com­
mon topos of presence of self-consciousness. 
On the occasion of his discussion of neostructuralism, Frank undertook to differentiate his­
torically between the variants of the classical concepts of the subject, or of self-consciousness. 1 
His classification distinguishes egologic from non-eg%gic models of self-consciousness. With 
the help of this separation, we can now define Derrida's historical perspective more precisely: 
in his discussion, he pursues especially the egologic (i.e. the reflective) models of self­
consciousness. These have the underlying principle that 
Jeder BewuBtseinsvollzug mit dem Vorstellen eines Gegenstandes identifiziert [wird], von dem 
in diesem Fall lediglich gelten soli, daB es sich urn das (verdinglichte) BewuBtsein selbst han­
dell. Dieses Sich-selbst-Vorstellen des BewuBtseins nennt die philosophische Tradition ReJlex­
ion. Wir k6nnen also vom Reflexions-Modell des SelbstbewuBtseins sprechen.2 (Frank, Die 
Unhintergehbarkeit der Individualitiit: 30)3 
The privileging of consciousness, which is traditionally thought as self-perception of being­
present, is based upon the notion of an unbroken presence. However, it is not through self­
evidence4 with which the subject's self-consciousness is constituted-as deconstruction claims­
but as an effect of differance. 5 It is in particular its second component-the supplemental-with 
which Derrida explodes the reflection model of self-consciousness. 
I Especially in the outline of the concepts' history in chapter 1 of Frank (Die Unhintergehbarkeit von 
Individualitiit) . 
2 Cf. also Gasche ("Deconstruction as Criticism": 186). 
3 "each performance of consciousness [is] identified with the imagining of an object which in this 
case shall only be regarded as the (reified) consciousness itself. The philosophical tradition calls the con­
sciousness' ability to imagine itself reJlection. We can thus speak of the model of reflection for self­
consciousness. [my translation]" 
4 Ryan explains the significance of the notion of self-evidence: "Self-constituted and exempt from 
negotiation. it precedes discourse and is more primordial than history" ("Self-Evidence": 2). 
5 Frank draws attention to of Althusser's poststructuralist concept of subject whose thesis is that 
"[ ... ] the consciousness that begins in and with each use of signs is not the effect of a projection of 
meaning, but rather a process of self-reflection of this field" (What is Neostructuralism?: 95). 
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Employing Husser! as an example,1 Derrida follows the argumentative threads up to the contra­
dictions of the notion that assumes a self-present subject. By proving how the idea of a pre­
semiotic inner experience becomes increasingly problematic for Husserl' s own argument, Der­
rida is able to operate from within the text without applying an external counter model (cf. 
I. 1.4. Dissemination). 
Derrida's point of deparmre is that Husserl dismisses the consciousness' self-presence de­
rived from linguistically mediated operations. i.e. the signification process in the subject's 
world experience. Hence, he seeks to discern a pre-expressive level from an expressive one in 
the conditions of consciousness. 2 Against the internal life that refrains from all language and 
physicality, Husserl posits the "psychical" as the external life of the consciousness which m 
contrast ro the transcendental ego is derivative (Frank, What is Neostructuralism?: 230f). 
The presence of the ideal self-consciousness, however. excludes the very difference that has 
to be generated through the reflection of the self on itself. Husserl tries to circumvent this con­
tradiction by pretending that the internal differentiality of self-consciousness is a virtual differ­
ence and thus hopes to defuse the problematic. One can contend, as Frank does, that with such a 
modification of difference Husser!' s self-consciousness transforms into something virtual and 
thus into an "unreal element": "The idea of a merely virmal consciousness annuls itself: there is 
consciousness of virmalities, but no virtual consciousness" (ibid.: 233). 
If an experience of consciousness cannot, per definitionem. be virtual, then Husserl rid 
of differentiality and supplementarity of self-consciousness at the high cost of intrinsic contra­
dictions . .l 
As (non-virmal) self-consciousness is only constituted in the mirror of reflection, it is split 
into three temporal moments: first, the moment of a still-unconscious innerliness: second, the 
moment of going outside itself and mirroring itself; and finally, a third moment of reinternalis­
ing the mirror image within the self (ibid.: 235). Consequently, Derrida attacks Husserl's con­
cepts from two sides: first, with the demonstration of temporality in the act of reflection that en­
ables self-consciousness and second, with the no longer guaranteed identity of self and mirrored 
I Den'ida rejects, as already. with a different perspective. shown in 1.1.4. Dissemination. on the one 
hand in his analysis of Husserl' s idealistic concept of the sign the untenable splitting of intended meaning 
and linguistic expression, on the other he demonstrates the self-consciousness' temporality. 
I am referring here to Frank's exposition of Husser!' s phenomenology and its critique (What is 
Neostructuralism?: see especially lecture 15). Frank explains in detail the central function of self-
consciousness in Husser!'s philosophy (ibid.: 229tT). 
3 Frank sums up Derrida's critique on Husserl's theory of consciousness: "This [Husserl's] model 
seeks to guarantee the unity of the divided consciousness by transforming the OIher into the Other of it­
self. To accomplish this, however, ref1ection has to (temporarily) surrender itself to the reality of the op­
position, to the division, and to the nonsimulIaneity of the two moments of consciousness (Bewuj3tseins­
Relate). Once delivered over to the medium of reality, of temporal sequentiality, and of contrast, ref1ec­
tion can no longer return to the sphere of pure ideality and instantaneousness, at \east as long as this 
sphere is understood as pure nonbodily and transtemporal autoaffection" (What is Neostructuralism?: 
234). 
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self. Elsewhere, Derrida describes this non-identical relation metaphorically as "folding" of the 
presence to itself. 
GaschC concludes this doubled apona, which marks all philosophies of reflection, with 
Merleau- Ponty: 
[...J the reflection recuperates everything except itself as an effort of recuperation, it clarifies 
everything except its own role. [ ... ] the temporal differences between the always belated 
movement of recovery and return on the one hand, and on the other hand the originary consti­
tution, their dissymmetry, forbid al\ contemporaneity of reflection with itself. [ ... J The aporia 
between the constitutive principle and reflection as a retrospective construction is non-existent 
ror the philosophy of reflection. (Gasci1e, "Deconstructive Criticism": 186t) 
The pure ideality of meaning is in the same category as the concepts of subject and meaning. In 
reversing Husser!, who understands repeatability as the consequence of the ideality of meaning, 
Derrida defines a certain totality of meaning by its iterability. But if the transcendental ego is 
supposed to be both guarantor and place of realistic experience, then its totality cannot be at­
tested in the moment in which the 'I' itself is suspected of supplementarity and non-identity. 
Subordinate to dijferance, the subject no longer has the possibility of experiencing a meaning­
endowing totality. Beyond the question of reference-meaning-undecidability takes the place of 
(otal ity !ideality (Frank, What is Neostructuralism?: 417). Thus, dissemination undermines the 
process of meaning-endowing and understanding (which hermeneutics attempts to salvage) in 
two ways: language and subject are subordinate to the principle of temporality. 
Following the disintegration of the notion of consciousness or of the subject as being pres­
ent [0 itself into a double non-identity, Derrida tentatively formulates which bearing, regarding 
a rev Isio11 of these concepts, deconstruction has to take: 
Thus we no longer know whether what was always presented as a derived and modified re­
presentation of simple presentation, as "supplement," "sign," "writing," or "trace," "is" not, in 
a necessarily but newly, ahistorical sense, "older" than presence and the system of truth, older 
than "history." (Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: 103) 
A [ the core of such a deconstructive or poststructuralist concept of the subject would thus be: 
the relation to Being as a presentic reality is, with the principle of dijferance, always deferred. I 
There is no (Husserlian) transcendental consciousness that is located outside of language 
through which it yet has a medium for expressing pre-linguistic, evidential self-experience. 
Language, the force of spatialisation and temporisation, always comes before consciousness and 
I Derrida sees Freud, who explains the constitution of consciousness with supplementarity and gra­
phcmatisation, from a neurological-psychological perspective ("Freud and the Scene of Writing"). 
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disproves its identity. I The subject's self-presence exposes itself as a-linguistically motivated­
illusion. 2 
1.1.8. Text and Textuality 
The notion of textuality forms the basis for the deconstructive theory (or theories) of text 
Within the poststructuralist spectrum the notion of textuality is subject to variations, as the broad 
span of meaning of the concurrent notion of epis{(?me (i.e. as the rules of discourse of a seman­
tic structural system underlying the individual texts) illustrates: At the cost of having to with­
draw specific historical contextualisations in favour of transhistorical constants,3 Derrida's com­
prehensive notion of episteme covers the entire metaphysical thinking of the western world. 
Contrary to this, Foucault works with a considerably narrower variant that is specific to epochs. 
Roland Barthes, according to Hempfer, subsumes, under his notion of ecriture, styles specific to 
epochs as well as "transepochale Vertextungsformen,,4 (Hempfer, Poststrukturale Texttheorie 
und narrative Praxis: 13). 
I If subjectivity is a consequence of the differential structure of the sign, it remains unsolved in Der­
rida how (unstable, only minimal) identity of meaning can be recognised or be conceived as such. This is 
where Frank's debate with Derrida begins: self-consciousness can only be thought if something exists, of 
which the self in the reflective act then becomes aware, before the self-experience. The Fundamental di­
lemma, according to Frank, is that "self cannot be deduced from the existence of a relation whose con­
stituents are both not - or principally both not directly accessible" (Die Unhintergehbarkeit: 42). The 
paradoxes of the egologic and non-egologic models of the philosophical tradition (which Derrida criti­
cises quite rightly) are only solvable, Frank argues, if one presumes the existence of in incorporeal, irre­
lational consciousness as one "that does not from the outset press the subject into the position of an object 
(of itself)" (ibid.: 32). From this Frank concludes the existence of an immediate consciousness that does 
not require a self-presentation (ibid.: 32). Furthermore, the identity of signs necessitates an act of mean­
ing or significance attribution by the individual; the dependence on signs is no "sufficient reason for sig­
nification" (ibid.: 25). - With his objection to Derrida, Frank turns the problematic of the aporias of the 
traditional explanation attempts into a virtue for individuality. He posits his irrelational self­
consciousness, without for example discussing the question to what extent this has to be thought as pre­
linguistic: it remains unclear how the irrelational self-consciousness has to be understood in relation to 
the linguicity of consciousness. Language itself is, and Frank would undoubtedly follow here Derrida's 
argument, always social and relational. I assume that Frank has the situating of the individual outside 
language in mind and thus going back before the linguislic lurn, without discussing deconstruction's ob­
jections against such a conception. He does not confirm this explicitly, though. [all my translations] 
2 The often-cited thesis that poststructuralism celebrates the death of the subject corresponds at best 
as a metaphorical rendition with Derrida's theory. His aim is clearly not the negation of the category of 
the subject in general but the turning away from the metaphysical subject as one that experiences itself in 
an immediate self-presence. 
3 Cf. Lentricchia's critique of Derrida's ahistorical notion of text (After The New Criticism: 176). 
4 "Trans-epochal forms of textualisation [my translation]". 
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With the central problem of the relation of material/social reality and text/ecriture put forward, 
we can define the width of the conceptual field of textuality within poststructuralism. 1 The dif­
ferences are not to be found, for example, in the intratextual definition, but in the definition of 
the relation between text and extra-textual context. To this end I will bring Derrida' s approach 
up against that of Foucault (and Edward Said).2 
Foucault criticises the deconstructive reduction of all extra-textual factors to a purely tex­
tual function; text, on the contrary, is to be conceived of as manifestation of an episteme which 
is trying to conceal its being part of a network of power in the play of the text: "the activation 
of an immensely complex tissue of forces, for which a text is a place among other places (in­
cluding the body) where the strategies of control in society are conducted" (Said, The World: 
215). The reduction of the text's origin back to the author springs from the desire to limit and 
control the semantic limitlessness: "The author is yet another, more subtle precautionary meas­
ure whose function is to control, censure and police the excesses of polysemic discourse of fic­
tion" (Foucault, quoted in Harari, "Critical Factions": 44). 
Hence Foucault's discourse is defined as a double historicity: First, the meaning of the text 
is constituted in the process of semantic and pragmatic contextualisation, decontextualisation and 
recontextualisation and is therefore principally historical (Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge: 
105). Second, the individual text is situated within the episteme (i.e. the discourse form) of a 
specific epoch and therefore within its historical boundaries (ibid.: 116f). 
The second aspect marks Foucault's difference to Derrida. While the intratextual perspec­
tive on the non-expressed, on that which manifests itself only in the ruptures of discourse and 
disproves the totality of meaning (or its controlled heterogeneity) is common to both, the epis­
temological interest, which guides Foucault's discourse analysis, puts a greater emphasis on 
historio-social critique. Although his concept of the text is dynamic, he has to arrest structures 
through which he can mark the discourse forms of a certain epoch: "Archaeology [ ... ] seems to 
treat history only to freeze it" (ibid.: 166). In order to make the rupture-the discontinuity be­
tween two formations-visible, a description of these formations is required which necessarily 
has to presume a certain immobility of the structure (ibid.: 166ff). His work has therefore, in 
contrast to his theoretical propositions, a decidedly more structuralist orientation. 
Derrida defines textuality by the general graphematic character of language, Le. with the 
potential absence of author and reference (cf. 1.1.5. Iterability of the Sign and Grammar of the 
Text), with language's lack of origin and its general priority over the subject (cf. 1.1.7. Subjec­
tivity and Meaning). This then strips text of an intentional subject's authority over the produc­
r will however not discuss the question whether Foucault has to be regarded as structuralist or as 
poststructuralist. 
2 I will chiefly follow the discussions of this controversy in Harari (Textual Strategies), Leitch (De­
constructive Criticism) and Said (The World, The Text, and The Critic). 
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tion and control of text and the subject's relation to world. That Derrida, with his understanding 
of text and writing, takes up the Jewish conception of writing has been succinctly developed by 
Susan Handelman. ) 
However, textuality in Derrida's conception is-in contrast to Foucault's-not a real, prov­
able structure or movement on a textual level but. as Gasche says, a quasitranscendental struc­
ture which itself generates absence and the illusion of presence. Text(uality) does not equal the 
written text (Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror: 274);2 Derrida himself does not keep up this sys­
tematic separation either terminologically or with regard to his theoretical conception and con­
tinually oscillates between the phenomenological and transcendental level. 
Playing with the semantic possibilities of the word 'hymen',3 Derrida demonstrates with an 
analysis of Mallarme's Mimique (Derrida, Dissemination) the peculiar double structure of pres­
ence and absence intrinsic to the infinite-deferral character of text 4 Derrida uses this text as a 
paradigm for his conception of textuality beyond mimesis, beyond a differentiation of interior 
and exterior. text and world, original and representation: 
We are faced then with mimicry imitating nothing; faced, so to speak, with a double that dou­
bles no simple, a double that nothing anticipates, nothing at least that is not already itself dou­
ble. There is no simple reference. It is in this that the mime's operation does allude, but alludes 
to nothing, alludes without breaking the mirror, without reaching beyond the looking-glass. 
(ibid.: 206)5 
The historicity and self-referentiality of the textual structure is accompanied by the shifting from 
a 'closed' conception of text, in the sense of a static model of structure, toward a model of an 
individual and exclusively textual practice as play. 
I Handelman explains: "The poet and the Jew are not rooted in an empirical, natural present: they 
are never here but always there [, .. ] They are natives only to the world and the Scripture: the home of the 
Jew is a sacred text in the middle of commentaries" ("Jacques Derrida and the Heretic Hermeneutic": 
99), - Handelman draws a parallel between Derrida' s and entanglement of text and interpreter and the 
relation of divine and oral Torah in which human interpretation becomes part of the divine text. It is 
against this background that Handelman describes Derrida' s theory as "re-emergence of Rabbinic herme­
neutics in a displaced way" (ibid.: 111). In this, the moment of the Derridean displacement has to be 
situated in his notion of the trace: while in Jewish tradition text and world are effects of God's trace, it is 
only. according to Derrida, the trace which as movement of differentiality motivates the conception of 
God as an absolute presence by referring to its Other: presence (ibid.: 117). 
2 Cf. 1.2.1. Definitions. 
3 'hymen' signifies both consummation of marriage and proof of inviolate virginity. 
4 Cf. the excellent presentation by Gasche ("Joining the Text": 164ff). 
5 An important issue. unfortunately not quite adequately worked out, of this one of the best essays 
on Derrida (Gasche, "Joining the Text"), is Derrida's relation to Heidegger in this context: Gasche dem­
onstrates the analogy of Derrida' s conception of text and Heidegger's Sein with Heidegger's fundamental 
dissymmetry of trait and retrait. It is this asymmetry on which Seinsvergessenheit, but also the possibility 
of its destruction is based upon, which prompts Heidegger to determine Sein in a temporal and historical 
definition as Unter-Schied ("Joining the Text"; 158), - About the differences between Derrida and Hei­
degger, see Gasche (ibid.: 172). 
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The radical levelling of the differences between text and world-with the disintegration of the 
hierarchy of cognitive argument against the rhetoric of the text (in the sense that the rhetoric 
surplus explodes the illusory control over its semantics)-prompts Derrida to postulate the es­
sential undecidability of literary and philosophical, or critical, discourses. I 
Such a differentiation is based, according to Derrida, on the metaphysical opposition of 
outside and inside: while the non-literary discourse is subject to the requirements of verification, 
soundness of argument, etc., literature is granted a special mode: figurality. Even if, as decon­
struction does, particular attention is paid to the figurative, or metaphorical, component of 
philosophical texts as an indispensable part, philosophy merely appears as a single form of a 
general literary discourse. With this, the binary opposition between literature as playful margin­
ality and rational-analytical forms of discourse becomes void; a categorical separation of aes­
thetics/aesthetic practice and epistemology becomes invalid. 2 Discourses might operate with 
various textual strategies, but Derrida contests the possibility of a systematic separation, for ex­
ample, into discourse types. The Yale Critics undertake a slight terminological shift in their at­
tempt to replace Derrida' s concept of text with a globalisation of literature, or literariness (see 
Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity: 224f).3 
While the Yale Critics (excluding de Man) adopt the levelling of genre distinctions as it le­
gitimises the critical discourse's emancipation from the priority of the pre-text (Miller, "The 
Critic as Host"), other critics suspect this thesis of-as has occurred already in the loss of the 
relation to world- abandoning the notion of reason and subsequently the possibility of cri­
tique. 4 
Derrida indeed eliminates--similar to Lyotard in his theory of postmodernism--exactly the 
systematic differentiation in social spheres (with their specific forms of discourse and claims of 
validity) which Habermas defends as indispensable for the conclusion of modernism. It is there­
fore no coincidence that Habermas takes precisely Derrida's flattening of genre distinctions as 
subject matter for his universal-pragmatic countermove. It is in this context that he charges Der­
rida that this "aestheticizing of language" is bought at the cost of the "twofold denial of the 
proper senses of normal and poetic discourse" (Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse on 
Modernity: 205). The demolition of genre distinctions neglects, says Habermas, the entirely dis­
similar functions of rhetoric in philosophy and literature: in literature it operates as the poetical 
expression's self-reference, whereas it is "tamed" in the discourses of the social spheres of law, 
moral, economics and politics and merely functions for specific reasons of problem solution 
(ibid.: 245). 
I See 1.1.3. The Deconstructive Method. 
2 For further elucidation cf. 1.2.3. Literariness of Discourse. - In this context, de Man would not 
use the concept of aesthetics but the concept of poetics. 
3 Cf. 1.2.3. Literariness of Discourse. 
4 This is the tenor of the works of Hempfer, Abrams and Butler. 
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Again, Habermas' critique suffers in that his argumentative level misses Derrida's more funda­
mental critique. What Derrida is attempting is not a (certainly possible) gradual differentiation 
of stylistic "rhetoricity" according to the text's pragmatic function, but a fundamental, system­
alic distinction of rypes of discourse with regard to linguistics and pragmatics. 
The fact that Derrida, with his version of textuality, does not give up the possibility of a 
critical practice (of writing) has to be emphasised against Habermas. Evidence for this is Der­
rida's deconstruction of Levi-Strauss' anthropology whose basic differentiation between writing­
less on the one hand and civilised people on the other is derived from a narrow concept of text 
and which therefore does not transcend the traditional opposition-as already demonstrated in 
Derrida's readings of Rousseau and Saussure-of "innocent nature" and "violent civilisation" 
but. to the contrary, actually affirms it. Levi-Strauss demonstrates this opposition's inherent 
ethnocentrism and phonocentrism through anti-ethnocentrism - by attributing violence to civi­
lised peoples (Derrida, Of Gralllmatology: 132). Derrida, in contrast, argues that-in opposition 
to the presumption of an originary presence, innocence, purity of the uttered word-at every 
stage an always already existing non-identity as a moment of violence is demonstrable. For him 
this means, referring to the taboo of the proper name in the N ambikwara tribe, that already the 
original act of classification, of (self-)denomination, is an act of violence. In a subsequent act of 
violence the prohibition of the proper name (as the phenomenon of Levi-Strauss' ethnographical 
interest) tries to conceal the first; in a third step the "non-self-sameness [non-propriere] at the 
origin" is reflexively revealed (ibid.: 109). 
Derrida's contention against Levi-Strauss' idealisation of the tribe as natural and non­
violent -which experiences violence only through the ethnographer's intrusion and the force of 
writing-is the following: the obliteration of the proper name in fact signifies the possession of 
lI'riling and an originary violence - the abstraction of individuality and presence of its bearer. 
This then collapses Levi-Strauss' opposition of nature and ci"ilisation, and speech and writing. 
The seemingly secondary, i.e. historically following, reveals itself as the definition of the ori­
gin, which it then no longer is (ibid.: 101ff). 
Derrida's argument against Levi-Strauss is based on his (at first implicit) much wider con­
cept of text with which he operates: he interprets the tribe's acquisition of writing as the transi­
tion from arche-writing (as becoming aware of differences, proper name, act of classification) to 
writing in the narrow sense. Writing is a symbolic operation that is the foundation of all insight, 
experience and communication, and which, in the moment of classification into the general sys­
tem of symbols, necessarily violates the unnameable individual (which never existed). With this, 
however, Levi-Strauss' equation of 'possession of writing' with 'exploitation of man' is null and 
void, as it is based on an untenable categorical differentiation of non-violent speech and violent 
writing (ibid.: 219). 
With this brief example of Derrida's deconstructive argument, we can gauge its potential 
for criticising ideology. On the one hand, it becomes obvious that Derrida's theory can be ap­
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plied to criticism against ideologies; this is made evident with Derrida's theory-immanent dem­
onstration of non-validated presumptions and customary patterns of thinking (e.g. the opposition 
of nature and civilisation) with which Levi-Strauss' operates. This also shows that deconstruc­
tion by no means evades or voids the notion of critique. On the other hand, however, Derrida 
limits the reach of his critique (and not only in this context) by often not clarifying with which 
concept of writing, or on which level, he is arguing: writing as an underlying quasi­
transcendental structure of episteme and language in general (ct'. 1.1.5. Iterability of the Sign 
and Grammar of the Text), or writing as a specific, graphematic form of linguistic expression. 
His not always entirely clear widening of the concept of writing then leads to an understanding 
of violence that is very different to Levi-Strauss' critique of contemporary civilisation, and 
whose stretched semantic range shifts the critical discourse to another level. This however does 
not keep Derrida from playing off his very own conception of original violence against Levi­
Strauss' much more specifically aiming critique of contemporary civilisation. (In fact, Levi­
Strauss does not negate the power-stabilising function of writing.) 
With his polemic, which blends a 'medium range' theory with a radically epistemological 
critique, Derrida forgoes an opportunity of specific social criticism in subsuming, and thereby 
diminishing, all forms of political power under original violence. It is the levelling of the differ­
ence between quasi-transcendental and phenomenal/social categories~-which does not necessar­
ily follow from his premises-that evokes the impression of an affirmation of the existing order. 
This then demonstrates why-not regarding its potential for critique-the deconstruction of 
critical approaches to contemporary civilisation could be branded as tending toward neoconser­
vatism. 
1.2. DECONSTRUCTION IN LITERARY CRITICIS~l 

1.2.1. Definitions 
On the occasion of the Johns Hopkins Symposium in 1966, Jacques Derrida presented his paper 
"Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences". It is now generally ac­
cepted that this event marked the beginning of poststructuralism in Anglo-American literary 
criticism. l However, the Yale Critics and others-Paul de Man, Geoffrey Hartman, Harold 
Bloom, Joseph N. Riddel, Paul Bove and William Spanos--do not develop a systematic theory 
of a deconstructive literary criticism but pursue-at least according to their understanding-a 
decol1structive interpretation practice that is chiet1y motivated by philological or literary inter­
ests and not by Derrida' s philosophical prob !ems. 2 
The reception of Derrida, which supplied the theoretical foundations for the critical exege­
S1S, is confined to but a few text-depending on their systematic 'exploitability' Of Gram­
IIwwlogy. "Signature Event Context", "Limited Inc abc". and "Freud and the Scene of Writ­
ing". It is curious to note that the two texts that are, in my estimation, highly relevant for liter­
ary criticism, namely Dissemination and Spurs, have generally been ignored. 3 
That the perception of Derrida's work is subject to various Anglo-American distortions has 
been mentioned more than once. For this, especially the different academic socialisation, or the 
New Criticism's deficit in theory,4 the skipping of other phases of literary theory (e.g. of struc­
turalism, and of phenomenological or reception-oriented approaches) as well as the Anglo­
American literary criticism's tendency to assimilate new theories or methods 'pluralistically'S 
can be regarded as responsible. The general stant for the defence of Derrida's deconstruction is 
the accusation of a "domestication of Derrida" 6 Leitch articulates this critique succinctly: "The 
development from Derrida to de Man to Miller manifests itself as a continuous narrowing and 
reduction" (Leitch, Deconstructive Criticism: 52). 
About the history of the symposium and the reception of Derrida' s paper, cf. Lentricchia (After the 
Nell' Criticism: 158ff, 168). 
2 Derrida strategy of the close reading can be seen as a link to the New Criticism - cf. de Man (The 
Resistance to Theory: 116ff). 
3 This might be due to their relatively late translation inro English. An exeption is Gasclle who refers 
cenrrally to these texts in his analysis of Derrida' s concepts of text and meaning. 
~ cf. de Man's analysis (The Resistance to Theory) and Lentricchia (After the New Criticism: I 58ff). 
, cf. Norris (Deconstruction: chapter 1) and Eagleton (Literary Themy: 148). 
b The notion was introduced to the debate by Godzich (Reading de Man Reading) and was taken up 
by Gasche ("Joining the Text"). Norris (Deconstruction) and Ryan ("Self-Evidence") argue similarly. 
The latter criticises in particular the reduction of deconstruction's radically political dimension through 
the rather conservative Yale Critics. 
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This assessment of deconstructive literary critics-whose highly divergent orientation is gener­
ally not recognised, especially not by their polemic opponents--remains within the framework 
of [he concession that the attribute 'deconstructive', or 'deconstructionist', apply to all of them. 
Two more recent works, however, question even this: Leitch proves convincingly that Bloom, 
Riddel and Spanos can only with limitations be subsumed under the heading of 'deconstructive 
literary studies' (ibid.). Gasche, on the other hand, questions deconstruction's very applicability 
[0 problems of literary theory and criticism. 
In the following, I will briefly sketch, as an overview of Derrida's influence on Anglo­
American criticism, the most important approaches. I Their generally very different orientation 
is [he reason for my later focus in Paul de Man's theory. 2 
Joseph Hillis Miller, with his radically epistemological scepticism and subversive attitude 
toward thought, takes up both Derrida' s critique of metaphysics and de Man's theory of text. In 
this he proceeds at times in a unsystematical and contradictory manner; for instance, he adopts 
Derrida's differance but not the trace; he equally accepts de Man's 'rhetoricity' of the text, yet 
not its 'grammatical dimension'.3 It is in only a few texts that Miller explicitly develops the 
foundations of his theory. He himself warns in a methodological contemplation against the dan­
ger of a short-circuit between deconstructive interpretation practice and deconstructive literary 
theory (Miller, "Theory and Practice": 609). For the subsequent discussion of a possible appli­
cation of Derrida's work to problems of literary criticism, I will therefore refer to Miller on 
only a few relevant points. 
Geoffrey Hartman adheres, in spite of his self-conception as a playful Derridean, to the 
concept of literature as representation (Hartman, The Fate of Reading: xii, 97). His consistent 
recourse to interpretation I s psychological motivation for interpretation (ibid.: 8ft) seems to im­
ply furthermore the recognition of a subject as authority for text production and text reception. 
II is (implicit) model of text and interpretation oscillates between a conservative appeal for rhe 
close reading of the traditional canon (ibid.: xiii, 270); taking up Derrida, the theorising of a 
radical hermeneutics of indeterminacy; a phonocentric orientation of an analogous, non-arbitrary 
language, a general abandonment of linguistic theory and metacritique in the sense of a meth­
odological ref1ection. 4 Hartman maintains that interpretation is not a meta- but a paralanguage, 
an at times arbitrary creative act (ibid.: 268). 
I A more comprehensive introduction can be found in Norris (Deconsfruction) , Culler (On Decon­
struction) and Leitch (Deconstructive Criticism). 
2 The question whether the other Yale Critics could be regarded as deconstructionists is, at least 
within the frame of this dissertation, of relatively lillie importance as their critical practice leaves but few 
:lpproaches for theoretical systematisation . 
.1 Cf. the critical discussion in Leitch (Deconstructive Criticism: 52). 
4 Hartman himself describes his approach a criticaHentative in contrast to Derrida' s "transcenden­
tally reductive" deconstruction (The Fate of Reading: x). Elsewhere he calls his work "deconstruction 
without licence" (ibid.: 269). - McCallum accuses Hartman of an 'wild' eclecticism ("Indeterminacy": 
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The contradictions are obvious: on the one hand Hartman refers to an institutionalised concept 
of literature that assumes the literary text's priority, on the other he attempts-against Derrida, 
yet with Derrida' s theorem of the supplement-to raise the status of interpretation by trying to 
diminish the difference between primary and secondary text. A widening of the concept of the 
supplement as characteristic of psychological operations in general weakens their specific attri­
bution to the relation between interpretation and primary text (ibid.: 161). It is simply a misin­
terpretation, though, to reduce Derrida's supplement to such a difference. Again, Hartman's dif­
ferentiation from Derrida remains more than unclear in his argument. 
Harold Bloom, like Hartman, has not developed a systematic language theory or text the­
ory. With regard to interpretation, his views about the dissolving of the notion of reference 
match deconstruction's theoretical foundations, even though he holds on to the notion of mean­
ing, as Leitch demonstrates: the constitution of meaning remains interpretation's ultimate (not 
explicitly named) objective. Simultaneously, Bloom's Darwinist model of the history of litera­
ture is based, even more so than Hartman's, on a re-personalisation and a re-psychologisation of 
the concept of text, which Spanos quite rightly criticises as a relapse into logocentrism (in the 
sense of an idealised concept of meaning that is based on subject).! 
William Spanos, and his disciple Paul Bove, can be associated to the field around decon­
struction. With the phonocentric foundation of their theory of text, however, they stand closer 
to Heidegger than to Derrida2 and I will for that reason not focus on them in the following 
chapters. 
In his seminal work The Tain of the Mirror, Gasche maintains the more radical thesis that 
all deconstructive critics essentially miss the philosophical and theoretical implications of Der­
rida's deconstruction. In order to ascertain whether literary criticism requires a deconstructive 
revision, or to what extent Derrida's theory is actually applicable, I will briefly outline Gasche's 
argument. 
Following an analysis of Derrida' s philosophy, Rodolphe Gasche attempts to develop the 
basis of a methodologically reflected deconstructive literary criticism. He sees the fact that Der­
rid a 's work can only be partially applied to literary criticism as based on the quasi­
transcendental status of its categories. At the core of his contention lies that an application of 
78); he lacks "a notion of critical consciousness loyal to the specijica differentia" of the theories he cites 
(ibid.). 
J For a detailed critique of Bloom's history of literature, cf. Leitch (De constructive Criticism: 130ff) 
and Norris (Deconstruction: 116ft). 
2 Spanos himself talks explicitly about his relation to Heidegger and Derrida ("Breaking the Cir­
cle"). He compares Heidegger's Seinsvergessenheit, as the forgetting of the temporality of being, with 
the closed, or closed-off, form of the work of art and with New Criticism and structuralism's under­
standing of the work of art as a final product. The breaking up of form in postmodern art thus mirrors 
the breaking up of Seinsvergessenheit, i.e. the consciousness of temporality. Writing is then interpreted 
as the veiling of temporality; speech, in contrast, as its paradigm. - cf. also Leitch's critique (Decon­
structive Criticism: 84). 
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the concepts on the level of the 'real text' fails to recognise their non-ontological, non­
phenomenological character (Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror: part III) as it does not pay atten­
tion to their systematic standing within Derrida' s theory. I 
The concepts of writing and speech. as they are commonly used, cannot serve to explain arche­
writing. Writing, in its colloquial sense, as the visible and coded script in the world, is only the 
metaphor of general writing. [ ... J Major writing, as Derrida calls the arc he-synthesis of writing 
in the context of his essay on Bataille, and which is opposed to minor writing, is not reducible 
to the sensible or visible present of the graphic or the 'literal'. [ ... ] Writing in Derrida's sense 
is not determined by what it is about, nor has it anything essentially in common with the signs 
present on the page [ ... ]. Despite its quasi transcendental status, or precisely because of it, ar­
che-writing is not essence. It has no proper value of its own, positive or negative [ ... ]. (ibid.: 
274) 
Thus thematically oriented as well as formalistic interpretations are intrinsically logocentric ap­
proaches. They assume a totality of the signified2 or try to suppress the delimited play of signi­
fiers with a grammar; they ultimately adhere to an essentialist, i.e. ontological, notion of litera­
ture in their efforts to determine the specifically poetic (ibid.: 263ff). The essentialist definition 
of literature, says Gasche, is also valid for the Yale Critics who proclaim the literary character 
of all discourses. He, in contrast, considers this assumption a misreading of Derrida's concept 
of text; rather, the orientation of literature to the signified as representation displays its submis­
sion to the conception and ethos of philosophy. Literature, in Derrida's thinking, i.e. a "radi­
cally non-phenomenologizable structure" that is unconnected to the paradigms of philosophy, 
does not yet really exist (ibid.: 259). 
If however, and thus goes Gasche's surprising conclusion, there barely exists such decon­
structive literature, then the traditional literary criticism is not without a certain justification. It 
is, so to speak, the theoretical pendant of a literature that is trapped in a conception of expres­
sion (in the sense of the expression of a non-verbal signified) and it therefore fulfils an appro­
priate function (ibid.: 259f). Derrida's theories can, if at all, only find entrance to literary criti­
cism as transcendental philosophy. 
Even though Gasche's explication of the theoretical status of Derrida's thought is unques­
tionably innovative in the critical literature on deconstruction, his contention seems to fall prey 
to his own purist systematisation of Derrida. Gasche' s cutting off of the real text level goes too 
far; he-under the mistaken impression of supporting Derrida -criticises in the Yale Critics' 
work what especially the later Derrida than practices himself. Derrida's notoriously playful, 
semantically indeterminable and fractured discourse seems at least to hint at the blurring of the 
I Gasche demonstrates this paradigmatically with the concepts of writing, text, and metaphor (The 
Tain o/the Mirror: 271ft). - cf. also 1.1.8. Text and Textuality. 
2 The concept of polysemie, which tries to circumvent the reduction of a single meaning. falls prey 
to this tendency toward totalisation, too, says Gasche corresponding with Derrida. 
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difference between transcendental (infrastructures) and phenomenological structures. This, for 
example, happens in the equation of (transcendental) writing (ecriture) and graphical writing in 
Of Grammatology, of figurality and metaphorical language of discourse in Dissemination, of 
spatialisation and timeitemporisation of space, of the trace and the exploding of closure with the 
juxtaposition of two texts in "Tympan", etc. It is especially Derrida's technique in his essay on 
Mallarme that confirms my disagreement with Gasche. Even though Derrida emphasises 
blanche, the white space of the diacritical nothing between word and word, meaning and 
meaning, as the 'unthematised' movement of the self-reflective multitude of the text, he concur­
rently remarks on its double on the textual level, namely Mallarme's metaphorical field of 
blanche, snow, swan. virginity, hymen (Derrida, Dissemination: 258). A systematic differentia­
tion between phenomenological and quasitranscendental structures would indeed require the 
very dichotomy of original and representation for the discourse that Derrida dissolves in his es­
say. Although quasitranscendental structures are underlying the disseminating movement on the 
textual level, the latter is ultimately the only access to, or indicator of, the quasitranscendental. 
Truth is, as Derrida suggests in his reading of Plato, dependent on its representation, and thus it 
ceases to be what it is (ibid.: 156ft). Both Derrida and Gasche find such discourse practice that 
is beyond philosophical definition realised in modernity, especially in Mallarme's work. Para­
doxically, it appears that it only becomes literature through its own negation: 
[ ... ] it is by suspending its being as literature that literature becomes capable of challenging 
philosophy I s dominant categorization. Literature puts itself between quotation marks by open­
ing itself to the absolute loss of its meaning, whether of content or of form. Literature becomes 
a radical interrogation of philosophy, and of most past literature as well, not only by refusing 
its foundation in a preceding and prior being of meaning but also by disclaiming any formal es­
sence as concerns its substance or expression. (Gasche, 17ze Tain of the Mirror: 258) 
The de-limitation of writing in modernity demands, according to Gasche, first, a new literary 
criticism which does not ask for fixed or totalised meaning, and second, a revision of literary 
criticism's approach to pre-modern text (ibid.: 261ft). The impossibility of an objective, limit­
ing interpretation is thus not the result of a hermeneutic problem but is rather firmly rooted in 
the decentred structure of text itself. I In turn the opennesslinfinity of interpretation causes a de­
ficiency which-in a new interpretation-requires supplementation. 2 
Cf. Frank (What is Neostructuralism?: 65ff) and Butler (Interpretation, Deconstruction and Ideol­
ogy: 62). 
2 Here the double semantic of the supplement becomes obvious: the supplementing to the deficiency, 
finding of meaning the interpretation is an inventing, i.e. an extension, an addition to the text. 
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An exegesis that does without a descriptive and analytical doubling of the text falls, according to 
Gasche, prey to pure arbitrariness. What is required is a literary criticism that is both decon­
structive and scholarly. I 
Deconstruction's call for the dissociation from the traditional concept of meaning is shared 
by phenomenological approaches and, to a certain degree, by hermeneutics. Derrida himself 
demands a rigorous hermeneutic analysis of the text's semantics as the first step in a decon­
structive reading. However, only the "account for the text's meaninglessness" (ibid.: 266) 
would be the deconstructive work in such an interpretation. Yet, what Gasche aims at in his 
project is not meaninglessness as subject but as the (non-phenomenal) structural moment before 
any 'thematisation': 
[ ... ] such a structure must withdraw itself from being mastered in totality, from being 
decidable, from being itself a theme if it is to be account for the possibility of the meaningless­
ness of a text. If it could be fully determined, in fact, it would be the text's ultimate meaning 
and would no longer account for its essential undecidability. If, in the last resort, the unthema­
tizable because undecidable agencies of modern literary texts [ ... ] radically subvert the possi­
bility of literary hermeneutics, it is because they represent the limits from which understanding 
and knowing become possible. (ibid.: 267) 
Gasche admits that such textual infrastructures are barely developed (ibid.: 269). As an example 
for unphenomenologisable, unthematisable unity, he names supplementarity, mise en abyme and 
re-mark, which however become manifest only as products of a deconstructive discourse (it 
would be a mistake to equate, for example, a mirror metaphor in a text with a mise en abyme). 
Concluding this contemplation about deconstruction's literary-critical relevance, we can 
state the following. Systematically, three fields of literary criticism require a fundamental revi­
sion: first, the field of poetics/aesthetics, second, questions of interpretation techniques or 
methods and third. various thematic aspects. Gasche has demonstrated that the methodological 
reflection of differences between the transcendental and the real textual level is required for all 
three ranges of application. Questions on the poetic practice, against which the deconstructive 
interpretation strategy's merit will have to measured, are to be given the highest priority: the 
dominance of text over interpretation has to be emphasised. 2 Concerning the thematic focal 
points, a certain methodological caution is required: pseudo-deconstructive themes-e.g. meta­
phors for writing-can, as thematic units, again be elevated to undeconstructed, semantically 
fixed signifieds. And yet we can tentatively assert, without running the risk of committing such 
a reduction, that traditional thematic complexes, e.g. identity through recollection, epiphany and 
Gasche does not explain, though, how he perceives a "scholarly" criticism that would not contra­
dict deconstruction's most fundamental premises. 
2 For a discussion of these theses on deconstructive literary criticism, cf. 3.2. Deconstruction as In­
terpretation Theory. 
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involuntary recollection require, in light of Derrida' s introduction of temporality to the question 
of identity, new interpretations. 
1.2.2. Grammar and Rhetoric 
Paul de Man's critique on Derrida's reading of Rousseau. in which the French philosopher ex­
emplarily demonstrates the deconstructive strategy by opposing intention and gesture (Derrida, 
Of Grammatology: part 2), is of importance for the link between deconstruction and Nabokov's 
novelistic/poetic techniques which this dissertation assumes. 
Paul de Man counters Derrida' s allegation that Rousseau is caught up in the phonocentric 
and logocentric tradition by postulating the text's self-deconstruction. In accordance with Der­
rida, he relates the chain of substitutions that dominate a text to a subject-centred thinking, but 
analyses how the text itself already deconstructs these through the mutual obliteration of its op­
positions. De Man holds that Rousseau's language is not blind to its own ambivalence the con­
sciousness of contradiction already exists in the text itself (de Man, Allegories of Reading: 17).1 
In relation to the priority of text, de Man allocates a secondary position to the recipient - almost 
as the 'accomplisher' of the text's cognitive performance. Paradoxically, this hierarchical con­
ception eliminates the traditionally perceived difference of aesthetic text and the interpreter's 
cognitive explication. 
The text's ambivalence, its dialectic of blindness and insighr,2 is mirrored on the reception 
level as the discrepancy between "the aesthetically responsive and the rhetorically aware read­
ing. ,,3 In this sense, de Man defines the function of metacritique as the reflection on intratextual 
and intertextual ambivalence, i.e. as the reflection on the text's self-deconstruction and the in­
terpretation's hovering between blindness and insight: "To write critically about critics thus be­
comes a way to reflect on the paradoxical effectiveness of a blinded vision that has to be recti­
fied by means of insights that it unwittingly provides" (ibid.: 106). The personal perspective is, 
in turn, based on a specific blindness which provokes a further metacritical interpretation the 
constitutive blindness of texts initiates a whole chain-reaction of discourses (ibid.: xx). Bove' s 
summary, especially with its Heideggerian tint, of de Man's text and interpretation theory dem­
onstrates his closeness to hermeneutics: 
De Man summarised his differences to Derrida in an interview (The Resistance to Theory: 118). 
2 Unlike Derrida, de Man uses the word 'dialectic' himself in this context. 
3 There is, for example, a difference between the theoretical premises of the interpretation of (in the 
case of New Criticism, the closed literary form as the object of analysis) and the insight into the openness 
(and thus uncontrollable) literary structure through the interpretative practice. 
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Destructive reading always presupposes as part of the hermeneutical situation the closure of a 
historical period, a breakdown within the traditional language being examined, and the discov­
ery of contradiction. A destructive misreading must therefore emerge from a partially 'privi­
leged' position, in incomplete understanding of what the mystified rhetoric of another discourse 
is covering-over. When, however, the opening up of the horizon of meaning involves destroy­
ing one's own rhetorical stance, the destructive process is brought up short by the necessary 
'error' or 'blindness' of one's own position. The historical rhetoric is not available for destruc­
tion until the time when that rhetoric has itself displaced. (Bove, Deconstructive Poetics: xvi) 
However, de Man's distancing from Derrida, which is also being debated in literary criticism, 
requires a strong relativisation. My thesis is that the higher priority of the text, which de Man 
emphatically stresses, is based on a misinterpretation of Derrida' s dialectic of intention and 
gesture because Derrida too works with text-inherent contradictions of argumentative and rhe­
torical/figurative discourse levels. I 
A clear separation of these two concepts is, to a certain degree, only tenable if self­
deconstruction is understood as the re-introduction of a textual subject, or of an auctorial text 
intention; then this self of deconstruction would be the author, not the text. Such an interpreta­
tion, however, would be in stark contrast to de Man's emphatic emphasis of textuality as a dis­
course which is subjectless, i.e. uncontrollable by the subject. 2 Yet it is true that de Man reverts 
more strongly to the text's guidelines than Derrida. 
De Man's difference to Derrida is located rather in his concept of deconstruction's specifi­
cally linguistic and textual foundation. De Man combines poststructuralism and speech act the­
ory in his concept of a double structure of language. He defines the text's self-deconstruction as 
a product of the difference between its stating and its performative dimension: "A perfectly 
clear syntactical paradigm [ ... ] engenders a sentence that has at least two meanings, of which the 
one asserts and the other one denies its own illocutionary mode" (de Man, Allegories of Read­
ing: 10). A clear decision in favour of either of the two semantic possibilities would, however, 
only be possible by reverting to an extra-linguistic context which, of course, does not exist in 
1 iterary discourse. 3 
The text's double structure, its "blinded vision" (de Man, Blindness and Insight: 106), is 
thus not merely a self-contradiction in the sense of a logical discrepancy between two state­
ments, but expresses itself in the undermining of the text's argumentative logic through the sub­
versive character of its rhetorical structure (i.e. the performative dimension):4 
I Culler does not acknowledge this when he, following de Man, disputes Derrida by saying that a 
deconstructive reading is already presumed by the text itself (On Deconstruction: 173). 
2 About the question of authorial intention, see de Man (Allegories of Reading: 72). 
3 De Man demonstrates this with his Proust analysis of the metaphor "torrent d'activite" and its dou­
ble semantic textual function as both 'heat' and 'cold' (Allegories of Reading: 650· 
4 What is interesting about de Man's inclusion of speech act theory (which I will not explain in de­
tail) is that the performative dimension of language already includes the aspect of self-reflexivity, cf. 
Gasche C" Setzung' and 'Ubersetzung"'). 
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[Self-deconstruction] happens [ ... ] between, on the one hand, metalinguistic statements about 
the rhetorical nature of language and, on the other hand, a rhetorical praxis that puts these 
statements into a question. (de Man, Allegories of Reading: 98) 
Going back to Nietzsche, de Man revives rhetoric from its secondary status as ornament or sty­
listic figure and re-introduces it to the text's semantics - it is only its performative dynamics 
that allows for the text's cognitive project (which Derrida, according to de Man, allocated only 
to the reception). "The figurative structure is not one linguistic mode among others but it char­
acterizes language as such" (ibid.: 105). Figurality-as the operation of the substitution of iden­
tity for difference-is declared as the mode of language in general (ibid.: llOf).' 
In Rousseau's parable about the evolution of language, which introduces exactly this sub­
stituting operation, the traditional opposition of referential and metaphorical language exposes 
itself as an illusion: the metaphor precedes the proper noun. 
[ ... ] if all entities are the same, namely entities, ro the extent that they differ from each other, 
then the substitution of sameness for difference that characterizes, for Rousseau, all conceptual 
language, is built inro the very act of naming, the 'invention' of the proper noun. (ibid.: 148) 
The metaphor's blindness, its lie, is not caused by the absence of reference but by the illusion of 
an object reference which is always already suspended (ibid.: 151). This discrepancy between 
referential and figurative text mode is explained by its grammar, i.e. the adherence to the code 
- Grammar is the condition for the possibility of meaning of a text. At the same time it suspends 
the dimension of referentiality: "But just as no text is conceivable without grammar, no gram­
mar is conceivable without the suspension of referential meaning" (ibid.: 268f).2 In an almost 
dialectical counter-movement, the text always includes a promise of referentiality. The ambiva­
lent character of language produces its object reference as telas and simultaneously undermines 
it (without saying so, de Man follows here Derrida's notion of meaning and truth as being sus­
pended). The illusion of reference is therefore not erroneous thinking on the recipient's part but 
is prefigured by the text itself. 
For an interpretation practice this means that the illusion of reference, as a dimension of the 
text, cannot easily be disregarded: "It would be quite foolish to assume that one can light­
heartedly move away from the constraint of referential meaning" (ibid.: 201). De Man's theory 
is not to be conceived of as a negation of referentiality: 
In a genuine semiology as well as in other linguistically oriented theories, the referential func­
tion of language is not being denied - far from it, what is in question is the authority as a 
model for natural or phenomenal cognition. (de Man, The Resistance to Theory: 11) 
I Ray calls de Man' s poststructuralist combination of rhetoric and semantic "an act of suspension 
beyond binary choice" (Literary Meaning: 192). 
2 About de Man's argument, cf. 1.1.5. Iterability of the Sign and Grammar of the Text. 
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The aesthetic experience of undecidability instead of interpretation-called by Miller, following 
Gide, mise en abyme-opposes all constitution of meaning. That which Gasche, following Der­
rida, defines as a distinguishing feature of literature, i.e. as the specific characteristic of mod­
ernism: meaninglessness as product of ruptures in the referential play of the text, is defined 
more globally by de Man as the self-reflexive movement of all literary discourses. 
The text's inherent unreadability reflects its own ambiguous status: the non-referential play 
of reference completes, or reflects, its self-deconstruction. De Man calls this text-immanent 
metacommentary of the unresolvable self-contradiction allegory: "The allegory of reading nar­
rates the impossibility of reading" (de Man, Allegories of Reading: 7). Miller, who argues in a 
similar vein, calls the moment at which the illusionism of the text is revealed as such, the lin­
guistic moment. In it, the impasse, i.e. the incompatibility of text interpretations, is exposed. 
Thus, text is always also metatext: 
Since any narrative is primarily the allegory of its reading, it is caught in a difficult double 
bind. As long as it treats a theme (the discourse of a subject, the vocation of a writer, the con­
stitution of a consciousness), it will always lead to the confrontation of incompatible meanings 
between which it is necessary but impossible to decide in terms of truth and error. (ibid.: 76) 
The mutually exclusive and in themselves contradictory receptions of a work-and here an ex­
planation of the interpretative dilemma of traditional literary criticism in confrontation with 
(post)modern texts seems to be possible-often mirrors the alternative between two readings of 
one text. Analogous to the double structure of a text are the possibilities of a nafve and a decon­
structive reading: the former would operate with the traditional categories of understanding that 
are based on the referential model and which consequently fall behind the text's complexity; the 
latter would comprehend and explicate the text's self-deconstructive moment. A final decision 
for either of the two alternatives, however, cannot ever be reached. 
The self-deconstruction of the text, too, remains imprisoned by the boundaries of Derrida' s 
aporia of its epistemological and methodological helplessness, namely to try and postulate non­
reference in the mode of reference: "But this impossibility [of reading] necessarily extends to 
the word "reading" which is thus deprived of any referential meaning whatsoever" (ibid.: 77). I 
In contrast to Derrida' s conception of an infinite deconstruction, de Man situates his alle­
gorical metacommentary outside the deconstructive reach. For him, the self-reflection of un­
readability represents the non-transcendable limits of (self-)deconstruction. It is this irreducible 
performative moment which ultimately escapes the radical scepticism of deconstruction. Against 
Derrida's textual levels, radically playing themselves off against each other, and against his lev-
I Even though Miller's definition of this aporia of the text ("impasse", "linguistic moment") is ap­
proximate to de Man's "unreadability", the status of literature that Miller deduces from this remains am­
bivalent: from the text's self-deconstruction he concludes the supremacy of primary literature while in his 
essay "The Critic as Host" he petitions secondary literature's liberation from its derivative status. 
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elling of the textual play of reference, de Man again reconstructs a logical hierarchy in the text 
structure whose top level-the allegory of unreadability as the performative dimension of the 
tex t -evades deconstruction: 
What is at stake is the possibility of including the contradictions of reading in a narrative that 
would be able to contain them. Such a narrative would have the universal significance of an 
allegory of reading. As the report of the contradictory interference of truth and error in the 
process of understanding, the allegory would be no longer subject to the deconstructive power 
of this complication. To the extent that it is not itself demonstrably false, the allegory of the 
play of truth and falsehood would ground the stability of the text. (de Man, Allegories of 
Reading: 72) 
De Man's differentiation from Derrida is generally located in his notion of self-deconstruction, 
in his thesis of its limitation' and in his even stronger recourse to an ahistorical concept of text.' 
Much more precise, however, seems to be Gasche's verdict that de Man is closest to Derrida 
when he does not refer to him, while his explicit recourse to the concept of deconstruction is in­
compatible with Derrida (Gasche, '"Setzung' and 'Ubersetzung"': 43). To put it more bluntly: 
de Man's subversive reading strategy matches Derrida's deconstructive practice; his concept of 
text. however, cuts the French Philosopher one short of its quasi transcendental status in two 
points: 
First, the figural dimension of language-the product of the incompatibility of grammar and 
referentiality (de Man, Allegories of Reading: 270) and thus non-phenomenological constituent 
of language in general-is understood by de Man as a phenomenon of the textual leveL but as a 
rhetorical structure, its priority over metonymy is radically cancelled (cf. l.2.4. The Aesthetic 
Code). Similarly, the notion of text itself is shifted to the real text level (in contrast to Derrida's 
non-ontological, non-phenomenal conception). However, a black-and-white opposition between 
quasitranscendental Derrida and phenomenal de Man, as implied by Gasche, is to a certain de­
gree misleading: Derrida too operates with the ambivalence of his concepts when he equates 
quasitranscendental structures with stylistic phenomena on the textual level. This becomes more 
distinct, and problematic, as de Man hardly recurs to non-phenomenal structures in his argu­
ment. That de Man does not differentiate between grammar and the grammatical dimension is 
symptomatic: even though he introduces figurality as the condition for the possibility of signifi­
cation processes, in his interpretative practice (de Man, Allegories of Reading) he treats it as a 
demonstrable linguistic structure, namely as a semantic state of uncertainty between the gram­
matical dimension and the rhetoric of the text (Gasche, '" Setzung' and 'Ubersetzung"'). 
I Cf. Norris (Deconstruction) and Culler (On Deconstruction). 
2 This is, for example. Eagleton's critique (Literary Theory). 
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Second, concerning his conception of an allegorical metacorrunentary of the fictional status, this 
blending of levels prompts de Man to equate self-deconstruction with self-reflection. I However, 
a pre-deconstructionist model of self-reflexivity is, as Gasche argues conclusively, incompatible 
with Derrida's difjerance: no matter whether in relation to the identity of the subject or of the 
sign, the moment of temporality in self-referral via the Other withdraws the guarantee of iden­
tity. Subject and object of self-reference are (potentially) non-identical (Gasche, The Tain of the 
Mirror: 275). 
The infinite play of referral of the text, which functions independently from any object re­
lation, at the same time paradoxically explodes all controlled self-reference with its disseminated 
semantic: 
Though the text necessarily refers to itself, this movement never comes to completion. In addi­
tion, all self-referral, as shown in "The Double Session," is grafted on a structurally endless re­
ferral to other determinate texts, thus making all textual self-reflexivity ultimately impossible. 
(ibid.: 281)2 
Self-reflection cannot be equated with the text's knowledge about its own status but is an effect 
of the underlying textual operations, i.e. of the process of dissemination and the movement of 
the re-mark: 
The illusion of self-reflection of a text is witness only to the representational function of a text, 
not to its representation of something outside the text or its self-representation. It is the effect 
of the text's nature as a system of referral. The general text is generalized representation or 
[ ... ] generalized reference. Within such a system, no self-reflection or self-representation can 
coincide with itself to constitute itself as presence, because as representation it is already in­
scribed in the space of repetition and splitting or doubling of the self. Thus, the structure that 
best characterizes the text, and at the same time accounts for the necessity and essential limits 
of a text's self-reflection, is the structure of the re-mark, in which all textual traces are not only 
elements of referral but are also overmarked by the space of their engenderment and inscrip­
tion. The re-mark, by which the text is folded upon itself, is not, then, to be taken for a reflec­
tion. The angle of the re-mark by which the text as text is folded back upon itself excludes 'any 
possibility of its fitting back over or onto itself' [ ... ]. (ibid.: 291) 
With regard to de Man's problematic conception of self-deconstruction we will have to analyse 
in the following whether, and how, we can develop a concept of literature and which forms of a 
non-totalising, non-identity producing deconstructive self-reflexivity are hypothetically deduci­
ble from this. 
Here I am adopting Gasche's contention ("Deconstruction as Criticism"; The Tain of the Mirror). 
2 Cf. also Gasche (The Tain of the Mirror: 290). 
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1.2.3. Literariness of Discourse 
From the concept of textuality (as the common denominator of all Yale Critics) the levelling of 
the differences between literary and non-literary discourse is extended by a second context of 
reason. While Derrida operates in his argument with the rhetorical surplus of all discourses, 
which disproves the alleged control over its semantics, the Yale Critics define the (subversive) 
self-reflexivity, figurality, and the suspension of reference of the discourse much more narrowly 
than Derrida's literariness. l The binary opposition of literature as playful marginal note and the 
rational-analytical discourse of philosophy is dissolved: no discourse can deny its own figurality 
(philosophy would be a special form of a general literary discourse). Thus literary criticism, 
following its conception of itself, cannot claim a higher cognitive accomplishment in compari­
son to the literary text. Inversely, however. it conceives itself as freed from its traditional sec­
ondary status as (explicating) supplement to the text. 
This release from the object relation-nothing else is figurality-is defined by deconstruc­
tion as the freedom of the text: "this leads to the feeling of liberation and weightlessness that 
characterizes the man freed from the constraints of referential truth" (de Man. Allegories of 
Reading: 114). In the moment of suspension of reference, literature-as paradigm for all dis­
courses-becomes play. 
The metaphor of play, which is taken up by deconstruction's notion of discourse, is to be 
understood as a counter-concept to the theory of mimesis which has dominated traditional liter­
ary criticism. 2 Instead of thillking of art in the sense of the representation of an original, of an 
idea or a social reality. mimetic relations are recognised as intertextual ones, as relations be­
tween linguistic units, not, however, as between pre-semiotic ideal and semiotic imitation. 
The text's signification process is constituted by its internal play of referral which, again, is 
in (diachronous and synchronous) intertextual relation4 to other texts and which is therefore, in 
principle, open and infinite: "the text is not an autonomous or unified object, but a set of reJa-
I This is. according to Gasche, the Yale Critics' central misinterpretation of Derrida. Cf. also 1.2.1. 
Definitions. 
2 About the history of the notion of 'mimesis'. see Blumenberg ("Wirklichkejtsbegriff und 
M6glichkeiten des Romans"). - All variations in the definition of the relation between art and world have 
the underlying basic pattern that an has always been defined and evaluated through a kind of world refer­
ence. 
3 Butler attempts to differentiate a traditional concept of literature that is based on the differentiation 
of text and non-linguistic world. He separates "co-text" (the context that the fictional text has to create 
for itself) and "context" (the text's situation in the world) (lnterprewtioll. DecoflslruClion, and Ideology) . 
.j Hempfer supplies an analysis of the (problematic) ambiguity of the concept of intertextuality: the 
concept is used on several levels that are to be systematically differentiated, namely with regard to the 
relation between a few individual texts or with regard the actualisation of transindividual, epochal codes 
(PoslSlruklllrale Texllheorie: 54). 
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tions with other texts. [ ... ] The' genealogy' of the text is necessarily an incomplete network of 
conscious and unconscious borrowings" (Leitch, Deconstructive Criticism: 59). 
If one follows the deconstructionist postulation of a general literariness, the formalistic 
definition of the aesthetic code could be expanded to encompass all types of discourse. What 
Eto. following Roman Jacobson, defines as the specific characteristic of the aesthetic message, 
namely the features ambiguity and self-focusing (Eco, A Theory of Serniotics: 262), would then 
he the definition of all discourses. Literariness-as general structural feature-would thus be 
constituted by the following attributes: first, the signifiers attain matChing signifieds only from 
contextual relations; in the variable context, meaning and connotations constantly change (ibid.: 
256ff). Second, the material sides of the signifiers appear not to be arbitrary concerning their 
meanings (ibid.: 163). 
The postulation of the radical self-referentiality of the text, in which a categorical separa­
tion of literary text and interpretation is relinquished, leads the Yale Critics nonetheless to an 
explanation crisis that is only thinly veiled with notions like intertextuality and play: dec on­
structive literary criticism has not yet developed a new definition of its function. The justifica­
tion through an intertextual continuation of discourses-as supplement of a deficiency (cf. Cul­
ler, On Deconstruction: 102ff)-remains untouchable as long as it not motivated by the experi­
ence of a deficiency. This, however, would require, as Hartman's and Bloom's positions show, 
the reintroduction of the subject. 
The critique on the referential model of literature was not initiated by deconstruction at aIL 
even though the argument sometimes produces exactly this impression. The suspension of 
meaning already occurs in non-postmodern, or non-poststructuralist, literary theory fictitious­
ness is an approved mode of literary discourse. I The decisive postulation by deconstruction is 
thus not a special status of literature but precisely the expansion of the specific characterisation 
of literary discourse to embrace semiotic processes in general. On this point, deconstruction dif­
fers most obviously from other models of non-referentiality which, in their conception, keep up 
the differentiation of literature and philosophy. 
The way out of the dilemma of an indefinite, general literary discourse seems at first to be 
a pragmatically oriented conception of literature. The question whether a discourse should be 
regarded as literature, or whether the anticipation of referentiality underlies the reception or not, 
would thus depend on the historically, situationally determined decision of the reader but would 
not be decidable with semiotic criteria. The problem of determining and confining the comext 
Habermas (The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity), Iser (The Implied Reader; The Act of 
Reading) and Lodge (The Modes of Modern Writing) all presume, even though with different conceptions 
and varying theoretical suppositions, that there is an intersubjective consensus about the suspension of 
reference in literature. 
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(which is required by this pragmatic approach) remains unsolved. With Derrida, not only a text 
linguistics, but also a pragmatics-based differentiation, is impossible. 
Paradoxically, with his critique of the concept of mimesis, de Man re-introduces-albeit in­
consistent with his global definition of literariness that encompasses all types of discourses­
first, the differentiation between literary and non-literary constitution of meaning and, second, 
develops a theory of the characteristics of literature. 
First, even if de Man's subversive-and compelling-analysis of Jauss' reception aesthetics 
demonstrates his closeness to Derrida, his categorical separation of aesthetic and phenomenol­
ogical experiences differs from Derrida who works with a set of basic notions-differance, 
trace, supplement-which he applies to all areas of his theory. Derrida's supplement is not only 
a constituent of signification processes but also of psychological operations or of empirical ex­
perience. In contrast to this, de Man objects to Jauss' approach that processes of comprehen­
sion, or of experience, of the phenomenal world are not necessarily transferable to the aesthetic 
processes of understanding (de Man, The Resistance to Theory: 62). He interprets this Jaussian 
analogy as an indicator of the embodiment of the concept of aesthetics in the classical represen­
tational concept of literature - Jauss' understanding of literature is thus a mimetic one. 
From his critique of mimetics, de Man also derives his preference of allegory over symbol. 
According to him, Cratylism-as aesthetic phenomenon-is the (futile) attempt to transcend the 
non-referentiality and the arbitrariness of language: 
To the extent that Cratylism assumes a convergence of the phenomenal aspects of language, as 
sound, with its signifying function as referent, it is an aesthetically orientated conception; one 
could, in fact, without distortion, consider aesthetic theory [ ... ] as the complete unfolding of the 
model of which the Cratylian conception of language is a version (ibid.: 9) 
The perception of the conventional relation between signifier and signified, as realised in alle­
gory, suspends, according to de Man, the aesthetic-mimetic function: 
Allegory names the rhetorical process by which the literary text moves from a phenomenal, 
world-orientated to a grammatical, language-orientated direction. It thus also names the mo­
ment when aesthetic and poetic values part company. (ibid.: 68) 
Second, although de Man declares a semiotic/linguistic substantiation of the specifically literary 
as invalid, he assigns the highest level to the deconstructive capacity of literary texts. He dis­
places the problem of the definition of literature to the extent of its being conscious of its own 
fictitiousness: 
The self-reflecting mirror-effect by means of which a work of fiction asserts, by its very exis­
tence, its separation from empirical reality, its divergence, as a sign, from a meaning that de­
pends for existence on the constitutive activity of this sign, characterizes the work of literature 
in its essence. (ibid.: 17) 
58 Deconstruction 
Notwithstanding Derrida's contention against speech act theory (cf. 1.1.5. Iterability of the Sign 
and Grammar of the Text), de Man operates here to a certain degree with an argument that is 
similar to, for example, Searle and Habermas' who both argue that the suspension of literature's 
claim for truth, or reference generates the specific force of literature. Because of its own decon­
structive potential, literature does not require a demystification by the recipient. All the while de 
Man does not discuss how this textual consciousness is to be understood without recourse to a 
sUbject (as either producer or as recipient). That the interpreter de Man, in view of a task which 
necessarily has to fall short of the aesthetic-cognitive force of a text, does not surrender in fa­
vour of a purely metacritical professional practice seems peculiar and has accordingly been 
commented upon by critics.! It seems justified to accuse de Man here of falling back upon an 
existentialist concept of I iterature. 2 
That which so far has not been critically discussed is the immanent contradictions of de 
Man's conception. He ascribes a specifically deconstructive force to the literary text which is 
motivated by its insight into its own non-reference. This manifests itself in the rupture between 
the rhetorical and the semantic level of the text, which means that although the self­
deconstruction specific to literature is based in pragmatics, de Man demonstrates it in the text's 
semantic structure. His not quite clear concept of literature thus admits an unintentional 'legiti­
misation' of a semiotic differentiation of discourses. 
1.2.4. The Aesthetic Code 
On the basis of the theory of deconstruction, and especially on Paul de Man's text theory, we 
can develop a working thesis of a (specifically postmodern) deconstructive self-referentiality 
whose verification, however, will only be achieved through the analysis of the novels in the 
following part of this dissertation. 
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the American branch of deconstruction defines 
the literariness of all language through its figurality and its self-deconstructive moment. Here 
Gasche's idea-that the self-reflexive movement of self-deconstruction is to be reduced by the 
forces of unity and identity-has to be taken into consideration. In the following, I will therefore 
Abrams, for example, asks the polemic question about the function of literary criticism in general 
("The Deconstructive Angel": 434). - Bove contests de Man's definition of the relation between litera­
ture and literary criticism: "Poems and novels then are [according to de Man] implicitly misreadings, in­
terpretations of other poems, novels and interpretations. In fact, one might extrapolate from this that po­
ems are interpretations of other poems and subject, therefore, to the same structure of blindness and in­
sight, of differance, which 'afflicts' critical discourse. Poetry exists in condition of truth and error" (De­
constructive Poetics: 47f). 
2 Cf. Spanos ("Breaking the Circle": 423) and Bove (Deconstructive Poetics: 32, 291). 
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try to develop first, a new definition of literary figurality, and, second, some preliminary 
thoughts on an open, non-identical self-referential text. The aim of which cannot be to achieve a 
comprehensive structural/conceptual framework as this would be in stark contrast to the post­
structuralist concept of text as decentred structure. As the codes are individual and inexhausti­
ble, Barthes was prompted to consciously and artificially limit them within his (post)structuralist 
analytical technique (Barthes, S/Z). In this dissertation I will not, however, adopt Barthes' ac­
knowledgement of the arbitrariness in the definition of structures, or of codes it is not about 
the registration of codes as a reconstruction of the work but about the question which specific 
forms of (selj)deconstruction are possible in the aesthetic medium. I also do not claim that my 
hypothesis, which is a deduction from the theoretical basics of deconstruction, concerning all 
possible forms of the self-deconstructive novel, is complete. 
Recourse to de Man's critical investigation of the problem of figurality and to Derrida's ex­
ploding of the notion of genre is reasonable for a limitation of specifically literary forms of self­
deconstruction. 
The lie of the metaphor was defined by its ambivalence toward its own status: by attempt­
ing to conceal its non-referentiality by promising truth, i.e. reference, (cf. 1.2.2. Grammar and 
Rhetoric), it necessarily produces metaphysical illusions. Regarding the substitution on the 
paradigmatic axis, through which the metaphor constructs itself,l the dissimulation appears as 
the thinking of presence of the one through the other, which however is always already semioti­
cally mediated. 2 Eco describes, in agreement with deconstruction, its semiotic function: 
[...J 'similarity' no longer involves a suspected resemblance based on the thing itself [ ... J; a 
'similarity' between semantic markers is simply a semic identity. On the other hand metonymy 
often seems to be a simple matter of overcoding: substitution by syntagmatic contiguity is based 
on the fact that, given a ready-made syntagm, established habits will permit one of its elements 
to be substituted by another. (Eco, A Theory of Semiotics: 280) 
As the equivalence is determined by approximations and relations within the code, i.e. by conti­
guity,3 the metaphorical substitution is based on a metonymic practice (ibid.). 
1 The structuralist definition of the concepts of metaphor and metonymy are adopted from Lodge 
(The Modes ofModern Writing: 75[) who in turn takes up Roman Jacobson's definitions. 
2 Butler too holds on to this traditional concept of metaphor, opposing deconstruction. Yet his words 
betray that a relation to world does not generate the possibility of recognising similarities: "The grounds 
of likeness in metaphors thus involve all sorts of conventions of reference to the real world [ ... ]. Meta­
phor consists in the implication by likeness of a certain description of the world [ ... ]" (Interpretation, 
Deconstruction and Ideology: 16). The likeness thus does not exist between objects but between cultural 
units, or the semantically transmitted unity of meaning. Therefore, the (aesthetic) experience of likeness 
is based on a syntagmatic combination in the code. 
3 Eco indicates-in the sense of a poststructuralist model-that the metaphor's dependence on conti­
guities in the code does not exclude the possibility of change, i.e. the creation of new relations. 
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De Man formulates a similar argument in favour of metonymy as substitution on the syntag­
matic axis, which traditionally has been degraded as an "accidental II connection (Culler, The 
Pursuit of Signs: 191) in comparison with the "essential resemblance" of metaphors, I in the 
analysis of a passage by Proust in which he uncovers the contradiction between the metaliterar­
ily explicated priority of the metaphor (as the expression of the notion of presence) on the one 
hand, and the metonymic linguistic practice of Proust's text on the other hand: 
In a passage that abounds in successful and seductive metaphors and which, moreover, explic­
itly asserts the superior efficacy of metaphor over that of metonymy, persuasion is achieved by 
a figural play in which contingent figures of chance masquerade deceptively as figures of ne­
cessity. (de Man, Allegories of Reading: 67) 
With its own rhetorical practice, the text therefore deconstructs its metaphorical surface struc­
ture. Correspondingly, in another passage of Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu de Man 
can demonstrate in a deconstructive reading commanded by the text itself, how the involuntary 
recollection as unity of subject and object, of thing and idea, collapses in the discrepancy be­
tween the non-tangible object and the individual's projections. De Man comments: 
Banal when taken by itself, the observation acquires considerable negative power in context, 
when one notices that it occurs at the center of a passage whose thematic and rhetorical strategy 
it reduces to naught. For if the "proximity" between the thing and the idea of thing fails to pass 
the test of truth, then it fails to acquire the complementary and totalizing power of metaphor 
and remains reduced to "the chance of a mere association of ideas." (ibid.: 71) 
In accordance with Eco's semiotic theory, the metaphor exposes itself here as metonymy. In 
contrast to Eco, de Man is more concerned with the metaphorical effectiveness of a metonymic 
passage and less with the metaphor's already remote semiotic-metonymic origin. A relation of 
simultaneity is shifted into a temporal succession. 
De Man maintains an inversion of the opposition in favour of metonymy, but demonstrates 
the mutual play of the substitution modes which makes it difficult to differentiate them as rhe­
torical figures: metonymy, on its part, disguises itself as metaphor, as figure of necessity. 2 
The deconstruction of an opposition of a non-semiotic likeness and likeness as semiotic 
construct is also predominant in de Man's attack against conventional poetological preferences, 
such as the Romance theory of art's organic symbol, in comparison to which allegory was 
looked down upon as mechanic and arbitrary (i.e. as purely semiotic, artificial construct). The 
Romance notion of symbol, as de Man explains the linguistic turn, mystifies a semiotic relation 
Lodge, too, detects a "bias toward metaphor" in both traditional and stJucturalist poetics (The 
Modes ofModem Writing: 92). 
2 In contrast, Lodge, in his outline of a new history of literature, seems to presume, in spite of his 
critique on the traditional oppositions, the possibility of a semiotic differentiation of metaphor and me­
tonymy (The Modes ofModem Writing). 
I 
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as a referential ("organic") one. Allegory, in contrast, reveals exactly the (arbitrary) contiguity 
and temporality. It refers to its non-presence and its being semiotic and is thus more authentic. 
The self-reflexive act of literature, which produces a relation between semiotic levels, is, ac­
cording to de Man's terminology, therefore allegorical - the self-deconstruction of the text de­
fines it as allegory (de Man, The Resistance to Theory; cf. 1.2.3. Literariness of Discourse). 
Derrida's theory of text explicitly ascribes to all discourses-and therefore not only to 
(post)modern literature-a trace, marking its belonging to it. (This can, but not necessarily, be 
the author's intention.) According to Derrida, such a self-referential commentary about its own 
genre paradoxically disproves exactly the text's genre: the commentary itself is not part of the 
genre. The text-immanent self-classification 'unlocks' the text's limits and determines it, in 
principle, as open (Derrida, "The Law of Genre"). I Derrida operates here with the paradox of a 
class that contains itself as an element. The boundary between genre and its classification is 
blurred by text-immanence as the text transcends its own class in the self-reflexive act of classi­
fication: "[ ... ] this supplementary and distinctive trait, a mark of belonging or inclusion, does 
not properly pertain to any genre or class. The re-mark of belonging does not belong" (ibid.: 
61). Derrida deduces from this paradox the following: 
[ ... ] a text cannot belong to no genre, it cannot be without or less a genre. Every text partici­
pates in one or several genres, yet such participation never amounts to belonging. And not be­
cause of an abundant overflowing of free, anarchic, and unclassifiable productivity. but because 
of the trait of participation itself, because of the effect of the code and of the generic mark. 
Making genre its mark, a text demarcates itself. (ibid.) 
Derrida therefore postulates, against a theory of genre-classification, that the law of the law, i.e. 
the law of genre, is its transcendence: "the law of the law genre [ ... ] is precisely a principle of 
contamination, a law of impurity, a parasitical economy" (ibid.: 55). 
However, that which Derrida defines here as a moment of the self-reflexive force of text­
which however can never control its dissemination-is not yet a characteristic specific to litera­
ture. He quotes Blanchot's text La folie dujour as a paradigm of such a deconstructive force: 
It is thus impossible to decide whether an event, account, account of event, or event of ac­
counting took place. Impossible to settle upon the simple borderlines of this corpus, of this el­
lipse unremittingly repealing itself with its own expansion. (ibid.: 67) 
I This definition of the "open text" has to be differentiated from the "open work of art", which-in 
the sense of a work in progress-is structurally incomplete, or which describes its own production and 
which invites the recipient to the act of closure or the filling up of the gaps. Eco names the post-Webern 
poetics as an example (The Role of the Reader: 56). The open text, in contrast, is determined by its 
structural and semantic ambivalence which is based on the text-immanent model reader (or in Wolfgang 
Iser's terminology: the implied reader) as a strategic structural characteristic which allows for more than 
one possible reception (ibid.: 9ff). 
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Important is the aesthetic-conscious ambivalence of the text which makes the flow of its seman­
tic, or its reception instruction, uncontrollable. The text's self-deconstruction produces this very 
state of uncertainty which promises neither identity nor non-identity, but which perpetually os­
cillates between these two poles. Elsewhere, Derrida speaks similarly about Mallarme' s text: 
[ ... ] the quasi-' meaning' of dissemination is the impossible return to the rejoined, readjusted 
unity of meaning, the impeded march of any such reflection. But is dissemination then the loss 
of that kind of truth, the negative prohibition of all access to such a signified? Far from presup­
posing that a virgin substance thus precedes or oversees it, dispersing or withholding itself in a 
negative second moment, dissemination affirms the always already divided generation of 
meaning. Dissemination-spills it in advance. (Derrida, Dissemination: 268) 
The exploding of the semantic unity and the de-limitation of genre is, according to Derrida and 
de Man, a quality that is inherent to all texts. Thus literature would still be something else: it 
incorporates its semantic non-identity, the diacritic traces of presence and absence, into the 
meaning-generating textual structure. Derrida himself points out the correspondences on the se­
mantic level. As I have already said (cf. 1.2.1. Definitions), Derrida finds Mallarme's blanche 
as realised metaphor and empty space, semantic presence and diacritic absence between seman­
tic units. The empty space brings out the thematic units, however, disappears again in the act of 
production again - ad infinitum. This-asymmetric-dialectic of presence and absence, of "Sag­
barem" and "Unsagbarem"l (Frank, Das Sagbare und das Unsagbare) almost shines through the 
text. The 'unmentionable' produces a semantic remainder that cannot be achieved on the level of 
semantics (Derrida, Dissemination: 252). Literature attests its irreducibility to an extratextual 
origin or t6 a textual point of reference which could guarantee semantic stability. The self­
deconstructive text resembles a hall of mirrors in which the spectators eventually lose them­
selves. 
Hence, self-deconstruction is not to be understood simply as the negation of reference and 
meaning for, as deconstruction postulates in the aporia of its technique, the negation of mean­
ingfulness too again creates meaning. From a formal point of view, this seems to imply non­
thematised structures for the self-deconstructive novel which would place its semantics into a 
relation of reference that, in principle, cannot sway to either side, i.e. that produces ever-new 
semantic circles. 
With this we can formulate a differentiation between, on the one hand, self-reflexivity as 
commentary on the assumed own textual identity and, on the other, self-deconstruction: self­
deconstruction would be a form of self-reference in which the subject and the object of the re­
flection diverge. and which, in contrast to self-reflection, makes this moment of non-identity ap­
parent. 
I The "mentionable" and the "unmentionable" [my translation]. 
63 Deconstruction in Literary Criticism 
Derrida's understanding of literature thus seems to match de Man's conceptual shift to the text's 
self-deconstruction; the former, however, implies a historic specification (Derrida quotes exclu­
sively from modernist works) from which the latter abstains. 
With its concept of literature, or self-deconstruction, the deconstructive text theory reaches 
a point of transformation, which at first seems to continue the de-limitation between the­
ory/criticism and literary text. At the same time, however, it introduces a differentiation be­
tween text and self-deconstructive text, i.e. between literature that is to be deconstructed and lit­
erature with which the deconstructive text theory seems to deconstruct itself: deconstructive text 
theory describes texts which steer the process of reception toward non-mimesis, originlessness, 
etc. as themes; self-deconstruction would thus be a structurally rooted premise of text that is re­
alised in the act of reception. Hence, the deconstructive dimension is transferred into the text by 
the self-contradiction of the theory. From this follows that deconstruction has to suffer all the 
problems of semiotic verifiability, at least in literary criticism, which it had wanted to skip with 
its levelling of discourse distinctions. 
A tentative definition of self-deconstructive texts as literature cannot express anything about 
their content or their formal design. However, a preliminary limitation to a genre (including its 
self-classification), which in this dissertation is the novel, seems sensible in order to restrict, 
amongst others, problems of semantic and pragmatic conventions. The knowledge of the text, 
that the movement of the folding can never return to its origin, would thus be an effect in the 
play of its structure. Yet this would only be demonstrable by a momentary fixation of its struc­
tural composition - only then the correspondences concerning its deconstructive self-exploding 
on various levels could be reconstructed. Such an analytical model would be Eco's idiolect 
model (Eco, A Theory of Semiotics: 270ff). 
It is only against the background of a conventional structure of the literary text that the pos­
sibilities of its subversion can become visible as structures that in the moment of self-reflection 
suspend the meaning of the text. Bearing in mind the aporia of the deconstructive technique, we 
have to ask in turn whether the text can indeed produce meaninglessness: to what extent does 
the text not necessarily always (with a widening of semantic conventions, i.e. comprehensibil­
ity) generate a new understanding which in turn has to be surpassed? 
My thesis is that there are specific forms of self-deconstruction in the aesthetic medium of 
the novel whose deconstructive forces concerning semiotics and aesthetics can be distinguished 
from non-narrative texts. The basis of my notion is not an essentialist conception of literature, 
of which de Man has been accused, but an understanding of literature (here: of the novel) in the 
sense of narrative (and thematic) discourse conventions. Its is not irrelevant that the boundary to 
non-narrative and (intentionally) non-fictional discourse is indistinct: the formal conventions of 
narrativity operate with a layering of discourse levels which from an aesthetic point of view can 
produce a complex communication practice in the sense of doublings, multiple reflections and 
semantic distortions. Their characteristic is the production of irreconcilable paradoxes which, 
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according to the definition of self-deconstruction, let the text fluctuate in the ambivalence be­
tween affirmation and negation. The fusion of narrative levels-which, according to the tradi­
tional function, would have to be kept logically apart-or the suspension of the hierarchy of nar­
rative levels, lends to a certain degree more radical and more consequent potentiality to a de­
construction of meaning, as it is aesthetically consummated, instead of being argumentatively­
rhetorically postulated. The result would be a logical and pragmatic circle which cannot be 
solved by a distinction of class and element. What remains yet to be explained is to what extent 




1 .3. 1. Definitions 
"Write as I will [ ... ] I shall never overtake myself" - with this statement the narrator in Tris­
tram Shandy (Book 4, chap. 13) has already captured the problem of self-reflexivity in the novel 
(or. here more specifically for the narrator). At the same time. this quote indicates that the phe­
nomenon metaJiction-self-reflexive literature-is not really an invention of the twentieth cen­
tury but that it can in fact be traced back to the very origin of the genre. 
The doubling of Sterne's narrator in subject ("I") and object ("myself") reveals the central 
problematic of metafjetion. The novel is, at least to a large extent, its own topic. It is for a rea­
son that Tristram Shandy's choice of the verb 'overtake' leads to an association of Achilles and 
the tortoise. I The narrator's--{)r the novel's-reference to itself produces temporal and logical 
problems-paradoxes-which critical literature has tried to deal with by applying various theo­
retical approaches. 2 A cause for the multitude of new studies on this topic is the undeniable 
boom in the production of self-reflexive literature in the second half of this century. 3 Thus. 
metafictionality seems to be especially characteristic of (post)modern literature; the following 
thoughts do not, however, assume that the novel realises itself as a theme only in modernism. 
In relation to the issues discussed in this dissertation, the fundamental methodological ques­
tion here is to what extent-from the perspective of a deconstructive theory of text-the phe­
nomenon metaJietion can be circumscribed as a concept and be regarded as a (dominant) char­
acteristic of a (literary) historical epoch. Relatively recent works on metafietion disregard this 
caution. even though they invariably cite deconstruction . .t 
The deconstructive reading as it is practised by the Yale Critics does indeed investigate the 
autotextual self-deconstructive movement of texts. In this, as the analysis of de Man's texts 
showed. they partly equate self-reflection with self-deconstruction (cf. 1.2.1. Definitions). Yet, 
this does not pay attention to the fact that Derrida does not understand the (self)deconstructive 
I In Hofstadter, the fictitious dialogues between Achilles and the tortoise go paradigmatically 
through the problems of self-referentiality (Godel, Escher, Bach). 
2 Cf. de Man (Allegories of Reading). - Most works on self-referential literature however establish 
only a vague relation between new literary theories, without developing clear explanatory models. 
3 Cf. the bibliographies in Waugh (Metajiction: 155-169), Hutchinson (Games Authors Play: 124­
128) and Hutcheon (Narcissistic Narrative: 118-135). 
4 Cf. the works of Waugh (Metajiction), Hutcheon (Narcissistic Narrative; A Theory of Parody) and 
McHale (Postmodernist Fiction). especially McHale cites an almost incredible combination of literary 
theories. 
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movement of the text as self-reflexivity. I Similarly, he does not position the text's deconstruc­
rive movement on the discursive level (on which the narrator's self-reflection functions in Tris­
tram Shandy), as it is rather the product of the play between the semantic and the rhetoric di­
mension. Furthermore, the fundamental difference between an approach which attempts to sys­
rematise metafiction as literary phenomenon and the text theory of deconstruction has com­
pletely been neglected. The theoretical works on the genre 'novel' differentiate, at least implic­
itly, between self-referential and other, namely mimetic, literature while deconstruction assumes 
rhat self-reflection is a characteristic of all texts and that consequently a systematic typology is 
impossible (cL 1.2.4. The Aesthetic Code). Already formalism and structuralism generally de­
fined all literary texts by the characteristic of their autoreflexivity. 2 
How can we now define meta fiction against this background? For the time being we will 
exclude deconstruction's central objection against a differentiation of discourse types in order to 
demarcate the field within literary criticism. 
Metafiction-as fictional text which thematises itself-breaks the categorical distinction of 
fictional and critical discourse. 3 At this point the critical investigations on the theory of the 
novel and deconstructive text theory are generally in agreement. In comparison to literary the­
ory's understanding of the concept of metalanguage, the term meta fiction seems to be much 
wider: it refers not only to a discursive reflection of semiotic aspects but to "the whole process 
of composition and reception of literary texts" (Rose, ParodyllMetafiction: 65). 
On the whole, however, a more precise understanding of the prefix 'meta-' is necessary, 
especially with regard to the alienation strategies which meta fiction employs: meta- denotes an 
intratextual relation of various elements of the novel, whereas parody refers intenextually to 
other texts. 4 In the interpretation practice this differentiation cannot, however. be strictly main­
tained: metafictional parody, for example, is extremely intratextual in that it uses its own narra­
tive as the target of its parody, rather than other texts or discourses. The term metafictional 
parody is indicative of the close relationship between self-reflexivity and parody in the novel: a 
novel can only demonstrate its roots in the historical tradition via the parodistic reception and 
distortion of pre-texts. Metafictional parody reveals tradition as an element of its own semantics 
before it can be transcended. 
I Flores neglects this completely when equating self-referential and self-deconstructive literature: 
"The quality of literariness in such texts, irrespective of their conventional genres, might be described as 
a certain fictiveness (events or identities neither present or absent) akin to the play of difJerance [ ... J. 
Texts marked by such literariness are those which are likely to seem already deconstructed or which an­
ticipate the deconstructionist commentator, who is thus left with little to do" (The Rhetoric of DOUbtful 
AuthoriTy: 11 t). 
2 Cf. Eco (A Theory of Semiotics: 261ft). 
3 See Boyd (The Reflexive Novel: 15). 
4 By equating meta fiction and parody, Rose (ParodyIIMetafiction: 65) blurs exactly this difference 
be[ween parody as intertextual relation on the one hand, and meta fiction as combination of intertextual 
and intratextual relations on the other. 
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The relationship between text production and text reception in the text itself is hinted at by the 
emphasis on the narrative form. The textual structure does not only produce instructions for its 
reception itself but makes them (implicitly or explicitly) apparent as such (Scholes, "Language, 
Narrative. and Anti-Narrative": 207). This auto-production of the literary code, which then can 
become the inherent pre-text of a self-parody, motivates the meta fiction-research I s affinity to re­
ception-aesthetic approaches. I At the same time they often neglect that Wolfgang Iser does not 
in any way want the textual structure of the implied reader be understood as characteristic of 
self-referential texts (see Iser, The Implied Reader). 
Paradoxically, it is this very thematisation of the reading process in the novel which pro­
duces its autonomy: the text creates, apart from semiotic and narrative conventions on which it 
has to rely, the rules of its own play, cut loose from the world. 
It has often been explained that the self-definition of metafictlon as play is tied to a literary 
tradition. We have to emphasise, however, that the notion of play in metafiction is not bound to 
the context of a specific aesthetics but that, in fact, it shows many variations concerning its po­
etic function. 2 Important is the notion's affinity to the postmodern discourse theories of Derrida 
and Lyotard: play represents the lack of origin and the non-reference of the discourse (cf. 1.1.4. 
Dissemination). 
In the critical literature on metafietion, bot the terminology and its link to the literary tradi­
tion are handled, or interpreted, differently. Alter talks about the "self-conscious novel",} 
Scholes of "anti-narrative" ("Language, Narrative, and Anti-Narrative") and of "metafiction" 
which he distinguishes from "fabulation" (Fabulation and Metafiction) , while Michael Boyd 
seems to prefer the term "reflexive novel" (The Reflexive Novel). However, the terminology 
meta fiction is most common in Anglo-American criticism and seems to be at the same time the 
most unproblematic as it does not specify the level, or the kind, of self-reference (of the narra­
tor or of the text, that is). It is unavoidable that a clear distinction between literature with self­
referential elements and metafietion (as predominantly self-referential literature) cannot be 
maintained rigorously. 
In his more historically oriented argument, 4 Robert Alter interprets the self-referential novel 
as a reaction to the fragmentation of the perception of reality. The novel therefore, according to 
I Strongly reception-aesthetically oriented works are Boyd (The Reflexive Novel), Hutcheon (Narcis­
sistic Narrative; A Theory of Parody) and McHale (Postmodernist Fiction). 
2 Hutchinson produces in his work (Games Authors Play: Sff) a historical overview of the notion of 
play in aesthetics. 
3 "A self-conscious novel, briefly, is a novel that systematically flaunts its own condition of artifice 
and that by so doing probes into the problematic relationship between real-seeming artifice and reality" 
(Alter, Partial Magic: x). 
4 Alter sketches the historical development of self-referential literature from the eighteenth to the 
twentieth century; in the nineteenth century, however, Vanity Fair is the only novel that follows this tra­
dition (Partial Magic). 
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Alter, does not mirror social reality but rather the experience that a reference to this reality is 
no longer possible: 
But when history seems to have become intractable to the imagination, there is a certain ten­
dency for the writer [ ... ] to turn back toward his own creative activities, to affirm the integrity 
of his work against a background of historical chaos by directing attention to the strategies of 
art through which the work has to come into being. (Alter, Partial Magic: 149) 
Concurrent with the subjective perspective of the experience of reality is the consciousness of 
contingency, which, says Alter, finds its aesthetic expression in the admission of the arbitrari­
ness and fictitiousness of the 'portrayed' (ibid.: 17f). Similarly, Waugh locates the relation of 
metafiction to reality in its negation, i.e. the thematisation of discontinuity of said relation. At 
the same time, however, she interprets the technique of framing as a structure which, as the 
condition for insight, determines the reception of fiction as well as the perception of social real­
ity (Waugh, Metafiction: 9). 
Hutcheon and Scholes attempt to rescue the mimetic quality of meta fiction by claiming a 
"mimesis of process" as opposed to a traditional "mimesis of product" for the self-referential 
novel (Hutcheon, Narcissistic Narrative: chap. 2), or, by promoting the act of reception itself to 
the object of mimetic representation. I This implies the replacement of a nai've understanding of 
reality as totality. Reality is, according to Hutcheon, construed solely in the perspectival com­
position of the perceiving subject. The subjective semiotic construction of reality is thematised 
or mirrored by self-referential literature and its representative capability is therefore not sus­
pended: "autorepresentation is still representation" (ibid.: 6). 
Michael Boyd, too, recognises in this questioning of a naive notion of reality, or of mime­
SIS, the driving force of metafiction. He defines self-reflexivity as a variant of an anti-realism 
that parodistically questions the epistemological innocence of the realist novel of the nineteenth 
century: "For the antirealist, reality is a protean, a mental construct bereft of the certitude given 
by the belief in any universal laws of the mind. Everyone is a novelist" (Boyd, The Reflexive 
Novel: 18). Even though the psychological novel and the symbolist novel turn against the realist 
novel, they retain-in modified form-a concept of representation (ibid.: 18ff).2 The reflexive 
novel according to Boyd is, in contrast, antirealist and antimimetic: 
Scholes calls such novels "anti-narrative": "[They] can quite properly be seen as attempts to frus­
trate our automatic application of these codes to all our event-texts. Such anti-narratives are in this sense 
metafictional because they ultimately force us to draw our attention away from the construction of a 
diegesis according to our habitual interpretive processes. By frustrating this sort of closure, they bring 
the codes themselves to the foreground of our critical attention, requiring us to see them as codes rather 
than as aspects of human nature or the world. The function of anti-narrative is to problematize the entire 
process of narration and interpretation for us" ("Language, Narrative, and Anti-Narrative": 207). 
2 Boyd differentiates the reflexive novel from other forms of the anti-realist novel, especially from 
the psychological, symbolist and from the non-fictional documentary novel (The Reflexive Novel: 19ff). 
They have an ambivalent attitude toward the problem of realism in common: on the one hand, they refer 
I 
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Fiction that looked at itself, that was reflexive, would not be creating yet another fictional 
world that needed to be related to the 'real' world: it would take as its 'object' the relationship 
between 'real' world and fictional worlds. It would be a species of criticism in fictional form. 
CaB it metafiction. Or call it the reflexive novel, the novel about the novel--onanisticaBy or 
perhaps incestuously using its own imaginative energy to sustain itself [ ... ] the reflexive novel 
focuses on the fiction-making process itself. (ibid.: 23)1 
Although Michael Boyd comes to a conclusion that is directly opposed to Hutcheon-Boyd talks 
about "antimimetic literature" while Hutcheon speaks of a II mimesis of process II -they coincide 
in their understanding of the representative field of metafiction. 
In her study, Hutcheon goes on to develop a typology of the various forms of self­
referentiality. She distinguishes between 'linguistic' and 'diegetic I forms on the one hand, and 
open (thematised) and hidden methods (Hutcheon, Narcissistic Narrative: 17ft) on the other. 
Thus, there are four discernible types: 
Overt I I Covert 
Diegetic 
'plot allegory', parody, 
narrator commentary, etc. 
I 
1 Detective novel, fable, fantasy 




Thematisation of the possibilities 
and limits of language; thematisa­
tion of fictitiousness I 
Riddle, joke, pun, anagram, etc. 
Although I do not want to deny the significance of such a typology-it is a tool to describe a 
field of aesthetic phenomena-, the theoretical basis is to a certain degree unstable. The system­
atic differentiation between open and hidden forms would only bsensible if there were a higher 
authority (in the sense of text-, narrator- or author-consciousness) that could be acceded or de­
nied a controlled consciousness of self-referentiality. However, with a pragmatically oriented 
concept of literature, which Hutcheon demands, the forms 'open' and 'hidden' are dependent on 
the reader's consciousness, and thus on the pragmatic context, and cannot therefore be system­
atically differentiated in this way. In fact, Hutcheon's later admission that there are always vari­
ous forms of self-referentiality at play proves, or confirms, the deconstructive liquefaction of 
typologies. 
Boyd's approach is more interesting insofar as he understands the genesis of self-referential 
literature in the twentieth century as a turning point for the realist novel (see 1.3.2. Metafiction 
and the Evolution of the Genre Novel). According to Boyd, the reflexive novel is marked by its 
to an extra-literary object, on the other, they criticise the conventional forms of the representation of re­
ality. 
1 Cf. also Boyd (The Reflexive Novel: 36). 
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literary alienation techniques, I by the paradigm of Iinguicity, by its explicit fictionalisation of its 
characters as well as by its performative character (Boyd, The Reflexive Novel: 34). Boyd re­
frains, however, from attempting to differentiate types of discourse systematically. Metafiction 
is therefore rather to be seen as a (gradual) 'density' of self-reflexivity of a literary text. This 
does not exclude the possibility that, in less radical forms of literary self-reflexivity, the mimetic 
relation to world is not entirely suspended. 
1.3.2. Metafiction and the Evolution of the Genre 'Novel' 
With regard to the discussion around the historical evolution of the genre 'novel' and its specifi­
cally (post-)modern form one has to ask whether meta fiction can be considered as either a con­
stant genre characteristic of the novel, or as a historical form that is developing only now. 
There is general consensus that the novel is already born with traces2 of self-reflexivity. 
The parody of the knight romance in Cervantes' Don Quixote and the extensive self-reflection of 
the narrative impossibility to capture life in writing in Sterne's Tristram Shandy are usually 
cited as evidence. 
Equally agreed, however, is a historical development to almost exclusively self-referential 
forms of the novel in the twentieth century. Socio-historical and literature-immanent poetologi­
cal reasons are asserted. Thus the necessity for the new form's legitimisation, or the novel's 
new claim to totality (namely, that it has to reflect the world's complexity in itself) are seen as 
the aesthetic motivation of self-referentiality for Fielding and Sterne. 
Boyd's interpretation of the development of meta fiction in the twentieth century seems to be 
the most interesting as it-in agreement with Hutcheon, Alter, Waugh, et al.-finds the respon­
sibility for the novel's 'bending back' onto itself in the growing problematic of reality as con­
struct on the one hand, but equally in the formal developments that are derived from aesthetic 
problems of the question of representation. Seen historically, it is exactly the mimetic refine­
ment in the psychological novel which leads to a non-mimetic self-reflexivity. With the repre­
sentation of processes in consciousness, the perspective gradually shifts to linguistic processes. 
Experiments with language slowly lead toward a thematisation of language as the novel's self-
Boyd, however, sees a, from my poim of view untenable, analogy to Brecht's Verfremdungseffekt 
(The Reflexive Novel: 27f), a view which completely neglects Brecht's firm roots in realism as well as his 
didactic ambitions. 
2 Cf. Alter (Partial Magic: 149; "Mimesis and the Motive for Fiction": 238); Boyd (The Reflexive 
Novel: 15); Waugh (Merajiction: 5) and Hutcheon (A Theory ofParody: 8). 
I 
Meta/ietion 71 
reflection (Boyd, The Reflexive Novel: 20, 119ff).1 Mimetic intention changes dialectically into 
its opposite: 
It is only when the search for a new language in which to portray the life of the minds leads to 
an awareness of the artificiality of all invented languages that the various forms of psychologi­
cal fiction prepare the way for a rejection of verisimilitude as a norm. (ibid.: 170). 
With its reflection of linguicity and fictitiousness of the experience of self and world, the novel 
can now become, says Boyd, the paradigm for the epistemological scepticism of modernism in 
general: 
When language loses its transparency, its ability to represent things, then literature-that use of 
language which by its fictive nature, has always expressed a problematical relation to things­
will be seen to offer itself as a kind of model in the process of questioning the representational 
qualities of language. (ibid.) 
With the abandonment of representation, concludes Boyd in agreement with Foucault and 
against the transhistorical conception of non-referentiality of deconstruction, metafiction is lo­
cated in the centre of modernism and identifies itself therefore as a historical phenomenon 
(ibid.: 171). 
But if self-reflexivity-and in this I follow Michael Boyd's views-has, on the one hand, a 
special affinity to modernism and postmodernism, while on the other, it is a constant throughout 
the history of the novel, then it has to be asked to what extent specifically modern or postmod­
ern forms of self-reflexivity can be determined. Literary criticism with its affirmation of an in­
crease in self-reflexivity has, to my knowledge, not pursued a more precise answer to this ques­
tion. In the following chapter, I will take up aspects of the debate around postmodernism in or­
der to be able to develop theoretical historical boundaries of modern and postmodern forms of 
self-reflexivity. 
1.3.3. Metafiction and Postmodernism 
The deluge of publications that are primarily concerned with defining postmodernism clearly in­
dicates that we cannot speak of one theory. 2 These essays are, most often quite misleadingly. 
based on equally unclear definitions of modernism: whether modernism begins with the Enlight-
I Boyd names as the last mimetic chapter in Ulysses "Scylla and Charybdis", as first non-mimetic, 
i.e. exclusively self-reflexive passage, the "Wandering Rocks" episode (The Reflexive Novel: 123). 
2 We can distinguish socia-historical (Jameson, Newman), historio-cultural or historio-philosophical 
(Lyotard), and aesthetic theories (Hassan, Sontag) of postmodernism. 
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enment, with the Romantic period or with the aesthetic modernism of the turn of the century is 
usually kept vague. 
Lyotard's argument confirms that the concepts of modernism and postmodernism cannot be 
thought of separately when he links philosophical postmodernism with the aesthetics of mod­
ernism and thus evades a systematic separation as well as a historical periodisation (Lyotard, 
"What is Postmodernism?"; The Differend). With this move, his aesthetics combines the em­
phatic autonomy conception of the art of classical modernism with the conceptually contrary 
claim of the mediation of art and world of the historical avant-garde movement. In aesthetic re­
gard, Lyotard differentiates between "true" and "false" postmodernism and the "true" post­
modernism is declared the "real" one. 
Equally surprising is that Lyotard defines the beginning of postmodernism with the becom­
ing-reflexive of social discourses. That which in Habermas' conception is representative of 
modernism, 1 now becomes for Lyotard the characteristic of postmodernism. With this definition 
Lyotard reaches a point at which he does not have to differentiate between avant-garde and clas­
sical modernism and at which he can link postmodernism back to modernism (Lyotard, The 
Differend: 135). A conception of postmodernism as a (cultural) historical epoch which succeeds 
modernism becomes thus unnecessary, as he emphasises: 
What, then, is postmodernism? [ ... ] It is undoubtedly part of the modern [ ... ] A work can be 
become modern only if it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus understood is not modernism 
at this end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant. (Lyotard, "What is Postmodern­
ism?": 338-9) 
In American criticism, the postmodernism discussion revolves around a programmatic aesthetics 
and around the periodisation and (normative) classification of aesthetic phenomena. If in the 
first phase Susan Sontag, Ihab Hassan and Leslie Fiedler demanded and celebrated a firmly anti­
modernist, i.e. following historical avant-garde movements, fusion of art and world as a specifi­
cally postmodern phenomenon, then the 1970s and early 1980s with their superficial eclecticism 
displayed a rather affirmative tendency: the aesthetic self-conception does no longer critically 
orient itself with art's relation to social reality but is increasingly concerned with itself, thus im­
plicitly rehabilitating the postulation of autonomy of both modernism and its critical pendant, 
the New Criticism. Here, citation takes up the position of a critical mediation with a tradition 
that strives for formal innovation. 2 
In a more speCUlative and descriptive definition of historical phenomena, Hassan differenti­
ates within postmodernism two threads: literature of silence and Pop Art, or mass culture, as 
literature offullness (Hassan, The Right Promethean Fire: 118ft). Thus, he merges the succes-
Cf. Habermas (The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity). 





sors of classical modernism with new avant-garde movements under the all-encompassing roof 
of postmodernism. This contradictory project shows symptomatically the difficulties of at­
tempting to link historical with systematic definitions of postmodernism. 
Notwithstanding the inherent contradictions in Hassan's work and the incompatibility of the 
various theoretical approaches, we can determine a common denominator in the definitions of 
philosophical and literary postmodernism. Indeed, it is the 'bankruptcy' of exactly those (al­
ready for modernism problematic) categories which deconstruction finds as its objects of criti­
cism: 
• 	 the loss of extra-discursive possibilities for the legitimisation of discourses and 
consequently the admission of their self-referential production and movement. 
• 	 The crisis of the representational, or referential, model of language and there­
fore 
• 	 The questioning of the category 'history'. 
The obliteration of the signified in the discourse in postmodernism-and nothing else is non­
reference-deprives historiography of its function of representing history. (Hi)story is, as I have 
argued already with Whites metahistorical approach (cf. 1.1.6. History as Transformation of 
Structure), always already linguistically constructed plot. The knowledge of the fictitiousness of 
history deprives the narrator of the possibility to reproduce unrefracted 'events' or 'himself as 
if there were a narratable history. 
For the conventions in narrativity, this signifies that plot patterns whose stories are de­
signed from the ending point of self-solution-only from which they then become narratable 1 
have to become citations, or pastiches. Their solution principle, which is supposed to demon­
strate the possibility of epistemological insight into the world, is undermined. In the postmodern 
novel the plot becomes anti-plot and goes against solution. 
If history can no longer be narrated without refraction, if language only refers to language, 
the 'I' itself can no longer be constituted: subjectivity loses itself in a centre-less net of dis­
courses. Hence, the perspectival subjectivism of modernism becomes questionable. 
With the loss of difference between life and writing, reality and its (fictional) representa­
tion, the distinction of author and narrator, too, is undermined: the author disappears in the nar­
rator and the narrator in the author, as Nagele affirms ("Modernism and Postmodernism": 13). 
1 E.g. the romance, the detective novel, etc. 
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The narrator's de-fictionalisation is, however, only the dialectical reversal of the fictionalisation 
of the author who himself becomes a product of his text. 1 
Based on this characterisation, metafiction-as self-referential, centre-less discourse that 
does not refer to any non-linguistic object-can be regarded as the paradigm of postmodern lit­
erature. 2 Self-reflexivity and the questioning of language are already inherent in modernism. 3 
Considering the controversy around the relation of modernism and postmodernism, we can 
come now to two possible conclusions: 
First, postmodernism-here: postmodern metafiction-is not a break with modernism but, 
in Lyotard's sense, a self-reflexive radicalisation of what has always been inherent to modern­
ism. An attempt of a general periodisation would therefore be of little value. 
Second, a specifically postmodern variant of metafiction would not exclusively be deducible 
from self-referentiality and the abandonment of the representational model of language. In fact, 
it would have to be found in a specifically aesthetic realisation, or radicalisation, of self­
reflexivity.4 Deconstruction in its reading practice has demonstrated that texts have been under­
mining, or involuntarily contradicting, their allegedly referential status and the transparency of 
language long before modernism came about. Especially the discourses that are regarded as lit­
erature (or their recipients) have always assumed their fictitiousness - the poets have, as Plato 
says, always been lying (therefore the admission of fictitiousness should not upset the postmod­
ern reader). Postmodern self-reflexivity can thus not yet be determined; the discourse of 
(post)modernism, however, can be circumscribed by its self-reflexive density. 
It is only with recourse to de Man's conception of self-deconstruction (cf. 1.2.2. Grammar 
and Rhetoric and 1.2.4. The Aesthetic Code) that postmodernism's epistemological break with 
the tradition can be, to a certain degree, adequately captured. The theory of deconstruction as 
well as postmodern aesthetics can be explained along the connecting line between self­
reflexivity and aesthetically conscious self-deconstruction. 
That which can be called (and text-linguistically demonstrated) a characteristic of postmod­
ern metafiction, is an aesthetically reflected folding-up of object- and metalanguage, of literary 
text and intratextual self-commentary, in which the function of the techniques of self-reflection 
are changed to destabilising self-deconstruction. The text's involuntary self-exposure, which de­
construction attempts to locate in between the factual and the rhetorical dimension, would be 10­
1 According to Nagele this dialectic of "self-realization and self-alienation" ("Modernism and Post­
modernism": 13) is a result of a changed relation between art and society, but he does not substantiate 
this any further. 
2 Cf. the moderation of the notions postmodernism and meta fiction in Hutcheon (Narcissislic Narra­
live: 2) and Waugh (Metafiction: lOff). 
3 Cf. 1.3.2. Metafiction and the Evolution of the Genre Novel. 
4 Similarly, Rose (ParodyIIMetafiction) tries to determine specific forms of parody for the "mod­
ernist episteme" (under which she subsumes both modernism and postmodemism). 
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cated in the textual structure - for example in the narrative-strategic collapsing of narrative hi­
erarchies. 
The resulting paradoxes of the textual referential play cannot be obliterated with a simple 
shifting of the semantic level to a new unity as, for example, in the sense of an analogy of 
complexity of text and complexity of world, as an interpretation of Tristram Shandy would have 
still allowed. The negation of meaning is no longer reinterpreted on a higher level as positive 
meaning. 
In chapter 1.2.4. The Aesthetic Code, I developed possible structures, or strategies, for a 
self-deconstructive novel: the text's self-referentiality no longer pretends to produce identity, 
i.e. closed meaning. In the aesthetically realised act of self-deconstruction, subject and object of 
the mirroring never meet. The specifically postmodern variant of self-reflection can thus be de­
termined as the no longer closing of a self-reflexive circle, which then explodes the identity of 
semantic projection in general. 
1.4. DECONSTRUCTION AND POSTMODERNISM 

Considering deconstruction's metatheoretical positioning, the contours of its problematic con­
nection to postmodernism become more defined. Deconstruction's aporia-on the one hand, a 
paracriticai practice of writing, and on the other, its subject and language critical epistemologi­
cal interest-to be both still analytical and metalinguistic discourse on other discourses, raises 
the question whether deconstruction is not to be regarded as a theory of modernism rather than 
of postmodernism. It has to be recognised, though, that the confusion of aesthetic and philo­
sophical modernism l certainly contributes to the ambivalence around a possible definition of de­
construction. 
In his sketching of the phenomenon postmodernism, Andreas Huyssen attempts to deter­
mine more clearly the relationship between poststructuralism and postmodernism. Contrary to 
the common belief that the 'post-' indicates a close affinity, Huyssen formulates his hypothesis, 
daB der Poststrukturalismus in Frankeich wie in Amerika dem Modernismus sehr vieI naher 
steht, als es die Apologeten einer postmodernen Avantgarde wahrhaben wollen [und] daB sich 
ferner der Poststrukturalismus durchaus als eine, wenn auch neue Theorie der Moderne lesen 
HiBt [ ... ]. (Huyssen, "Postmoderne": 31)2 
According to Huyssen, both the theory as well as its choice of objects for analysis support this 
hypothesis. He claims that deconstruction with its shifting of historical-political social analysis 
to a doctrine of universal textuality (cL 1.1.8 Text and Textuality) exercises an aestheticistic 
practice that is hardly distinguishable from either modernism's aestheticism or from the prac­
tices of the historical avant-garde (Huyssen, "Postmoderne": 32).3 
The principal examples for Derrida's conception of deconstructive literature (literature) are 
indeed, as Huyssen explains, the classic modernists: Mallarme, Celan, etc. (cL 1.2.1. Defini­
tions). For his dialectical conception of literary tradition and modernity, de Man denies, even 
more explicitly than Derrida, any occupation with postmodern literature, or with the meaning of 
this notion in genera1. 4 With similar rigour, Lyotard takes the side of non-mimetic modernism 
I Lyotard ("What is Postmodernism?"), too, links the theory of modernism with the aesthetics of 
modernism, cf. 1.3.3. Metafiction and Postmodemism. 
2 "that in France as weB as in America poststructuralism is very much closer to modernism than the 
apologists of a postmodern avant-garde want to admit [and] that, furthermore, poststructuralism, however 
new, can absolutely be read as a theory of modernism [ ... ]. [my translation]" 
3 Leitch's judgement is similar: "The scholar's text, a production of a deconstructed subject [ ... Jdis­
seminates meaning beyond truth or totalization. It is the birth of a frolicsome 'science', a playful 'herme­
neutics' of indeterminacy, reminiscent of Nietzsche's most visionary and aphoristic moments. Criticism 
catches up and surpasses avant-garde literature" (Deconstructive Criticism: 224). 
4 De Man criticises literary theories of postmodernism as "somewhat naively historical ap­
proach[ es]," as they are based on a concept of history as a continuity in the sense of a radicalisation of 
modernism. From a psychological point of view, he interprets historical conceptions of postmodernism as 
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as the only 'true' form of postmodernism (in contrast to the 'false' new eclecticism). I In a way, 
in Lyotard' s fixation of art to a progressing negation of meaning there is again a linear con­
struction of progress in art as a whole. Neither for Lyotard nor for deconstruction is there a lit­
erary postmodernism without modernism - it is as if the conservatism of a literary canon of 
classic modernism, which is vehemently defended by Geoffrey Hartman (cf. 1.2.1. Definitions), 
re-introduces deconstruction's radicalism: 
Anstatt uns eine Theorie der Postmoderne zu bieten und diese Theorie durch Analyse gegen­
wartiger Kulturphanomene zu entwickeln und zu stiitzen, konzentriert sich der Poststruktural­
ismus meist auf eine Archaologie der Moderne und liefert eine Theorie des Modernism im Sta­
dium seiner ErschOpfung. Es ist, als seien die kreativen Impulse des Modernismus in die Theo­
rie abgewandert, urn im poststrukturalistischen Text zu vollem SelbstbewuBtsein zu gelangen. 
(Huyssen, "Postmoderne": 33)2 
This placing of deconstruction would not necessarily have to be a negative critique: its claim for 
universal validity, however, is relegated to historical boundaries. 
Thus the postmodern discourse of deconstruction presents itself as immanent transgression, 
or transcendence, of modernism as defined by Lyotard. The differentiation as historical periodi­
sation, however, is not at all useful, although the prefix 'post-' might suggest so. Concerning 
literature, my considerations on the topic of metafiction resulted in the same conclusion.) That 
which Lyotard says about art matches the disseminating, in itself refracted, reflexivity which 
deconstruction ascribes especially to modern, (self-)deconstructive literature. Common to both 
theories is therefore the idea of a culmination of reflexivity in literary modernism. That which 
deconstruction tries to uncover is exactly the moment of self-critique of texts, i.e. the reflection 
of the breaking-up of their allegedly meaning-generating elements, which Huyssen, following 
Lyotard, calls the characteristics of postmodernism as an inherent dimension of modernism. The 
sublime, at the core of Lyotard's aesthetic model of the work of art's autocritique, is equal to 
the allegorical act of (self-)deconstruction in revealing the text's unreadability: The sublime and 
allegory are poetical principles in which the signifier and the signified can refer to each other 
without having an 'air' of identity philosophy. Translated into the language of deconstruction, 
Lyotard's energetic (i.e. non-semiotic) moment (i.e. the aesthetic dimension of the sublime) 
compensatory attempts of theorists about creative authors as the critic's efforts to keep up with contem­
porary writers (Resistance to Theory: 119f). 
I Cf. 1.3.3. Metafiction and Postmodernism. 
2 "Instead of offering us a theory of postmodernism, and instead of developing and supporting this 
theory with an analysis of contemporary cultural phenomena, post structuralism usually concentrates on 
an archaeology of modernism and presents a theory of modernism in the state of its exhaustion. It is as if 
the creative impulses of modernism have migrated into theory to achieve in the poststructuralist text full 
self-consciousness. [my translation]" 
3 Cf. 1.1.1. The Concept of Deconstruction. 
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functions as the generator of the text's unreadability, which deconstruction determines in the 
chasm between the text's stating and performative dimension. 
On the other hand, deconstruction as a decentred discourse that does not assume any 
metalinguistic epistemological perspective, identifies itself openly as a postmodern theory and 
writing practice: paracriticai intertextuality (parallel to Lyotard's paralogy) has taken up the 
place of logical metalanguage. Deconstruction's pre-text and discourse act like the heterogene­
ous discourses in Lyotard' s differend, for whose moderation there is no universal rule of judge­
ment (in relation to dissimilar kinds of discourse) (Lyotard, The Differend: 9ft). Therefore Has­
san's topography of the postmodern discourse (which otherwise certainly cannot be equated with 
Lyotard's) also reads like a description of deconstruction's practice: 
As an artistic and philosophical, erotic and social phenomenon, postmodernism veers toward 
open, playful, optative, disjunctive, displaced, or indeterminate forms, a discourse of frag­
ments, an ideology of fracture, a will to unmaking, an invocation of silences - veers toward all 
these and yet implies their very opposites, their antithetic realities. (Hassan: The Right Prome­
thean Fire: 125) 
In agreement with Lyotard's combination of the two dimensions, the space of deconstruction in­
corporates both modernism and postmodernism. The specifically postmodern seems to lie rather 
in the reflection on the impossibility of a 'true' discourse than in the de-limited discursive prac­
tice. With the critical reflection on its own foundations, postmodern discourse at the same time 





Romantic poetry is a universal progressive poetry. Its task is [ ... ] to re­
unite all distinct genres of poetics and to bring poetry back into inter­
course with philosophy and rhetoric. [ ... ] It alone, like the epic, can be­
come a mirror of the whole world around it, and an image of the cen­
tury. And yet it can also float, to a greater extent than anything else, 
between the subject and the object of representation, free of any real or 
ideal interest, holding the centre, on the wings ofpoetic reflex ion: it can 
perpetually raise this reflexion to a higher power and mUltiply it as if in 
an infinite series of mirrors [ ... J. Romantic poetry is still developing; 
more than this, it is izs very essence to be eternally developing, never 
finding its conclusion. 
-FRlEDRlCH SCHLEGEL 
Athenaeum fragment 116 
2.1. {EuVRE AND RECEPTION HISTORY 
The history of Nabokov' s reuvre reflects the nomadic life of its author: it consists of novels in 
both the Russian and the English language, short stories, poetry, four (little known) plays, an 
autobiography, a biography of Nikolai Gogol, reviews, publications on chess problems, transla­
tions of his and other authors' works, posthumously published lectures on the masterpieces of 
European and Russian literature and, last but not least, several scientific publications in the field 
of entomology. 1 
The author's transition from his mother tongue to English marks a break that is, however, 
somewhat blurred by a complicated publication history of the Russian text which Nabokov did 
not translate sequentially. 2 In fact, the early texts, some of which the author revised extensively 
in his English translation, were mostly read only after the scandalous success of Lolita in An­
glo-America, 
The reception history of Nabokov's work has, even if considerably late, been well docu­
mented by American criticism,3 I will therefore refrain from presenting an overview but will in­
stead mention a few general tendencies and problems. Although Nabokov was praised relatively 
early for his formal brilliance,4 it was equally early that the critique that a certain vacuity 
marred his writings was levelled. 5 This charge was later furthered (and still persists) by allega­
tions that with the confusing self-referentiality of his text he ignored his readers' desire for sub­
stance and meaning, 6 
Clancy quite rightly notes that a large proportion of critics content themselves with the de­
coding of Nabokov's riddles, without questioning these for their aesthetic importance (Clancy, 
the Novels of Vladimir Nabokov: Ilff).7 Especially Andrew Field, Nabokov's Eckermann, 
I See Field's bibliography (Vladimir Nabokov,' His Life in Art), The Vladimir Nabokov Research 
Letter publishes an annual bibliography of new publications. 
2 On the publication history of Nabokov's Russian texts in English language, see Grayson (Nabokov 
Translated). Cf. also the outline in Page (Nabokov: The Critical Heritage: 4ff) and Clancy (The Novels of 
Vladimir Nabokov: 2ff). 
3 Cf. footnote one, An overview of the reception history of Nabokov's work can be found in Roth 
(Critical Essays on Vladimir Nabokov), for literary criticism up until 1975 see also in Grabes (Fictitious 
Blog raphies). 
4 Cf. Khodasevich' s article in Vozrozhdenie of 1937 (in Page, Nabokov: The Critical Heritage: 61­
4), 
5 The most famous in this respect was written by Sartre in his review of Despair in the year 1938 (in 
Page, Nabokov: The Critical Heritage: 65-6), 
6 Cf. McDonald ("Eighteenth Century Optimism as Metafiction in Nabokov's Pale Fire") and Ad­
ams (After Joyce.' Studies in Fiction After 'Ulysses': 146), 
7 Cf. for example the single formal aspects in D.B. Johnson ("The Index of Refraction in Nabokov's 
Pale Fire", "Scrabble Games In Ada or Taking Nabokov Clitorally", "The Ambidextrous Universe in 
Nabokov's Look at the Harlequins!". Worlds in Regression), 
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adopts, to an at times almost embarrassing degree, the aesthetics and world-view of his idol ­
there is no lack of examples for such forms of literary personality cult. I 
However, more recent interpretations of Nabokov's reuvre, especially the works of Paul 
Bruss (Victims), O'Donnell ("Watermark") and Packman (Vladimir Nabokov: The Structure of 
Literary Desire), can be cited as exceptions which abandon a thematic-mimetic oriented inter­
pretation of Nabokov2 in favour of a non-mimetic reading (in the sense of metafiction). Even 
though these works are at least implicitly anchored in a poststrucruralist theory of text (and thus 
foreground problems of self-referentiality), they lack the reflection on the possibility, or form, 
of integrating Nabokov into this claimed theoretical context which is nowhere explicitly stated. 3 
Generally, we can distinguish two great phases in the development of Nabokov' s work: the 
incisive moment is marked by Nabokov's transition from Russian to English with the novel The 
Real Life of Sebastian Knight in 1938.4 With regard to the literary-theoretical approach of this 
dissertation, I will concentrate my analyses on the later, i.e. English or American, novels and 
will refrain from presenting the philological details of Nabokov' s Russian development. 
However, it appears reasonable to distinguish Nabokov's, or Sirin's,5 Russian phase re­
garding form and thematic from his later work at least in passing. Decisive for my thoughts on 
the phase model for Nabokov' reuvre is that, corresponding with Lyotard's definition of the 
double notion "modernism/postmodernism", 6 the phenomenon self-reflexivity cannot be attrib­
lOne example is Field's extraordinary identification in his defence of Nabokov' s translation of 
Eugene Onegin against Edmund Wilson's critique (Field, Vladimir Nabokov.· His Life in Art: 274f). 
:: This approach is represented by Stegner who reads Nabokov as an "impressionist novelist" (Es­
cape into Aesthetics). as well as by Lee (Vladimir Nabokov) , Pifer (Nabokov and the Novel), Walter 
Cohen ("The Making of Nabokov's Fiction"), Maddox (Vladimir Nabokov's Novels in English), Long 
(Marvell. Nabokov) and others. - Merrill differentiates the stated dualism of "staunch realism" on the one 
hand, and "fabulation" on the other, when he correctly accuses the metafiction theory, it neglected ex­
actly that thematic dimension of Nabokov's texts which the possibility of the representation of reality be­
comes itself the theme of the novel: "Nabokov quarrelled with epistemological assumptions underlying 
literary realism fully as much as with the social and philosophical ideas of the great realists" ("Nabokov 
and Fictional Artifice": 442). 
3 Thus Paul Bruss (Victims: Textual Strategies in Recent American Fiction) uses repeatedly the usu­
ally only vaguely defined notion of "textual control" (which stems from the poststructuralist theory of 
text) without ever clarifying his understanding of this term. 
4 Apparently with the scheme of the Bildungsroman or of the Kunstlerroman in mind, Field speaks 
of three phases: "immaturity" (until 1929), "apprenticeship" and "maturity" (beginning with the publica­
tion of Lolita). He indeed sees only the transitional phase, in which Nabokov begins to develop his 'later' 
themes, as an autonomous stage. - Green, in contrast, speaks of two main phases: the first (until the 
change of language) is marked by a stronger centralising on an artistic subject, i.e. style, auctorial ma­
nipulations and characters exemplified "the primacy of the subjective, creative, affirmative authorial 
imagination over all destructive opponents" ("Nabokov's Signs of Reference": 104). In the second phase, 
Nabokov transforms the novel's mode of meaning: the literary text no longer thematises the artistic pro­
duction, but in fact embodies it: "The novel would not only be about artistic creation in relation to the 
structures of the world, it would itself be and example, a demonstration, of imaginative reordering that 
yet exists as a structure of the world" ( ibid.: 1 04). 
5 Vladimir Nabokov's pseudonym for his Russian publications. 
6 Cf. 1.3.3. Metafiction and Postmodernism. 
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uted exclusively to the postmodern side - the modern and the postmodern phase are distin­
guished rather by a specifically aesthetic arrangement and an increasing radicalisation of self­
reflexivity than by self-reflexivity alone. 
With the conjunction of the blending of reality and fiction with the characters' subjective 
perception (cf. 2.3.1. The Real Life of Sebastian Knight) I want to distinguish the Russian vari­
ant of literary and linguistic self-referentialityl as a modernistic predecessor from the American 
novels. In this context, the early novels' cinematographic analogy, which is often already cre­
ated in the character's imagination (cf. King, Queen, Knave and The Enchanter), represents the 
formal and thematic bracket. Similarly, Luzhin' s fall into the supposedly total, real world of the 
chess board (cf. Defense) is a thematic variation of such pathologically distorted self-perception 
of characters who cannot distinguish between the real and fictitious world. 2 
It is significant that the characters of these early novels, in which there is not yet an all­
encompassing narrative and textual self-reflexivity and which are instead narrated from an al­
most anonymous and coolly-distanced3 restrictive personal perspective, are not autonomous lite­
rati or narrators with basic literary skills. Here they are chess-players,4 businessmen,5 and 
rather dubious and mediocre artists who are not, unlike their successors in the later writings, the 
authors of formally brilliant texts. The character dimension and the narrator dimension are not 
identical. Artistic production is not directly thematised: the clarity of the formal stylisation 
never lets the literary medium retreat from the events. Text immanently, Nabokov always lets 
the reality of textuality intrude into the world of his characters. Already in 1937, Khodasevich 
named this alienation technique as a characteristic of Nabokov' s style: 
[ ... ] Sirin not only does not mask, does not hide his devices, as is most frequently done by oth­
ers [ ... ] but, on the contrary, because Sirin places them in full view like a magician who, hav­
ing amazed his audience, reveals on the very spot the laboratory of his miracles. This, it seems 
to me, is the key to all of Sirin. (Khodasevich in Page, Nabokov: The Critical Heritage: 61) 
It is exactly the technique described here which prompted the Russian exile critics to call Sirin' s 
style unique and un-Russian6 even though, at the same time, a wealth of literary influences on 
Sirin were discovered. 
I Cf. Hutcheon's typology of the forms of self-referentiality in 1.3.3. Metafiction and Postmodern­
ism. 
2 Chess, or the analogising of chess and art, is a recurrent theme in N abokov' s novels. N abokov 
himself was a dedicated chess player and has spoken about his fascination for the game (Speak, Memory: 
216ff). 
J Merrill names a Nabokovian characteristic "a distinct chilliness to his early works" ("Nabokov and 
Fictional Artifice": 446). 
4 See Nabokov (Defense). 
5 As Hermann (Nabokov, Despair), and Albinus (Nabokov, Laughter in the Dark). 
6 Struve called Nabokov untypical for Russian exile literature in two regards: his "predilection for 
original plots and unexpected climaxes" and his "peculiar care for construction" stood "in contrast with 
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The turn to the later, more 'open' form of self-referentiality can be detected in The Gift, in 
which the theme of the artistic problematic acquires thematic priority, and in The Real Life of 
Sebastian Knight, in which the fictionalising of reality transcends the boundaries of subjective 
character consciousness for the first time. My thesis that Nabokov's poetic development can be 
demonstrated with this new, more radical form of self-referentiality is supported by a compari­
son of The Enchanter (written in 1939/40) with its later version, Lolita. I The cinematographic 
experience of an (intentionally) limited character perspective in The Enchanter is in Lolita trans­
formed into the confessions of the nymphomane Humbert, which, enriched with literary allu­
sions and jokes, are once again overtaken by the novel's trans ind ividual textual self­
referentiality (cf. 2.3.2. Lolita).2 Nabokov himself noted that the reason for such a tendency to­
ward textual self-referentiality might be found in the relinquishing of his mother-tongue Russian 
as literary medium, and in the higher degree of reflection that the use of a foreign language ne­
cessitates: 
The English at my disposal is certainly thinner thatlmy Russian; the difference being, in fact, 
that which exists between a semi-detached villa and a hereditary estate, between self-conscious 
comfort and hereditary lUXUry. I am not satisfied therefore with the results attained. but my 
studies disclosed several rules that other writers might follow with profit. (Lectures on Russian 
Literature: 320).3 
Thus, in criticism the suspicion has been voiced that Nabokov's inclination toward extreme lit­
erariness in his American novels was in order to disguise linguistic insecurities. 4 
All these are, at most, speculations that can explain the formal innovations of the early 
American novels. The fact that Nabokov's self-referential literariness climaxes at the point at 
which he perfects his command of the English language-in Ada, or Ardor-cannot be made 
plausible without assuming a change in his aesthetic approach. 
the loose and formless structure of a typical Russian story" (in Page, Nabokov: The Critical Heritage: 
48). 
Nabokov rejected the early story The Enchanter (which then was only posthumously published) 
and took up the theme only much later in his novel Lolita. Cf. the epilogue by his son, Dmitri Nabokov. 
2 Grayson's analysis of Nabokov's self-translation comes to the same conclusion. Nabokov's revi­
sions. says Grayson, show a tendency toward an "increasing stylization, increasing deployment of arti­
fice" (Nabokov Translated: 3t). 
3 Cf. a similar statement by Nabokov in his poem The Softest of Tongues (1959) in which he regrets 
the loss of his mother tongue. 
4 Cf. Green ("Nabokov's Signs of Reference": 105). - The widening of his cultural circle might also 
have contributed to Nabokov's tendency toward intertextuality (see Field, His Life in Art: 3t), even 
though Nabokov has always categorically denied the direct influence of other authors (Strong Opinions: 
116ft), 
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2.2. AESTHETICS 

Nabokov has never developed his conception of art in a coherent theoretical text: his aesthetics 
can only be deduced from his essayistic and scholarly writingsl and, as the analysis of The Real 
Life of Sebastian Knight will show, partly from the literary reflections in some of his novels. 
His dominant critical themes, whether in immanent poetological reflections or apodictic 
statements on other authors, distinctly conjure up the image of an individualistic and idealistic 
understanding of art (imprinted by his upper middle-class family background) which clearly de­
nounces any form of didactic intentions. 2 
In the beginning, Nabokov-and this needs to be stressed with respect to my thesis about a 
self-deconstructive movement in his texts-does not negate the mimetic task of literature. In 
fact, he attests to the artistic excellence of the great Realists of the nineteenth century, here es­
pecially Tolstoy. Equally, Nabokov admires classical modernism. 3 
By relativising and individualising his own conception of art (even more radically than 
Joyce), Nabokov saves the idea of realism for himself, yet without marking this displacement 
with a specific formal design of sUbjectivisation or relativisation of the perception of reality - in 
the sense of the interior monologue or the stream of consciousness. To the contrary, he dis­
tances himself from the personal narrative position (this, at least, is true for his later' American' 
novels). Objective, everyday reality is the sum of uncountable subjective realities and exists-if 
at all, and this seems for Nabokov hardly conceivable-as intersubjective consensus. Artistic 
subjectivity has access to only one individually authentic reality. About Kafka, Nabokov says: 
Indeed, this subjective life is so strong that it makes an empty and broken shell of the so-called 
objective existence. The only way back to objective reality is the following one: we can take 
several individual worlds, mix them thoroughly together, scoop up a drop of the mixture, and 
call it objective reality. (Lectures on Literature: 253)4 
Cf. Nabokov's Lectures on Literature, Lectures on Russian Literature, the biography on Gogol and 
his monumental translation of Pushkin's Eugene Onegin. - Also interesting is the exchange of letters with 
Wilson (Karlinsky. Vladimir Nabokov: Briefwechsel mit Edmund Wilson) in which Nabokov repeatedly­
in defense of his translation of Pushkin-expresses his literary preferences and convictions. 
2 Cf. Nabokov about Gogol: "At this super-high level of art, literature is of course not concerned 
with pitying the underdog or cursing the upperdog. It appeals to that secret depth of the human soul 
where shadows or other worlds pass like the shadows of nameless and soundless ships" (Nikolai Gogol: 
\50). In his interpretation of Bleak House, Nabokov similarly presents the thesis that it is only the re1a­
tivization of satire's didactic intention toward the autonomy of art which makes Dickens' novel an ex­
pertly accomplished piece of work (Lectures on Literature: 64f). 
3 Cf. Nabokov's lecture on Joyce (Lectures on Literature: 285-370). 
4 Cf. also with Nabokov (Strong Opinions: 11; 118). 
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The nineteenth century's realistic work of art, too, created its own reality. according to 
Nabokov. His fictional world is not merely a direct copy of the assumed objective, real world 
the original subjectivity of the artist draws up an equally original fictitious world: 
An original author always invents an original world, and if a character or an action fits into the 
pattern of that world, then we experience the pleasurable shock of artistic truth, no matter how 
unlikely the person or thing may seem if transferred into what reviewers, poor hacks, call 'real 
life'. (ibid.: 10) 
The relation between art and reality is thus one of an (indirect) analogy: the imagined world of 
fiction reflects the impenetrable 'real' world of subjective deceptions. Life, like art, itself is "a 
most melancholy and meaningful picture but meaning what, what?" (Ada, or Ardor: 284). 
Both nature and art, according to Nabokov the lepitdopterologist, follow a playful version 
of almost auto-reflexive mimesis, mimicry: 
When a butterfly had to look like a leaf, not only were all the details of a leaf beautifully ren­
dered but markings mimicking grub-bored holes were generously thrown in. [ ... ] a productive 
device was carried to a point of mimetic subtlety, exuberance. and lUXUry far in excess of a 
predator's power of appreciation. I discovered in nature the non-utilitarian delights that I 
sought in art. Both were a form of magic, both were a game of intricate enchantment and de­
ception. (Speak. Memory: 88) 
Extra-literary experience, the sensual perception of the real world's intricate structure. is with 
this point of conversion conceivable, following Nabokov, as aesthetic experience. 
The focal point of the aesthetic structure of deception and enchantment is the subjective 
consciousness; life and fiction collide in the artist's consciousness. The prioritisation of the ar­
tistic consciousness is derived from Nabokov' s definition of the purpose of art, i.e. "to try to 
express one's position in regard to the universe embraced by consciousness" (ibid.: 156). 
Nabokov describes the relation of auctorial artistic consciousness to the fictional world of 
characters ambivalently: with despotic power he reigns over his "galley slaves"; I given life, on 
the other hand, these characters acquire for themselves a certain dynamic and independence 
from their creator. Nabokov is too close to the great nineteenth century Realists to not want to 
be the mastermind of a fictive universe - whose puppets, however, once animated, become 
autonomous dancers.2 
1 Thus Nabokov in an interview with Appel (in Dembo, Nabokov: The Man and His Work). - Cf. 
also Green ("Nabokov's Signs of Reference": 10). 
2 Nabokov comments on a scene in Tolstoy's Anna Karenina: "The brilliant eye of the great writer 
always noting what his puppets are up to after he has given them the power to live" (Lectures on Litera­
ture: 162). 
86 Vladimir Nabokov 
Paradoxically, the act of artistic creation, according to Nabokov, is both bound to inspiration 
and calculated-intentional. l Nabokov's apotheosis of the autonomous artistic consciousness de­
mands that the interpretation conscientiously follows the work's structural and thematic com­
plexity;2 generalisations and abstractions never do justice to a work of art. Just as little can a 
work of art be interpreted with biography3 or the author's own explanations. 4 The fact that 
Nabokov sees himself as both highest artist and prime art critic stands in contrast with his the­
ory of art, not, however, with his self-confidence. 
The originality of artistic consciousness takes literature out of its historical and social inte­
gration. In Nabokov's work, history appears to be reduced to a history of the individual con­
sciousness. 5 Like a magician, the author takes over time and space and transforms them into 
elements of his unique fictional world: "It is the enchanter in him that predominates and makes 
him a major writer" (Lectures on Literature: 5). 
This individuality is realised in the uncompromising originality of style (Strong Opinions: 
173)6-Nabokov and his narrator in The Real Life of Sebastian Knight agree on this-which Al­
ter calls "logomania". 
In the process of the linguistic transformation of consciousness in art, the realisation and 
transcendence of formal conventions is required: 7 alienation is the condition of the possibil ity to 
express the sensuality of aesthetic experience in the literary medium and to transport it into the 
process of reception. Especially the early Nabokov tends to double the text's self-reflexive mo­
ment thematically. The later Nabokov refrains from such a thematisation in favour of structural, 
i.e. formal, doublings. Writing in the foreign language, which, almost like a Derridean delay, 
never allows for instantaneity of consciousness and linguistic expression, is in itself already the 
fundamental moment of a first psychological alienation that is converted in the literary produc­
1 Nabokov explained his work techniques in an interview with Appel (in Dembo, Nabokov: The Man 
and His Work). Cf. also his explications in Lectures on Literature: 376ff. 
2 Nabokov names abilities or skills a good reader is required to possess as "imagination," "mem­
ory," "dictionary" and "some artistic sense" (Lectures on Literature: 3). - Cf. Nabokov's introductory 
remarks to his lecture on Dickens: "We just surrender ourselves to Dickens' voice that is all. I would 
like to devote the fifty minutes of every class meeting to mute meditation, concentration, and admiration 
of Dickens" (ibid.: 630. 
3 Indeed, in his interpretations of literary texts (in Lectures on Literature, Lectures on Russian Lit­
erature) Nabokov never refers to the authors' biographies. 
4 Nabokov has always refused to interpret his own works. He condemns Gogol' s wish to counter 
criticism with self-interpretations: "[ ... ] we have here the incredible fact of a writer totally misunder­
standing and distorting the sense of his own work" (Nikolai Gogol: 224). 
5 Cf. Nabokov (Lectures on Literature: 2). 
6 Non-original art-along with Goethe's Faust, almost all German literature belongs to this category 
(Nikolai Gogol: 68)-ls, according to Nabokov's verdict, poshlus/: its characteristics reach from triviality 
and imitation to the sin of "culeur locale" (ibid.: 36) to non-authenticity in general - "not only the obvi­
ously trashy but also the falsely important, the falsely beautiful, the falsely clever, the falsely attractive" 
(ibid.: 73). 
7 Cf. also Pifer (Nabokov and the Novel: chap. 6). 
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tion: with the use of English, Nabokov's texts become-both linguistically and thematically-in­
creasingly self-referential. I 
Nabokov's position on this becomes very clear in his commentaries on problems of transla­
tion. 2 Like his conception of artistic subjectivity, his thoughts here are governed by an idealistic 
notion of language, which at first implies the ideality of pure meaning and a semantic control 
over language. In his practice, however, he subordinates the alleged ideal meaning to the lin­
guistic form: even though Nabokov, in his Pushkin translation, does without the translation of 
form in favour of semantic precision, his auto-translations (as well as the translation of Carroll's 
Alice in Wonderland into Russian) demonstrate a clear shift toward the preferred translation of 
purely Linguistic effects (Grayson, Nabokov Translated: 176), i.e. to a (retrospective) re­
evaluation of the materiality of signifiers as opposed to the text's meaning. In fact, his revisions 
tend to increase the self-reflexivity of the literary works. Thus, Nabokov' s translation practice is 
in contrast to his idealistic concept of language. 3 
Literary works that are indebted to both the representation and the (new) production of 
subjective aesthetic experience do not realise the important representation of general themes or 
ideas. Rather, in his lecture on Anna Karenina, Nabokov defined the "pattern of images", the 
"texture", as the highest organising principle: "The word, the expression, the image is the true 
function of literature. Not ideas" (Lectures on Literature: 166). Thus, his interpretation of Tol­
stoy's Anna Karenina certainly attains an almost paradigmatic status. According to Nabokov, 
the poetic is derived from a complex, partly contrapuntal world of metaphors and images from 
which the ideas (in the case of Anna Karenina, Levin's reflection on religion) completely re­
treat. In such a canvas of images, art and life blend into each other. In his autobiography, 
Nabokov formulates this principle of his conception of art: 
The following of such thematic designs through one's life should be, I think, the true purpose 
of autobiography. (Speak, Memory: 23)4 
By weaving the work of art into a poetic unity, this imagery transcends the banality of external 
chronology in the subject's consciousness,5 which is why Nabokov's autobiography is not or-
I Grayson describes this kind of foreign-language alienation as follows: "He sees the English lan­
guage through different eyes. He sees patterns of sounds and potential meanings in words which the na­
tive speaker, his perception dulled through familiarity, would simply pass over" (Nabokov Translated: 
216). 
2 See Nabokov's introduction and commentary in his translation of Pushkin (Eugene Onegin). 
3 Cf. Nabokov's justification of his method (Problems of Translation). - A splendid analysis of 
Nabokov's translation theory and practice can be found in the work of Grayson (Nabokov Translated: 
lSf). 
4 It is teIling that Nabokov frequently leaves it unclear, whether such patters are inventions of the 
author. Cf. for example the episode that relates his visit to a former Cambridge tutor (Speak, Memory: 
194ff). 




ganised chronologically but thematically. I Life, always already aestheticised, is suspended in 
art. Thus, the artistic subject inscribes itself into the text. His authorship, however, remains 
recognisable as a textual one. The trace of I is constantly evident, like a watermark, in the aes­
thetic structure of the literary work: 
[ ... ] the individual mystery remains to tantalize the memoirist. Neither in environment nor in 
heredity can I find the exact instrument that fashioned me, the anonymous roller that pressed 
upon my life a certain intricate watermark whose unique design becomes visible when the lamp 
of art is made to shine through life's foolscap. (ibid.: 15) 
Determining the "I" as a sign in the text (i.e. as a sign among signs) indicates how Nabokov's 
apotheosis of artistic subjectivity can suddenly turn, uncalculated by the author, into its con­
trary: in an act of exemplary (self-)deconstruction, the seemingly omnipotent artistic "I" ma­
noeuvres itself to the threshold to pure textuality. 
I have developed here Nabokov's conception of art as a theoretic conception. This, in fact, 
is the attempt to consistently demonstrate and interpret his scattered, often not necessarily gen­
eralisable, statements on literature, which nevertheless help to inform us of Nabokov's thoughts 
on art. 
Concluding, I have to emphasise that Nabokov does not represent a ['art pour ['art aesthet­
ICS, as Stegner implies (Escape Into Aesthetics). That which Stegner sees as an "intellectual 
game", is for Nabokov in fact linked to a subjectivist notion of reality and has thus an, even if 
abstract, mimetic function. The equation of reality and art via the conception of aesthetic expe­
rience of mimicry allows Nabokov to conceive of an aesthetics ofproduction and reception. Be­
cause of his overly complex self-reflexive notion of reality, Nabokov oscillates between priori­
tising artistic subjectivity, as a source of a transparent meaning, on the one hand, and its textu­
alisation on the other. 
The exploding of chronological time also indicates that Nabokov can use an autobiographical 
theme several times. An example would be the "Tamara"-theme in Speak-Memory, Maschenka and Ada. 
or Ardor. 
2.3. SELECTED NOVELS 

2.3.1. The Real Life of Sebastian Knight 
The short novel The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, written in Paris of 1938 with a view to a 
publication in English, signifies Nabokov's turning point from his Russian to his English, or 
American, phase. It is not only the language but also the novel's formal and thematic design that 
are overshadowed by traces of an 'immature' transitional character - which in early reviews and 
literary critiques was regarded as the work's major defect. I While the linguistic insufficiencies 
are merely the author's problems with a foreign language, the formal inconsistency of the novel 
stems from Nabokov' s radicalisation of his Russian topoi, which are achieved aesthetically only 
in his later novels. The Real Life of Sebastian Knight is thus interesting in terms of Nabokov's 
later development and because of its explicit incorporation of reflections on aesthetics. 
The theme of the fictitious biography Sebastian Knight is the narrator' ~minously known 
as the initial V.-search for the real life of his half-brother, the author Sebastian Knight. Right 
from the beginning the biographer's incompetence is demonstrated to the reader: V. confesses 
that in order to polish his very limited literary abilities he enrolled in a writing course (The Real 
Life of Sebastian Knight: 31). Even more telling is his hesitant disclosure that his half-brother, 
in spite of all his love for him, had always remained distant to him and that he consequently 
knows only little about Sebastian's life. It is this obviously unequal relationship-love and admi­
ration on V. 's side; disregard on Sebastian's-which steadily steers the biography back to the 
condition and the process of its creation. V.' s version of the his half-brother's unfamiliar life is 
constantly relativised as narration: "I have endeavoured to form a coherent picture of what I saw 
of my half-brother in those childhood days of mine [ ... ] but the task eludes me" (ibid.: 16). 
However, the less than reliable perspective of this admittedly unreliable author is only the 
top-most layer. The perception of the real life of Sebastian Knight gets mUlti-perspectively re­
fracted in further prisms: other people's accounts that are either of little importance or that are 
deliberately misleading, Sebastian's novels which V. uses as informational material for conclu-
I Cf. especially the reviews in Page (Nabokov. The Critical Heritage: 7ff). - Prevailing tenor is the 
allegation that the novel is aesthetically inconsistent (cf. Maddox, Vladimir Nabokov 's Novels in English; 
Morton, Vladimir Nabokov) and that it is tainted by the Nabokovian technical virtuosity without theme: 
"Mr. Nabokov has performed the extremely clever and extremely unsatisfying feat of writing a novel in 
which nearly all the problems that the novelist must solve have been evaded. His talent is obviously 
great; one joins with the publisher in hoping that he will put his other novels into English; but in the 
presence of this one, one can only feel cheated and aggrieved" (Walter Allen in Page, Nabokov. The 
Critical Heritage: 70). - Nabokov himself speaks later of the novel's "unbearable imperfections", ac­
cording to Field (Vladimir Nabokov: His Life in Art: 26). 
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sions about the author's life. In this regard, Bader speaks of a "synthesized spirality" of the nar­
rator's perspective (Bader, Crystal Land: 16): the Sebastian Knight of the biography is the in­
complete mosaic of manifold reflections that are thrown together by the narrator V. to form a 
distorted image. 
In contrast to his predecessor Hermann in Despair who never becomes aware of the distor­
tions of his subjective experience, the narrator in The Real Life of Sebastian Knight oscillates in 
a peculiar ambivalence between blindness and ironic reflection on the limitations of his own 
perspective. On the one hand, V. repeats exactly the mistakes of other biographe~ whom he 
vehemently criticises-Goodman also infers from Sebastian Knight's novels the author's life-, 
on the other, he comments in interruptions ironically on the impossibility of his biographical 
task: 
[ ... ] don't be too certain of learning the past from the lips of the present. Beware of the most 
honest broker. Remember that what you are told is really threefold: shaped by the teller, re­
shaped by the listener, concealed from both by the dead man of the tale. (The Real Life oj 
Sebastian Knight: 47) 
The narration of the search for history slowly wedges itself between the narrator's comments 
and the history of Sebastian Knight: the (fictitious) biography becomes, just like in Despair, a 
detective novel: the paradigm of the literary form of the quest, or rather, its parody. Nabokov's 
register ranges from the trivial exaggeration of the genre l to the application of typical plot pat­
terns and their negation, e.g. the illusory voice which, if it existed, could shed light on the 
darkness of V.'s investigations: "'Sebastian Knight?' said a sudden voice in the mist. 'Who is 
speaking of Sebastian Knight?' If (ibid.: 46). Genre-specifically raising the reader's suspense the 
chapter ends here. The reader expects a radical change- peripeteia-but his expectations are 
not fulfilled: 
The stranger who uttered these words now approached Oh, how I sometimes yearn for the 
easy swing of a well-oiled novel! How comfortable it would have been had the voice belonged 
to some cherry old don [ ... ] And then and there he would have launched on that story. But alas, 
nothing of the kind really happened. (ibid.: 47) 
In Sebastian Knight, the genre of the detective novel is only evoked to be immediately alienated. 
While in the genre the detective's investigations lead toward the enigma's solution, it here leads 
nowhere. According to the ambivalent position of the narrator, the parodistic adaptation of the 
literary scheme is achieved on two different levels: first, the narrator explicitly comments on the 
ruptured, or relativised plot pattern as such, e.g. in the search for Sebastian's mysterious last 
lover: 
1 Cf. V. 's interview with Sebastian'S former college tutor (The Real Life oj Sebastian Knight: 40f) 
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I asked my informant whether he thought she was Russian. He said she was, 'A handsome dark 
woman?' I suggested, using an old Sherlock Holmes stratagem. 'Exactly,' he replied, rather 
putting me off (the right answer would have been: Qh, no, she is an ugly blonde) [ ... ] (ibid.: 
135) 
Second, on the level of plot, the inversion of the detective scheme occurs as a pattern unknown 
to the bungling biographer: Nabokov plays with several scenic stereotypes-hotel receptions and 
their ledgers, the strange man in the train compartment-whose literariness induces an atmos­
phere of unreality. Even though V.' s research finally uncovers Madame Lecerf as Sebastian's 
elusive mistress (ibid.: 144f), he has nonetheless lost sight of his original endeavour. Madame 
Lecerf cloaks herself in secretive (or meaningless) silence and Sebastian's life remains undis­
closed to him. The recapitulation of the detective's solution-finding method, as prescribed by 
the genre, therefore remains exclusive to the pure imagination of V., narrator and only protago­
nist of the noveL Thus, the works of Sebastian Knight continue to be the only, if deceptive, ac­
cess to his brother's life which fades away in the sparkling proximity of his literary imagination 
(ibid.: 7). V. 's fictitious biography evolves, lacking a true life in reach, into a history of Sebas­
tian's literary arrangements, of his fictions, which themselves, according to V. 's presentation, 
are parodies of the detective novel genre (ibid.: 76ff, 86, 88, 146ff). However, what is pre­
sented by the suspense-thriller author Sebastian Knight as a possible solution-in The Prismatic 
Brezel all hotel guests suspected of murder turn out to be related to each other (in a bizarre and 
circular way)-is in the case of his biographer merely assumption, or pure wish projection. That 
net knitted by V. has only loose and hopelessly entangled ends that cannot represent a complete 
picture. 
The box-in-a-box construction, which on each level presents new parodistic inversions that 
in turn are in a relation of mutual mirroring, is broken by a single fissure that lets the staggered 
arrangement of levels penetrate each other and which simultaneously surpasses the limited point 
of narration: characters from the fictitious world in Sebastian's The DOUbtful Asphodel intrude 
into V. 's 'real' world; the comical-amicable fellow-traveller and detective who aids V.' s search 
for the hotel register is the 'living' incarnation of Mr Silver in Sebastian's The Back of the 
Moon, this "meek little man waiting for a train who helped three miserable travellers in three 
miserable ways," is called by V. "the most alive of Sebastian's creatures" (ibid.: 91). I 
With the dissolving of the clear differentiation between the logical levels, which is not 
achieved by narrative technique but at least indicated by the motive of the character's doubling, 
Nabokov radicalises the fusing of reality and fiction that can already be located in his earlier 
Russian novels in an essential way. While in his former works the inability to keep up this dif-
Cf. the analogous person's descriptions and the parallels of the situation (The Real Life of Sebas­
tian Knight: 91, 111ff). Clancy lists the correspondences in detail (The Novels of Vladimir Nabokov: 
89ff). 
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ferentiation could be interpreted as a psycho-pathological problem, the welding process is now 
no longer situated in the consciousness of a single narrator-subject but-transcending it-in the 
quasi 'subjectless' narrative discourse. Reflected fonnally, this widening of Nabokov's break 
with his typical Russian mono-perspective narrative-personal narrator and film metaphor-is in 
favour of broader structural analogies and the fusing of narrative levels. I 
The formal structure of The Real Life of Sebastian Knight with its encapsulation of levels 
and motives, and its perspective thus produces a narrative consciousness of the fictitiousness of 
the narrated world which, at least partially, is shared by the ambivalent narrator-biographer V. 
That the novel The Real Life of Sebastian Knight does still not make a distinct postulation about, 
for example, the fictitiousness of reality, is rooted in the narrator-character's loss of identity. 
The unilateral relationship of the two brothers turns increasingly into V.' s almost complete 
identification with his brother Sebastian. If at the beginning of the writing process the distance 
to Sebastian was foregrounded, now V.' s unreciprocated brotherly love and limitless adoration 
become the driving force for his identification with Sebastian's life and literary reuvre whose 
aesthetic premises become his own convictions. It is quite consistent that in the end Sebastian 
too was working on a fictitious biography (ibid.: 36). In conclusion we find-in the paralleling 
the narrative and the plot level-the unification of the two characters which, however, at least 
through the story's development, turns out to be fallacious: The terminally ill man whom V. 
pays a last visit is a complete stranger, not his brother (ibid.: 177ft); the deceptive impression 
of oneness at his brother's bed was a mere projection. The narrator's retreat into his brother's 
identity counteracts the macabre farce of the mistaken identity at the deathbed: 
Whatever his secret was, I have learnt one secret, too, and namely: that the soul is but a man­
ner of being-not a constant state-that any soul may be yours, if you find and follow its un­
dulations [ ... ]. Thus-I am Sebastian Knight. [ ... }--but the hero remains, for, try as I may, I 
cannot get out of my part: Sebastian's mask clings to my face. the likeness will not be washed 
off. I am Sebastian, or Sebastian is I, or perhaps we are both someone whom neither of us 
knows. (ibid.: 181) 
Boyd identifies Sebastian Knight as the real narrator because of the fusion of characters. In re­
ality, he says, the biography is Sebastian's camouflaged autobiography. In order to narrate a 
life. which has not reached its conclusion, in its entirety (this is the Sternian paradox) he had to 
invent V., an imaginary brother (Boyd, The Reflexive Novel: 154f). Significant for the semantic 
structure of the novel is, however, that an interpretation as suggested by Boyd is as imaginable 
as a reading which assumes a mere projection of an increasingly deranged narrator. The text's 
ambivalence does not prioritise any of the possible interpretations. 
Good examples for Nabokov's Russian technique can be found in The Enchanter: 94f. and in 
Laughter in the Dark: 67. cf. also the comparison with Lolita in 2.3.2. Lolita. 
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Boyd indeed neglects the function of the text immanent aesthetic reflection, which discursively 
foresees, or legitimises, the fusion of the narration's subject and object. 
I have already said that V., in his immeasurable veneration of his brother turns himself into 
a mouthpiece for Sebastian's aesthetic views. Even though one has to reject Bader's equating 
V's, or Sebastian's, aesthetics with Nabokov's (cf. Bader, Crystal Land: 16ff), there are at 
least two captivating poetic principles in Sebastian Knight that Nabokov shares with both his 
creatures: the demand for a radical individuality of style and the ensuing importance of artistic 
innovation by means of parody. The point of departure of Nabokov's idealistic aesthetics. and 
the original motive of art, is the individuality of the (artistic) subject which stands in stark con­
tradiction to Sebastian's biographer Goodman, who-breaking with Nabokov's defence of ab­
solute individualism-classifies Sebastian Knight as a modernist (The Real Life of Sebastian 
Knight: 102). This individuality finds its adequate aesthetic expression in the individuality of 
style and the complexity of the artistic imagination. Language is a mere medium-V. speaks 
about lithe abyss lying between expression and thought" (ibid.: 73)-and it only does justice to 
the absolute, pure, and unique expression of the artist in its original form: "He had no use for 
ready-made phrases because the things he wanted to say were of an exceptional build and he 
knew moreover that no real idea can be said to exist without the words made to measure" (ibid.: 
73). 
With this, the artistic subject transcends all historical relativity and ties specific to epochs: 
Time and space were to him measures of the same eternity, so that the very idea of his reacting 
in any special 'modern' way to what Mr Goodman calls 'the atmosphere of post-war Europe' is 
utterly preposterous. [ ... ] Whatever age Sebastian might have been born in, he would have been 
equally amused and unhappy [ ... ] And the reason of his discomfort was not that he was moral 
in an immoral age, or immoral in a moral one [ ... J; its was simply his becoming aware that the 
rhythm of his inner being was so much richer than that of other souls. (ibid.: 59) 
Aesthetic means for the expression of Sebastian's (and Nabokov's) non-conventional art is, as 
V. explains, parody as "a kind of springboard for leaping in the highest regions of serious emo­
tion" (ibid.: 80). Parody liberates art from merely reproducing no longer alive speech and form 
(here the detective novel pattern): by foregrounding the literary convention through its parodis­
tic repetition it can be de-automated and surpassed. 
Thus, it is only against the background of the self-reflexive form as a theme that aesthetic 
innovation becomes possible. This, however, is not an end in itself but legitimate as it is only 
thus that the collective patterns of perception and thought can be alienated and transcended in 
favour of individual ones. 
Simultaneously, the aesthetic alienation effect with its dialectic of redundancy and innova­
tion (Eco, A Theory of Semiotics: 269f) causes a feed-back with extra-aesthetic forms ofpercep­
tion: with the parodying of forms of perception, which presume a factual reality, on the plot 
level the reader is provoked to reflect on his own non-aesthetic patterns of perception. The 
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problem of reality and fiction becomes once more incorporated into the novel. I With its specific 
ability to break up traditional modes of perception, patterns of thought and language, art rises 
for Sebastian above the perception of reality. Nabokov's dictum of the priority of subjective 
human consciousness over the crude collective, historically determined experience of reality ac­
cesses The Real Life of Sebastian Knight in the shape of an intrusion of the (fictitious) fictitious 
world into the (fictitious) real world: during the search for his brother's real life V. meets all 
the characters that populate in imaginary world of Sebastian's The DOUbtful Asphodel. The spe­
cifically N abokovian form of self-referentiality, his "inverse Platonism", 2 is doubled in the self­
referential narrative mode which blurs the boundary between reality and fiction. Paradoxically, 
it is the very priority of aesthetic consciousness that questions V. 's ability to distinguish between 
reality and fiction, between self and the other. Although aesthetically legitimised, the blurring of 
this boundary effects for V. a loss of identity and authenticity which lets the aesthetic construct 
appear to be a figment of the narrator's imagination. Like his Russian predecessors, V. suffers 
at times from referential mania,3 i.e. the psychopathic paranoia and addiction to symbols-like, 
for example, the misleading chess symbols that V. encounters everywhere4-that are ironically 
commented on by the novel, or more precisely, by the failing of V. 's assumptions. 
However, these comments are hardly consistent with the narrator's obsession with identifi­
cation. In fact, the discrepancy between the blindness toward his own narratorial position and 
the addiction to symbols5 on the one hand, and his lucid self-reflections on the other, withdraws 
all consistency from the narrating character. This deficiency, which in the sense of deconstruc­
tion is not a real one, may also be based on the choice of a psycho-pathological narrator who at 
the same time also functions as a mouthpiece for Sebastian's, or V. 's, aesthetics. The posture of 
the narrating subject fluctuates between wandering in a hall of mirrors and artistic autocracy. 
Thus the novel! lingers in the ambivalence between the subjective/pathological and the aes-
I This is why Boyd in his interpretation of The Real Life oj Sebastian Knight infers the exclusively 
self-referential mode of the Nabokov's later novels, when he says: "If writing does not reflect the world 
or mirror the self but only is what it is, then writing about writing seems to be all that is left. For Sebas­
tian Knight, as for Vladimir Nabokov, such writing falls naturally into the category of parody [ ... ]" (The 
Reflexive Novel: 157), Sebastian Knight (and Vladimir Nabokov at this point of time) does exactly not 
presume a non-mimetic literature: within the novel, the function of parody does not get legitimised be­
yond the exclusively self-referential character of art. 
Z Donald B. Johnson (liThe Ambidextrous Universe") coined this term. With this technique, 
Nabokov follows the tradition of Russian Symbolism. In his Gogol biography he himself comments on a 
case of an imitation of life through art: "This vulgar imitation of artistic fiction on the part of life is 
somehow more pleasing than the opposite thing!" (Nikolai Gogol: 45). 
3 See Nabokov (Signs and Symbols). cf. also 2.3.4. Pale Fire. 
4 Apart from the names 'Knight' and 'Bishop', Pahl Pahlich Rechnoy is holding a black chess knight 
in his hands at V. 's arrival (The Real Life ojSebastian Knight: 126) and thus prompts V. (and the reader) 
to mistakenly assume that the biographer is finally on the right track. Cf. V.' s own comments on this 
(ibid.: 82). 
5 Which makes V., with unintentional self-parody, claim that "[a]s a reader may have noticed, I 
have tried to put into this book as little of my own as possible" (The Real Life oj Sebastian Knight: 125). 
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thetic/self-reflective demolition of the boundary between reality and aesthetic illusion which be­
comes increasingly structurally and thematically dominant in N abokov' s later prose. 
2.3.2. Lolita 
The novel's subject matter, an ageing European's love for a twelve-year old American girL 
turned Lolita (first published in 1955) into one of the most scandalous and hotly debated l books 
in the history of American publishing. It was this initially unpublishable novel2 which finally 
earned Nabokov international acclaim and financial independence, which, in turn, allowed him 
to give up his teaching position. Lolita, Nabokov's favourite own novel (Strong Opinions: 92), 
is also his most American novel: the influence of American culture and lifestyle lends it the 
parodistic, culture critical element which at first seems to make the interpretation of this bizarre 
love story as metafiction appear absurd. 
Yet, especially the readings that stress the representative character of Lolita admit the 'lit­
erarisation' and deconventionalising of the love theme but want this still to be understood as an 
alienation strategy of conventional referential literature. Trilling and Dupee presume that it was 
only through the deviation from the conventional patterns that made it possible for Nabokov to 
write a love story. The author, according to them, achieved this with the evocation of the 
courtly tradition of passion love and with the love motive's inversion into sexual perversion 
(Trilling in Page, The Critical Heritage: 92-101). To make an absolute form of love the subject 
of his novel, Nabokov had therefore to choose an unconventional, namely an incestu­
ous/pederastic, relationship and an unorthodox plot (Dupee in ibid.: 84-90).3 Within a certain 
frame, this explanation is plausible, but exactly this choice of theme and narrative form leads, 
via its intertextual links, to a 'literarisation' and fictionalisation of the text which develops a 
self-referential momentum of its own. The narrative situation is the catalyst of this movement as 
a comparison with Lolita's predecessor, The Enchanter, shows. 
The subject of the personal narrator's reflections is his passionate nymphomaniac love for 
the sixteen-year old schoolgirl Dolores Haze, alias Lolita. "This book is about Lolita" (Lolita: 
251), as the otherwise stylistically versed Humbert asserts. 
1 Among the first positive critics were Green and Trilling; Amis, in contrast, wrote a damning re­
view: "thoroughly bad in both senses: bad as work of art, that is, and morally bad - though certainly not 
obscene or pornographic" (in Page, The Critical Heritage: 103). (The most important reviews are well 
documented in this volume.) 
2 About the history of reception of Lolita see Appel (Nabokov: Criticism, Reminiscences, Transla­
tions and Tributes: 17-40), Field (Vladimir Nabokov.· His Life in Art: 335), Page (The Critical Heritage: 
9ft) and Nabokov himself in his epilogue "On a Book Entitled Lolita" (Lolita: 309-315). 
3 The same would be valid for the themes of love and incest in Ada, or Ardor. 
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He motivates his paedophiliac disposition both with biographical details-H. H. talks about his 
early-childhood infatuation with AnnabeU, a namesake of Edgar Allen Poe's creation-and with 
his literary precursors he quotes Dante and Poe, hints less directly at Proust and Keats. 
Humbert's predilection for nymphets signifies the absoluteness of love and at once the ab­
sence of the Other: the nymphet is the artistic, fictitious projection of a madman who in this 
love seeks to counter the ageing process, the temporality of being (cf. Gullette, "The Exile of 
Adulthood"). Art and the love of nymphets-here its literariness becomes evident-are both the 
aesthetic space of the experience of timelessness and of an absolute individuality (non­
conventionality) that does not lose itself in the trivial common, poshlust (Lolita: 313). 
Humbert's evocations of his nymphet invest her with artificial-photographic rather than 
physical-real qualities - Lolita is "a transcendental incarnation" (Albright, Representation and 
the Imagination: 205) of Humbert's artistic powers of imagination. The ideal of a nymphet's 
timelessness is expressed in The Enchanter: 
[ ... J no matter what age she attained [ .. J her present age would always transpire through her 
metamorphoses, nourishing their translucent strata from its eternal fountainhead. (The En­
chanter: 74) 
In contrast to Beckett's characters who perceive the imagination of fictional characters as a co­
ercion, as an error that deprives them of their original theme, i.e. of themselves, Humbert expe­
riences the state of aesthetic ecstasy in which the truth of being reveals itself only through the 
medium of art. 1 
Again and again, however, the reality of the true Lolita intrudes into Humbert's imaginary 
world Lolita, a vulgar, witty, prepubescent teenager, withdraws from Humbert's fictitious im­
age: "Mentally, I found her to be a disgustingly conventional girl" (Lolita: 146).2 
The timeless future that the nymphomane in The Enchanter hopes for turns out to be impos­
sible in Lolita. For Humbert, aesthetic bliss (ibid.: 313) in the medium of art finally bears com­
pensatory traces; the suspension of temporality can only be experienced in the aesthetic me­
dium: "I am thinking of aurochs and angels, the secrets of durable pigments, prophetic sonnets, 
the refuge of art. And this is the only immortality you and I share, my Lolita" (ibid.: 307). 
The transformation of literary conventions into the individuality of real art, as Nabokov 
demands in his aesthetics, takes here-in Humbert's resigned elegiac-its own legitimisation as 
its theme: "Oh my Lolita, I have only words to play with!" (ibid.: 32). The sensuality of the al­
literations, the ironic ruptures, the stylistic mannerisms and the narrator's self-reflexivity and 
j See about this Albright (Representation and the Imagination: 204). 
2 See also the following passage: "Oh, how she had changed! Her complexion was now that of any 
vulgar highschool girl who applies shared cosmetic with grubby fingers to an unwashed face [ .. .]" (Lo­
lita: 202) 
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his manifold literary allusions are employed for the individual artistic expression. Humbert's 
love affair with Lolita becomes self-reflection. In the medium of the novel, Humbert's love af­
fair with Lolita becomes a reflection on art: "Lolita, if it is anything really, is the record of Mr 
Nabokov's love affair with the romantic novel, a today-unattainable literary object as short-lived 
of beauty as it is long of memory" (Hollander in Page, The Critical Heritage: 83). 
Humbert is both prosecutor and defender of himself. His love in reflective recollection is 
therefore always ambivalent ("beautiful" and "beastly"). If it represents a state of aesthetic, or­
giastic ecstasy which Nabokov himself describes as aesthetic bliss (Lolita: 313), it at the same 
time always bears, concealed in joke, a moment of incestuous guilt: 
It had become gradually clear to my conventional Lolita during our singular and beastly co­
habitation that even the most miserable of family lives was better than the parody of incest, 
which, in the long run was the best I could offer the waiL (ibid.: 286) 
The antinomy of art, or beauty, and morals is the point of departure of interpretations that at­
tempt to read Lolita psychologically (cf. Clancy, The Novels of Vladimir Nabokov: 107) or to 
interpret its moral theme (cf. Bader, Crystal Land: 59ff). This perspective is certainly supported 
both by the number of cage images that symbolise Humbert's entrapment in his own obsession, 1 
and by Nabokov's hint at the inspiration for the novel (Lolita: 309). 
In the overall context of the novel, it would be an illegitimate reduction to read the cage 
symbols (as an example that has been dealt with by literary criticism) exclusively as semanti­
cally unambiguous attributes to the hero's predicament. In fact, this novel's fundamental feature 
is that different semantic levels blend into each other as its elements-fable, metaphoric, etc.­
are already polyvalently arranged. Thus, the image of the cage refers simultaneously to the 
novel's boundedness to the linguistic or literary form, to the narrator's solipsism as well as to 
the problem of perception in general. 2 
Sexual obsession and love as themes transform into a reflection on the possibility of per­
ception and a self-reflection on the literary form. This occurs chiefly through the narrator's 
aestheticisation and fictionalisation of the characters of the novel. 
The novel's constant associations of nymphomania with an obsessive misunderstanding of 
the other, or madness, as well as the demonstrative' literarisation' of the subject matter through 
the many intertextual allusions hint at the problematic of perception and understanding as a 
problem of the blurring of the boundary between reality and fiction. The effect of the paralleling 
of sexual obsession and literariness-and in this I differ from Trilling's view-is not a semantic 
amplification of the theme but a displacement to linguistic self-reflexivity which contradicts a 
I See Bullock ("Humbert the Character, Humbert the Writer": 192). 
2 Lee speaks of the cage as a "dual metaphor of artistic form and human fate" (Vladimir Nabokov: 
121); he does not realise though that language itself is the mati sed as the subject's prison. 
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prioritisation of a theme that is supported only by form: is it perhaps, inversely, Humbert's im­
prisorunent in language, or the literary form, that produces the nymphomane's projection? 
From the outset, the narrator repeatedly refers to his own unreliability-psychological in­
stability and earlier nervous breakdowns are mentioned-; he himself diagnoses his own nym­
phomania, which he locates between increased aesthetic perceptiveness and madness. He him­
self knows about his inability to perceive of Lolita other than the projection of his desires. 
Humbert's narrative perspective, regarding his own obsession, is marked by a peculiar ambiva­
lence of blindness and insight - uncontrollable, it is the subject of ironic narration and reflection 
and is transcended in an art that liberates love as aesthetic experience from the shackles of real­
ity. It is therefore at no point clear whether the narration is (fictitious) reality or whether it has 
its origins in Humbert's artistic, maniac fantasy. 1 Humbert, the nymphomane and author of his 
defence paper, and Humbert, the artist, are identical. 2 
In the novel's second part, which narrates Humbert's trip across the US with Lolita and his 
later search for the runaway girl, the problematic of Humbert's individual distortion of percep­
tion shifts by transcending the personal narrator perspective into a trans-individual, Le. an 
epistemological perspective. More specifically: the plot's quest structure and the thematic domi­
nance of the doppelganger and mirror imagery, question the insignificance of understanding. 
Structurally, this uncertainty is doubled by the shifting of the quest and doppelganger theme 
from the plot into the narration level and then furthermore into the act of reception. Direct and 
indirect allusions to Quilty, the Haze family's dentist's cousin, author and producer of popular 
plays, adored by girls and Humbert's successor as Lolita's paedophiliac lover, are scattered in 
the text. The strategy of Humbert's literary doppelganger construction is characteristic for his 
wavering between blindness and insight, between the limitations of his personal narrator per­
spective and authorial sovereignty. On the one hand, he is stricken with blindness even toward 
his own doppelganger - he never recognises him, in spite of clues from the people that they 
look alike; instead, he feels reminded of his Swiss uncle Gustave Trapp whom he is said to re­
semble.7he reader indeed learns to understand Humbert's recollection of his uncle Trapp as in­
dications of Quilty's presence. As Humbert, however, refers to Quilty (i.e. to Trapp's doppel-
The narrator's ambivalent position does therefore not allow for a temporal differentiation of the 
narration in reported reality and pure invention, as Tekiner suggests. According to her interpretation, 
everything that comes after the now married Lolita's letter is Humbert's pure fantasy who cannot cope 
with a reality without Lolita. This reading neglects, first, that the whole act of narration takes temporally 
place after the incisive act of Lolita's disappearance (Tekiner's version is not sound on its own psycho­
logical foundations), and, second, that the complete text stems from an unreliable author's pen. 
2 Bullock's conclusion is similar: "The question of the reality or non-reality of events in Lolita can­
not be answered because, Humbert being an artist, it is irrelevant: the entire book, an artistic construct, 
is fantastic and realistic at once" ("Humbert the Character, Humbert the Writer": 201). 
I 
99 Selected Novels 
ganger) at one point when his significance for later happenings is still unknown, I this eludes the 
reader during a first reading. 
Significant for this paper chase is that it is undecidable on both the plot level and the recep­
tion level whether the text produces these clues in anticipation of the subsequent plot or whether 
these are projections of the mad narrator or misled reader. It thus remains open whether Hum­
bert shared a hotel with Quilty as often as he suggests. 2 Neither Humbert nor the reader can 
distinguish between mere similarities and identity, fiction and reality. Humbert and Lolita's si­
lent pursuer might only be the maniacal hallucination-false double-of a paranoid Humbert: "I 
saw [ ... ] a broad and thickish man of my age, somewhat resembling Gustave Trapp, a cousin of 
my father's in Switzerland" (Lolita: 216). It is only later that Humbert realises that "it was be­
coming abundantly clear that all those identical detectives in prismatically changing cars were 
figments of my persecution mania" (ibid.: 236).3 
After the loss of Lolita this persecution mania changes into a paper chase whose reality out­
side Humbert's consciousness (does Quilty really leave hints for Humbert?) becomes doubtful 
(cf. ibid.: 246ft). 
The supposed traces which the pursuer Humbert finds are of a rather literary quality On the 
other hand, Quilty, being a man of letters himself, might be indeed the originator of this web of 
false traces: 
The clues he left did not establish his identity but they reflected his personality, or at least a 
certain homogenous and striking personality; his genre, his type of humour-at its best at 
least-the tone of his brain, had affinities with my own. He mimed and mocked me. His allu­
sions were definitely highbrow. He was well read. (ibid.: 247t) 
At this point in my analysis it becomes understandable what Nabokov, in comparison with the 
modern predecessor The Enchanter, gains in Lolita: The self-irony of the personal narrator and 
the idiosyncratic exploding of the narrative form's logic could not have been realised in the me­
dium of the personal narratorial perspective with its inherent perception limitations to the tem­
porality and viewpoint of the acting character. An auctorial mode could devalue the penetration 
of the character level as pertaining to authorial omniscience. In Lolita the reader's uncertainty is 
generated exactly by the personal narration's traditional differentiation between past experience 
and the present narrative act (knowing the whole truth). Nabokov integrates this difference of 
perspectival blindness and the narrative act's sovereignty into the plot and keeps it at the same 
time in Humbert's narrative perspective. The narrative discourse and the narrated are separated 
by the same difference. 
Cf. the entry for 'Quilty' in the Who Is Who in the Limelight which Humbert looks up: 'Dolores' 
and 'Darkbloom' are among the titles of QUilty's plays (Lolita: 31). 
2 Already the first hotel scene contains Quilty allusions (Lolita: 117ft). 
3 Cf. also the scene on the tennis court (Lolita: 224t). 
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The principle of the novel's self-solution' falls prey to the logically inconsistent narrative per­
spective; its narrative paradigms-detective novel and crime-memories, confessions, love story, 
Bildungsroman, Kunstlerroman2 and autobiography-exist in Lolita merely as parodistic cita­
tions and confusing intertextual systems of reference. Indeed the various literary allusions func­
tion not as semantic emphasis but mislead the reader (like, for example, the Carmen citation 
which falsely suggests Humbert murdering Lolita). Chase, as well as narrative strategy, is, in 
fact, of such literary quality that the underlying story dissolves in the reception act. At the same 
time Humbert's quest is analogised through the literary and practical act of understanding: 
The abundant labyrinths and doubles [ ... ] suggest how in our reading of reality-in our quest 
for meaning-we seem, inevitably, to find ourselves (or our shadow selves). (Packman, Vladi­
mir Nabokov: The Structure ofLiterary Desire: 18) 
Through Humbert and Quilty's paper chase, incorporating Humbert's self-reflectively playful 
narrative attitude, Lolita becomes metafiction. The constitution of meaning points into nothing­
ness, or in a Quixotic sense, only back to the questing subject itself. 3 The narrator searches for 
his last refuge in the self-determination of art. 
2.3.3. Pnin 
With its melancholic mood, the memories of a happy childhood in pre-Revolutionary Russia and 
the description of an isolated, homeless life in Western Europe and later in the New World, 
Pnin (first published in 1957) relates back to Nabokov' s early Russian texts, especially to 
Maschenka (cf. Field, Vladimir Nabokov: His Life in Art: 140). Yet this novel with its autobio­
graphically4 coloured mixture of Russian and American experience, with its parodistic confron-
I Cf. White ("The Value of Narrativity"). 
2 Both German categories denote novels in which the protagonist undergoes a process of character 
development, the internal evolution often being mirrored by progress in, or recess from, the physical 
world and which usually ends with the protagonists' entry into the world. An example for the 
Bildungsroman would be Moritz's Anton Reiser, for the Kilnstlerroman Mann's Tonio Kroger. 
3 Cf. Packman (Vladimir Nabokov: The Structure of Literary Desire: 42ft). 
4 The author's biography and that of his character is in central stations of life identical. Like 
Nabokov, Pnin represents the author's poetological position. Examples are Pnin's love for Pushkin and 
his emphatic explications about Anna Karenina (Pnin: 122; 129t) which in both tenor and contents are 
remarkably similar to Nabokov's lectures on the novel (Lectures on Russian Literature: 141ft). Pnin and 
Nabokov's interest is in the details of the novel and in its temporal structure. 
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tation of both cultures is part of Nabokov's American phase. 1 Considering this dissertation's un­
dertaking, the focus of interest will especially be on the construction of temporality. 
Formally, the novel is, as literary critics unanimously stress, of peculiarly conventional de­
sign: the unity of narration is guaranteed by the embracing perspective of an ironic and dis­
tanced narrator. For the 'American' Nabokov an untypical lack of linguistic games and narrative 
self-reflexivity is most obvious, even if this narrator occasionally intrudes and interrupts the 
narrative flow. 
Self-reflexivity of literature, in the sense of an immanent poetological reflection, which in 
The Gift, Sebastian Knight and Lolita take a central position, seems-in the tradition of the Kun­
stlerroman-to be, in the shape of dialogues on literature, embedded in the novel's story line. 
However, the literariness, i.e. the materiality of the signifiers, becomes in Pnin significant 
in another way as it flows. as a central construction instrument, into the creation of the fictitious 
world: the characters are evoked metonymically through their linguistic idiosyncrasies - lan­
guage is their world; their individuality is that of their use of language. First of all, it is Pnin 
who fascinates with often imitated, but inimitable, ever wrong phonetics and grammar: 
'Important lecture!' cried Pnin. 'What to do? It is a cata-stroph!' (Pnin: 17) 
and 
'My name is Timofey, , said Pnin, [ ... ], 'Second syllable pronounced as 'muff', ahksent on the 
last syllable, 'ey' as in prey but a little more protracted [ ... ). (ibid.: 104) 
Similar linguistic flaws (,,1 go now") also mark Professor Hagen, "who, though a lesser addict 
of the present tense than Pnin, also held it in favour" (ibid.: 170). Pnin's landlady Joan Clement 
generally appears with her apparently favourite word 'pathetic' in the novel. Lesser characters 
become visible as characters only insofar as they are linguistically present: 
Desdemona, the old coloured charwoman, who came on Fridays and with whom at one time 
God had gossiped daily (''' Desdemona,' the Lord would say to me, 'that man George is no 
good. "'), happened to glimpse Pnin [ ... ). (ibid.: 40) 
and 
Dr Eric Wind, a completely humourless pedant who believed that his English (acquired in a 
German high school) was impeccably pure [ ... ] saying 'the pond' for the ocean [ ... ]. (ibid.: 87) 
1 Hazel Cohen therefore calls Pnin "a representative Nabokovian novel. Its geographical and emo­
tional setting partakes of the dual experience of Russia and America. the experience of exile from the 
land of birth, and alienation in the country of adoption" ("Nabokov's Pnin: A Character in Flight From 
His Author": 57) 
102 Vladimir Nabokov 
The strongest ties between the areas individuality and language can be found in the protagonist 
of the novel, Timofey Pnin. 
Pnin has often been described as Nabokov's most endearing creation. Indeed, his helpless­
ness and eccentricity are the continual source of the comic aspect of the novel. At the same 
time, the character is filled through and through with melancholy and sadness that at times tres­
passes on the borders of sentimentality: 1 for lonely, homeless Pnin2 luck and happiness in life is 
unattainable. His failed marriage with the brashly impertinent Liza (a Nabokovian personifica­
tion of poshlust-satire) , episodically revealed, symbolises Pnin's fate to be used and then left by 
others (cf. ibid.: chap. II). Liza's visit in Waindell, which ultimately is merely about the finan­
cial support for Liza's son from her second marriage, condenses in one scene the motive for 
Pnin's solitude and his pain, but also the preservation of his integrity. 3 That exile is the basic 
condition of his existence is hinted at by the recollections of his childhood, woven into the nar­
rative, in which happiness is always already imbued with loneliness (ibid.: 132). The loss of his 
mother tongue-a fate that Pnin shares with his creator-supports this symbolic field. Pnin is 
really only in his element in Russian surroundings, as the "The Pines" episode shows: in conge­
nial society Pnin shines with his erudition on the temporal structure of Anna Karenina (ibid.: 
129f). 
This connection is furthered by Victor's daydreaming about a fictitious father as an 'exiled 
king' - solus rex (ibid.: 84f, 76),4 which in turn has a semantic relation to Pnin being Victor's 
metaphorical 'water father' (ibid.: 55). (It is telling that the geniusOfhe novel, Victor,S seems to 
be the only one who accepts and adores his father's personality.) 
For Pnin life in the American exile is a continuous confrontation with strange 'natives' 
(ibid.: 87) and technical dangers - heaters, washing machines, cars (ibid.: 39f, 113). This pres­
ent state gains immediacy of perceptible-concrete experience only in moments of sudden child­
hood memories, when past and present merge in the Pninian variant of a memoire involuntaire. 
This momentary suspension of irreversible, linear time in the subjective consciousness is the 
symptom of a heart condition, a feeling of life standing still at the threshold to death. 
The illusion of temporal simultaneity (matching the metaphorical translucency of two se­
mantic levels in the text)-Pnin's 'heart attacks' occur in the twilight of the setting sun-stems 
from a metonymic-textual relation between past and present, from a connecting piece (here the 
I Clancy considers the character and the novel as a whole "appallingly trite and sentimental in con­
ception" (The Novels of Vladimir Nabokov: 17). 
2 See the account of his constant house moving (Pnin: 62ff). 
3 Cf. the account of his emotions during his ex-wife's visit (Pnin: 53ff). 
4 This, of course, anticipates Pale Fire's central theme. 
5 Victor with his intellectual superiority is in a wayan underdeveloped predecessor to the protago­
nist of Nabokov's Ada, or Ardor, Van Veen. 
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location), which suddenly lets Pnin's subconscious glide into the dimension of the immediate 
past: 
Pnin told Madame Shpolyanski he would follow her in a minute, and after she had gone he 
continued to sit in the first dusk of the arbor, his hands clasped on the croquet mallet he still 
held. Two kerosene lamps cosily illuminated the porch of the country house. Dr Pavel Antono­
vich Pnin, Timofey's father, an eye specialist, and Dr Yakov Grigorievich Belochkin, Mira's 
father, a paediatrician, could not be torn away from their chess game in a corner of the veranda 
[...J (ibid.: 132)1 
The cited passage demonstrates the almost Proust ian quality of Pnin' s heart condition. 2 If 
Nabokov develops the simultaneity of past and present as an essentially ecstatic experience-the 
experience of the dissolving of the individual's boundaries-the thematisation of death catches 
up with this illusion: the past irrevocably gone, cut off from the present through death - Mira's 
death (his first love who was later murdered in a German concentration camp). In the begin­
ning, the narrator comments ironically on this ambivalence of Pninian memoire involuntaire, the 
de-limitation of human existence: "It may be wonderful to mix with the landscape, but to do so 
is the end of the tender ego" (ibid.: 20). 
In art, however, Pnin reflects during a conversation with a colleague that precedes his 
weakness in "The Pines", the linearity of time is suspended in favour of poetic truth; for Pnin, 
the temporal structure in Tolstoy's Anna Karenina is "the best example of relativity in litera­
ture" (ibid.: 130). 
As in The Real Life oj Sebastian Knight and in Lolita, Nabokov amplifies the central the­
matic aspect-in this case the suspension of linear time-with the narrative technique of encap­
sulation. In truth, however, this seeming doubling produces a displacement that banishes the 
Proustian-Nabokovian perception of time from the real experience to the realm of art - its sole 
residence. However, in a second step of deconstructive self-reference, Pnin with its ending un­
dermines the idea of the poetic truth of art. 
To substantiate my thesis, an analysis of the strategy, how Nabokov develops his notion of 
autonomous individuality-with the theme of suffering (linked through the psycho-pathological 
aspect of the memoire involuntaire with the aspect of time the synchronicity of past and pres­
ent)-is required. Solitude and suffering (in a tension between recollected fulfilled past and un­
happy present) as a basic condition of being in exile makes Pnin a paradigmatic character of 
modernity - Nabokov's variant replaces the ever-homeless, wandering Jew of classical Euro­
pean modernity with an exiled Russian. At the same time, however, Pnin's condition is also the 
guarantee for an unconditional, absurdly heightened individuality. 
I For analogous incidents in the texts, see Nabokov (Pnin: 27; 68). 
2 Both Field (Vladimir Nabokov: His Life in Art: 38) and Maddox (Vladimir Nabokov's Novels in 
English: 114) refer to the relationship between Pnin's heart condition and Proust's memoire involuntaire. 
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In addition, Nabokov always regards solitude as the condition for the subject's freedom and 
autonomy: Pnin in fact resembles the small island in the middle of the enonnous ocean on an 
advertising leaflet: 
'Impossible,' said Pnin. 'So small island, moreover with palm, cannot exist in such big sea.' 
[ ... ] 'Impossible isolation' (ibid.: 60) 
The comparison of Pnin with the island is----like a Russian doll-in itself doubled again: the im­
age shows an isolated palm-tree, a cast-away on the island, and the equally stranded ship's cat. 
Every detail represents symbolically in itself, once again, the whole, mise en abyme: uncondi­
tional solitude. 
In Pnin, suffering seems indeed to be the last refuge of individuality. Therefore Pnin has to 
be (at least in Nabokov's universe) an anti-Communist,l therefore he also has to withdraw from 
the apparent erasure of individuality through the theory and practice of psychoanalysis2 (as em­
bodied by Liza and her second husband). 
[ ... ] 'it is nothing but a kind of microcosms of communism - all that is psychiatry,' rumbled 
Pnin [ ... ]. 'Why not leave their private sorrows to people? Is sorrow not, one asks, the only 
thing in the world people really possess?' (ibid.: 52) 
For Nabokov, as well as for his protagonist, psychoanalysis, derided with merciless parody and 
satire in all his novels, represents the disrespect for human individuality and creativity - inci­
dentally, all the qualities that distinguish Pnin and his son Victor (ibid.: 84ff). 
The ending of the novel condenses the close association of exile, suffering and individuality 
and turns it into the motive for both plot and, retrospectively, the narrative structure in that, at 
the end, only an escape into a new exile can guarantee Pnin's further autonomous existence. 
Pnin's linguistic and behaviourist peculiarities are for his colleagues popular themes of 
parodistic imitations. These, however, do not do him justice. If his double existence as a cam­
pus legend is always hinted at-he is, for example, already known to the Clements before he 
becomes their tenant-, the novel ends almost with a confrontation between narrator, the paro­
died and the real Pnin. The narrator, a guest in the Cockerell's house and Pnin' s successor at 
Waindell, experiences oneohis host's imitations: 
[ ... ] Jack Cockerell impersonated Pnin to perfection. He went on for at least two hours, show­
ing me everything - Pnin teaching, Pnin eating [ ... ]. Finally the whole thing grew to be such a 
bore that I fell wondering if by some poetical vengeance this Pnin business had not become 
with Cockerell the kind of fatal obsession which substitutes its own victim for that of the initial 
ridicule. (ibid.: 187ff) 
I Cf. Nabokov on the Soviet Union (Strong Opinions: 48, 50, 149). 

2 Cf. Nabokov on psychoanalysis (Strong Opinions: 23f, 47). 
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This intrusive parody must leave a bad taste in the mouth, as it cannot do justice to Pnin's in­
imitable individuality. The plot-immanent parody lacks the sympathy which the narrator extends 
to Pnin. Notwithstanding the problematic narrative perspective (see below), Pnin evades, on the 
plot level, this ultimately violent definition - he escapes from the imitation and monopolisation 
by others. The, in this sense symbolic, ending of the novel-Pnin flees from a meeting with his 
pursuers Cockerell and the narrator-corresponds with strewn-in details which indicate the false 
fictitiousness of imitation: one part of Cockerell's parody is Pnin's tendency to lexical twists. 
Cockerell speaks about Pnin confusing' shot' with 'fired' (ibid.: 188) when he talked about the 
loss of his position at Waindell. Indeed, this episode is narrated at an earlier stage in the text: 
tt'So they have fired me,' said Pnin, clasping his hands and nodding his head tt (ibid.: 170). The 
reiterative account of a scene from two perspectives indicates that the true (as far as we can 
trust the narrator) and the imitated Pnin do not correspond. 
If the thematisation of the differences between character and its imitation on the plot level 
eventually works for the reconstruction of individuality that is opposed to the centrifugal forces 
of the world, then the novel's narrative structure reveals a counter-movement which demolishes 
exactly this construction. Plot and the explicitly unfolding thematic run counter to the novel's 
arrangement. This movement repeats, on another level, the displacement, the destabilisation of 
the textual semantic that was initiated by the Chinese-box encapsulation technique. 
Even though narrative characteristics and artfulness are at the heart of most of literary criti­
cism's concern with this novel, this intratextual deconstructive junction has (as far as I know) 
not yet been properly worked out. J 
The beginning of Pnin relegates the text's authorship to the traditional unreliable narrator. 
He remains-at first from an auctorial perspective-at an ironic and witty distance to the plot: 
"Now a secret must be imparted. Professor Pnin was on the wrong train. He was unaware of it 
[.. .]" (ibid.: 8). It follows a short, anecdote-like account of Pnin's academic surroundings and 
lecturing style, then another narrator's comment: 
All of which does not alter the fact that Pnin was on the wrong train. How should we diagnose 
this sad case? Pnin, it should be particularly stressed, was anything but the type of that good­
natured Gennan platitude of the last century, der zerstreute Professor. (ibid.: 13) 
Simultaneously, the narrator reveals himself, through allusions, as part of the novel's set of 
characters: he is an exile Russian and an academic, like Pnin, and he lives in the United States 
(ibid.: 11, 16). His academic-literary circle of friends, partly American, partly Russian, obvi­
ously overlaps with Pnin's (ibid.: 125). Everything indicates that the narrator is identical with 
lOne possible exception is Richter's analysis of the contradictions in the narrative perspective 
("Narrative Entrapment in Pnin and 'Signs and Symbols''': 424f). 
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Liza's unhappy love before her marriage with Pnin. Later, the narrator admits this explicitly 
(ibid.: 180ft). 
At that moment in the final chapter in which the narrator is revealed as Pnin's successor at 
Waindell, i.e. when he appears as a simultaneously acting character in Pnin's life, the narrative 
level is eventually wholly incorporated into the plot level. It is only retrospectively that the nar­
rator elucidates his identity: 
My first recollection of Timofey Pnin is connected with a speck of coal dust that entered my 
left eye on a spring Sunday in 1911. It was one of those rough, gusty, and lustrous mornings in 
St. Petersburg [ ... ] (ibid.: 174) 
Nabokov's narrative twist is, as it were, a macro-structural metalepsis. 1 In review, the auctorial 
narrative perspective is 'depreciated' by the last chapter and unmasked as a pure pose of narra­
tive omniscience and distance. 2 The criticism usually attempts to solve the narrative paradox­
the contradictory narrative mode demonstrates the absurdity of the narrated, and vice versa-by 
assuming the existence of a further narrator who is situated higher up in the discourse hierarchy, 
or by differentiating between narrator and implied author: 
The relationship between character and narrator is crucial in this noveL and is associated with 
the problems of identity and freedom. [ ... ] Nabokov affords the author-narrator of Pnin these 
omniscient powers, only to expose him to an ironic reversal; for the narrator is as much a fic­
tion of Nabokov's imagination as Pnin, he too is a "galley slave" who is at the mercy of the ca­
pricious literary games of his master, just as Nabokov himself has been at the mercy of the 
cruel tricks offate. (Hazel Cohen, "Nabokov's Pnin: A Character in Flight": 62t).3 
What is common to both approaches is that they attempt to rescue the truth of the narrated-in 
the sense of secured textual semantics-: in an inadmissible reversal the enhancement of Pnin's 
status as a stable centre of the text (as a direct representation of an implicit author, or second 
narrator) results from the devaluation of the pseudo-auctorial narrator ("dreadful inventor").4 
However, the logical problem of the narrator paradox remains unsolved: the alternating between 
two narrative voices cannot be detected precisely in the textual structure; passages that can be 
read as third party anecdotes on Pnin cannot be distinguished from other passages that render 
I Genette subsumes under the notion metalepsis all forms of transgressions of boundaries of narra­
tive discourse levels. Among these is also the blurring of a framing narrative (Narrative Discourse: 
234ft). 
2 From the point of view of narrative technique, the assumed extradiegetic narrator exposes himself 
as intradiegetic. Cf. Rimmon's presentation of narratological problems theoretical approaches to this 
problem ("Problems of Voice in Vladimir Nabokov's The Real Life of Sebastian Knight": 103). 
3 Grabes speaks of "a blatant shifting in point of view between the restricted angle of vision imposed 
upon a dramatized narrator and the unlimited powers at the disposal of the omniscient narrator" (Ficti­
tious Biography: 49). 
4 I agree with Maddox's argument (Vladimir Nabokov's Novels in English: 102). 
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tively, his homosexuality) which Nabokov's in semantics is a clear indication of mental pathol­
ogy. At first, only few sentences suggest that Kinbote's self-assessment and other people's 
judgement differ widely. The air of his (trivial) cliched self-presentation generally weakens the 
credibility of his statements: "My free and simple demeanor set everybody at ease" (ibid.: 19). 
The reader may now expect an unorthodox relation between poem and commentary. What 
follows, however, is a megalomaniac's cryptic projection, going against all established rules of 
text exegesis, without any plausible relation to the poem - a theme that, so far, should be unique 
for the genre 'novel'. 2 
Kinbote expected from his neighbour, the poet Shade, a literary rendition of his own al­
leged fate: his abdication as king of Zembla following a Bolshevik revolution. Jealous and ho­
mosexual Kinbote then ascribes the fact that Shade never used his autobiographical details in his 
poem to the interventions of Shade's wife. 
Kinbote's perception of the other-the startling strangeness of Shade's poem-ls now 
deeply ambiguous: disappointed he realises in the moment of a first reading after Shade's vio­
lent death that not a single word is concerned with him; some of the variants, which allegedly 
represent the poem's original Zembla version before the female censorship, he admits to have 
written himself (ibid.: 62, 83f). In his commentary, on the other hand, he forces this connection 
[0 Zembla as the poem's object of reference. 
The linking [0 the 'wrong' referent-Kinbote alias King Charles and his kingdom Zembla­
eventually leads to questions regarding the editor's mental health. In a way, the design of the 
text forces the reader into a hermeneutic circle of understanding in that it requires the knowl­
edge of the three parts-introduction, poem and commentary3-before the interpretation offered 
by Kinbote can be revised retrospectively, for which a second reading of the novel is necessary. 
From this, we can gather a layering of different, gradually coded levels of meaning: Kinbote is 
• 	 an exiled Zemblan and indeed the editor of Shade's poem, 
• 	 the exiled Zemblan king Charles the Beloved who has taken up a disguising 
identity , 
• 	 the mad exiled Botkin. 4 
) The commentary, whose subject is Kinbote' s life, is full of allusions and indirect admissions of his 
homosexual inclination. 
2 Cf. the first reactions to Pale Fire in Page (Nabokov: The Critical Heritage). 
3 About the function of the index, see Donald B. Johnson (liThe Index of Refraction in Nabokoy's 
Pale Fire") 
4 On a fourth level, Donald B. Johnson locates Botkin as the author of Kinbote's as well as Shade's 
texts ("The Index of Refraction in Nabokov's Pale Fire": 46f). With this he neglects the multiple author­
ship that is textually (i.e. not by a higher level) given. 
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In the first case, the interpretation matches the superficial self-installation of Kinbote, in the 
second the 'true' meaning indicated by Kinbote himself. The third level of meaning decodes the 
two 'guidelines' given by Kinbote as products of the megalomaniac exile Russian Botkin, mem­
ber of Wordsmith College, colleague and neighbour of John Shade the poet. This layering of 
possible realities is derived from the stacked-upon semantic levels of Kinbote's discourse. For 
now, my reading is thus not at all one which confronts Shade's poem with Kinbote's commen­
tary rather, it follows the guidance offered by the text of Kinbote who, with other levels of 
meaning shining through, undermines himself, or who suggest simultaneously several semantic 
keys. Mary McCarthy explains this in her famous review rather vividly: 
Pale Fire is not a detective story, though it includes one. Each plane or level in its shadow box 
proves to be a fake bottom; there is an infinite perspective digression, for the book is a book of 
mirrors. (McCarthy in Page, Nabokov: The Critical Heritage: 127) 
The aesthetic strategy of the semantic self-dismantling therefore functions within Kinbote f s 
commentary, i.e. within a single discourse, and not with a metonymic counter-point in the se­
quence of text passages, but with the paradigmatically arranged simultaneity of literal (con­
forming with the narrator) and metaphorical (interpreting the narrator) meanings: 
At times I thought that only by self-destruction could I hope to cheat the relentlessly advancing 
assassins who were in me, in my eardrums, in my pulse, in my skull, rather than on that con­
stant highway looping up over me and around my heart [ ... ]. (Pale Fire: 79f) 
Elsewhere Kinbote gives the account of a talk he had with Shade. According to this account, he 
had said to Shade "that all bearded Zemblans resembled one another - and that, in fact, the 
name Zembla is a corruption not of the Russian zemlya, but of Semblerland, a land of reflec­
tions, of 'resemblers' [ ... ]" (ibid.: 208). 
In the first passage the exiled king's peril through revolutionaries is blurred with the lunatic 
Botkin's paranoia: both semantic levels are evenly matched (the 'Kinbote equals Kinbote' inter­
pretation is thus excluded). In the second passage the dominant semantic level of 'Kinbote 
equals Charles' is dismantled by the shade and mirror imagery and refers to the 'Kinbote equals 
Botkin' solution. Kinbote's last allusion finally prioritises, involuntarily, Kinbote's identification 
as Botkin: l 
I may [ ... ] cook up a stage play, an old-fashioned melodrama with three principles: a lunatic 
who intends to kill an imaginary king, another lunatic who imagines himself to be that king, 
and a distinguished old poet who stumbles by chance into the line of fire, and perishes in the 
clash between the two figments. (ibid.: 236) 
I The account of another meeting with Shade during which Kinbote suffers from a nervous break­
down, demonstrates Kinbote's mental condition (Pale Fire: 204). 
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Botkin's Solus-Rex fantasy is, according to McCarthy's on this level convincing interpretation, 
nothing but "a transliteration of a pederast's persecution complex, complicated by the 'normal' 
conspiracy-mania of a faculty room" (McCarthy in Page, Nabokov: The Critical Heritage: 127). 
Self-description and self-fiction mark the paradigmatic/symbolic space of Kinbote's discourse. 
Projected onto the syntagmatic axis (i.e. the metonymic relation), the problem of self­
misconception, which Kinbote' s prose leaves to undecidability (in the sense of a semantic pri­
oritisation), appears in the motif of the false doppelganger which characterises both the relation 
between poem and commentary, and Kinbote and Shade. Both have in common the veiling of 
the metonymic relation, their contingency, which functions through the false assumption of 
similarity, or semantic equivalence. The ambiguity of the similarity between Kinbote, Botkin 
and Charles- "Resemblances are the shadows of differences" (Pale Fire: 207)-is repeated in 
the, by Kinbote merely imagined, congeniality with Shade. I His narration unintentionally re­
veals how little Shade sought a friendship with his neighbour and colleague. In fact, Shade and 
Kinbote are, and this shines-against his will-through Kinbote's words, perfectly complemen­
tary characters: Shade is realistic, agnostic, heterosexual, happily married, well-liked, station­
ary, English speaking, non-vegetarian; Kinbote is mad, (Zemblan) orthodox Christian, homo­
sexual, pederast, solitary, exiled, Zemblan-speaking and vegetarian. The mirroring of the char­
acters is kept up to the smallest details: Shade is right-handed whereas Kinbote is left-handed. 
This mirror-relationship is most obviously realised in Nabokov's chess motif, in which the ene­
mies' draws stand inversely to each other. Simultaneously it also creates a connotative link to 
the Solus-Rex motif, 2 as McCarthy has demonstrated (McCarthy in Page, Nabokov: His Critical 
Heritage: 129f). 
In the dimension of art, this principle of inversion corresponds with the completely dispa­
rate methods of aesthetic imagination (the authors only share the tendency toward autobio­
graphical narcissism): the "imaginative sceptic" Shade is contrasted by the "quixotic self­
mythographer" (Seidel, "Pale Fire and the Art of the Narrative Supplement": 844). Modesty in 
the autobiographical thematic and strict, neo-classicist form stand against the egocentric fabula­
tion and the free form of Kinbote's fiction: "Shade is the master of restricted form, the heroic 
couplet, while the phantasmagoria of Kinbote requires the amplitude of prose" (Albright, Repre­
sentation and the Imagination: 84). 
Kinbote's relationship to Shade is similar to a sublimation of the doppelganger constellation 
in Despair. That which Hermann's distorted perception assumes to be physical likeness, Kin­
bote believes to detect in a spiritual like-mindedness. Both characters share the fact that their 
doppelgangers are mere projections of their madness. The universe of both Hermann and Kin­
1 Both were born on July 5 - a symbolic hint of fate, Kinbote believes. 
2 About the relation between Pale Fire and the precursor Solus Rex, see Field (Vladimir Nabokov: 
His Life in An: 292) 
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bote is full of doppelgangers and mirror-characters. I Kinbote's substitution of differences with 
projected similarities determines his perception of the world in general. The false doppelganger 
represents the imprisonment of the Nabokovian individual which in the act of perception is con­
stantly thrown back onto the projections of its self. Kinbote's solipsism, comparable to V. 's ad­
diction to symbols in The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, is simply another form of the patho­
logical reference mania that is the theme of Nabokov's cryptic narrative Signs and Symbols. 2 
Similarly, Kinbote resembles the lunatic in Nabokov' s Gogol biography, 
who constantly felt that all the parts of the landscape and movements of inanimate objects were 
a complex code of allusion to his own being, so that the whole universe seemed to him to be 
conversing about him by means of signs. (Nikolai Gogol: 64) 
The idiosyncratic reading of Shade's poem is an expression of the editor's reference mania. His 
procedure in the commentary, to force the account of his alleged fate onto the text, is obviously 
absurd: not content related references but arbitrary associations, triggered by homophony or by 
an, in the original context, utterly irrelevant word is Kinbote's point of departure for his sup­
plement. 
If Shade's text, for example, reads: 
A picture window flanked with fancy chairs. I I TV's huge paperclip now shines instead II Of 
the stiff vane so often visited II By the naIve, the gauzy mockingbird [ ... ] (Pale Fire: 30) 
then Kinbote comments: 
Line 62: often 1/ Often, almost nightly, throughout the spring of 1959, I had feared for my life. 
(ibid.: 78) 
Repeatedly, Kinbote takes Shade's autobiographical details as excuses to return to his own 
(imagined) biography in the commentary: 
Line 130: I never bounced a ball or swung a bat /1 Frankly I too never excelled in soccer and 
cricket [ ... ]. (ibid.: 96) 
On a stylistic level, the net of reflected doublings, or doubled reflections,3 correlates with the 
form of the (not complete) anagram (Botkin-Kinbote), the word-golf game4 and the density of 
I Cf. McCarthy's detailed analysis (in Page, Nabokov: The Critical Heritage: 127). 
2 Cf. 2.3.1. The Real Life of Sebastian Knight. 
3 With regard to Shade, see lines 1 (Pale Fire: 29) and 183ff (ibid.: 34). In the case of Kinbote the 
reflections are too numerous to be indicated here. 
4 Cf. Field (Vladimir Nabokov: His Life in Art: 313) and McCarthy (in Page. Nabokov: The Critical 
Heritage: 131). 
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mirror and crystal imageryl-the leitmotif of the refracted shadow and, last but not least, the 
hidden quote from Shakespeare ("Pale Fire")-, which link Kinbote's prose with Shade's poem 
by way of motive. The reflections' semantic polyvalence in the complete text exemplifies Kin­
bote's Zembla: as a land of shadows and reflections it embodies, with its reference to Pope,2 the 
mode of (inter)textuality and interweaves the disparate semantics of the novel's two large textual 
units, i.e. de-limits them. 
The fact that the characters in Kinbote' s world seem psychologically implausible and un­
real-Gradus embodies this fictional, textual character in its most extreme, most parodistic 
form3-results from their functionalisation for Nabokov's deconstructive scenario of a world of 
reflections whose ur-image (not only) Kinbote cannot determine. Textuality is a symptom of the 
impossibility of secured knowledge of the world, an expression of an origin-less world of im­
ages. The wealth of literary allusions4 underlines this. The effect of a semantic exploding is not 
at all created by the logical paradoxes set up by the narrative strategy, but by the surplus of 
symbolic meanings which no longer dissolve in a semantic totality of signification.s Shade's po­
etic self-sufficiency forms, concerning the complete text, an only seemingly stable semantic 
counter pole. 6 
Even though an immanent idea of order (in the sense of a Christian teleology), aesthetically 
reflected by Shade's "metaphysical style" (Morton, Vladimir Nabokov: 105) and the references 
to Pope and Wordsworth, is subjectively relativised, Shade holds on to the idea of a post­
Christian subjectivity comfortably at home in the cosmos. Intertextual references and reflection 
symbolism here take up-in opposition to Kinbote's prose-a stabilising function which ulti­
mately is to confirm the self-consciousness of the 17 (cf. Pale Fire, canto L line I; canto III, 
lines 806-829). This certainty of the self is preceded by the almost Pninian experience of a cos­
mic meaning at the moment of the threshold of death: Shade's vision of the "white fountain", 
symbol of his experience of a pre-existent cosmic meaning, which he feels he has to share with 
others - the similarity, however, is ironically revealed to be a typological mistake: the supposed 
I Gradus, for example, used to work in the glass industry. 
2 McCarthy was the first to point out the reference to Pope's Essay on Man, epistle 2 (in Page, 
Nabokov: The Critical Heritage: 128t). 
3 Cf. the description of Gradus (Pale Fire: 216). As Stegner interprets the psychopathic characters 
as merely an aesthetic tool which circumvents the trap of literary conventionality, she fails to realise the 
radical dimension of self-referentiality (Escape Into Aesthetics: 43) and thus fails to understand that it is 
exactly the unreal rendition of the characters which underlines their textual quality. 
4 Clancy counts intertextual references to not less than fifty authors (The Novels of Vladimir 
Nabokov: 126)! 
5 Cf., for example, Field's analysis of the symbolism around the name 'Gradus' (Vladimir Nabokov: 
His Life in An: 302t). 
6 Cf. especially Albright (Representation and the Imagination: 82). 
i Literary allusions as well as symbolic names, for Kinbote elements of semantic surplus, attempt to 
stress here the continuity with the literary tradition and the act of subjective signification. - About the 
significance of name, cf. Fields (Vladimir Nabokov: His Life in An: 312). 
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"white fountain" about which the newspaper article was about was in this case in fact a "white 
mountain". For Shade this falsity of similarity-Shade's variant of a false doppelganger-does 
not destroy his experience, he just defiantly converts it through the medium of art into a subjec­
tive autoproduction of meaning as a net of correlations. As the experience of world and artistic 
creation are identical through their relational net, Shade feels that his closely mimetic, autobio­
graphical poetry is immediately legitimised. 1 And yet the two different forms of art of Kinbote 
and Shade are nothing else but the expressions of opposing interpretations of the experience of 
false similarity. 
However, in the context of the novel, i.e. in the confrontation with Kinbote's texts, Shade's 
optimism is revealed as illusive. His certainty, "that I I Shall wake at six tomorrow [ ... ]" (ibid.: 
58), is with dramatic irony negated by his death: on the same day Shade becomes the innocent 
victim of a murderer who had actually wanted to kill Shade's absent neighbour, and Kinbote's 
landlord, Judge Goldsworth. (Kinbote, of course, believes that this is a failed attempt on his life 
by a Zemblan revolutionary assassin.) 
The seemingly so mimetically calculated, unambiguous sentences escape in the confronta­
tion with Kinbote's prose the meaning intended by the author Shade and explode the semantic 
world he designed. Shade's text is barely a pure text anymore considering that a false, parasitic 
commentary is wearing it out for the commentator's narcissistic excesses. The metonymic prin­
ciple of contiguity-the commentary follows the text, and Gradus' intrusion into Shade's world 
leads to Kinbote-opens up the semantic peripheries of Shade's and Kinbote's worlds. The 
blending of the poem's and the commentary's motives matches the decomposition of Shade's 
meaning-construction by the plot. Thus a verse that stands out from its context links the two 
texts: "Man's life as commentary to abstruse / Unfinished poem" (ibid.: 57). 
Another example of such a transgression of textual units of meaning is the technique of 
synchronising, which both Kinbote and Shade employ. Shade bestows his belief in an immanent, 
coded order of the universe with a lyrical expression in the temporal analogising of different 
strings of events-the parents' waiting at home in front of the television set and the daughter's 
suicide at the lake2-, sequences of events which in the perception, or in the meaning-generating 
act of the subject, are referred to the totality of one meaning. Temporal simultaneity is inter­
preted as an unit of meaning in the sense of the paradigmatic layering of literal and figural sig­
nificance. The polyvalence of possible semantic levels of meaning, as they are extracted from 
the Kinbote-tale, are also on this lower discourse level the aesthetic principle. 
Paradoxically, it is exactly Kinbote who does not find pleasure in Shade's forced rhetorical 
technique: 
I I am referring here to Albright's analysis of imaginary power (Representation and the Imagination: 
82ft). 
2 See the verses 403ff in Shade's poem (Pale Fire: 41f). 
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Line 403-404: it's eight fifteen (And here time forked) /I From here to line 474 two themes al­
ternate in a synchronous arrangement [ ... ]. The whole thing strikes me as too labored and long, 
especially since the synchronization device has been already worked to death by FIaubert and 
Joyce. (ibid.: 156). 
Kinbote himself makes use of the same analogising technique, not, however, as an intentionally 
employed stylistic tool that is to express a specific outlook on life, but as a compUlsive projec­
tion of two unconnected worlds. The absurdity of his endeavour to synchronise Gradus' (ficti­
tious) gradual approaching with the genesis of Shade's poem-until the clash in the moment of 
the murder (cf. ibid.: 117; 183; 214)1- indicates the futility of his attempt. 
Like the mirror symbolism, the temporal synchronisation too indicates the difference be­
tween Shade and Kinbote's aesthetic imagination. With Shade, it is anchored in the reality of 
t~ 
autObiographic experience and recollection; in the case of latter, reality is skipped and trans­
formed into a fictional image of the subject's wishes and desires. 
The novel's text as a totality of these two discourses now reflects the uncertainty of refer­
entiali ty in both cases: the insight into Kinbote' s questionable mimetic foundations always ques­
tions the seemingly centred-ness of meaning and referentiality in Shade's art. In Shade's case, 
too, the reader merely has access to the level of linguistic expression - there is nothing that 
guarantees this level's reference to an extra-linguistic truth. Just as Kinbote strives to force a 
meaningful whole by synchronising the (writing) movements of murderer and victim, the paral­
lel passages in Shade's work might be a retrospective aesthetic stylisation. For the poet Shade, 
too, art is a means to surpass an un-artistic reality. The inviolate authorship of Shade is dubious 
anyway: Kinbote admits to have manipulated the variants according to his intentions (ibid.: 
180); the present poem might very well be a victim of Kinbote's editorial filter. 
The immanent reflection on two modes of literary creation does thus not allow for a priori­
tisation of Shade's mimetic art. For an interpretation of the entire text with its self-reflexive and 
non-mimetic imagination, it is decisive which status and which artistic quality is attributed to 
Shade's poem. 2 While the self-relativisation from its philosophical position is laid bare, i.e. is at 
the surface of the counter-point semantics, the current critical hypothesis about a deliberately 
bad or mediocre poem3 does not do justice to its strange ambivalence. Shade is only to a limited 
degree a voice of Nabokov's aesthetic position. 4 Nevertheless, formally and concerning the 
aestheticisation of the mundane, Shade's text bears a resemblance to Nabokov's 'own' poetry.s 
I In the commentary to canto IV it finally says: "Gradus is now much nearer to us in space and time 
than he was in the preceding cantos" (Pale Fire: 218). 
2 Cf. Pearce's argument ("Nabokov's Black (Hole) Humor": 80t). 
3 Cf. Stegner (Escape Into Aesthetics: 133). 
4 Cf. Nabokov's careful avoidance of undisclosed autobiographical references. 
5 As an example, we can cite the fourth and fifth line of Nabokov's poem A Discovery (the lyrical 
'I' describes the examination of a butterfly), which shows formal (the rhyming scheme) and thematic 
(aestheticisation of the worldly) parallels to Shade's poetry: 
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The hypothesis that Nabokov obviously takes the side of Kinbote's intertext, of his world­
inventing art (Nabokov's following novel Ada, or Ardor might be seen to indicate such specula­
tions), would include the assumption that Nabokov indirectly criticises his own poetic creations. 
It seems to be more plausible-and here I follow Ellen Pifer's argument (Nabokov and the 
Novel: 110f, 117)-to refrain from hypothesising about the author's intention in this regard. l 
The immanent poetological reflection on art forms in Pale Fire remains indeed ambivalent inso­
far as both texts are given subjective authenticity, yet not mimetic truth (if we disregard the pos­
sibility of a forging by the editor). The meaning-exploding movement of the Kinbote-tale and 
Shade's 'centric' fabrication of a meaning of life form the pendulum's movement of artistic self­
reflection. 
Ultimately, Shade's citation of the "pale fire" (Pale Fire: 57l becomes only meaningful in 
the mutual reflection of poem and commentary. It serves as an image of non-mimetic art slip­
ping away from the auctorial mimetic will (of both Shade and Kinbote). Simultaneously, it 
marks the disseminating force of the intertextual relation of the texts. Shade's poem remains, 
given over to the violating sudden death of the author as well as to the pen of a lunatic editor, 
(according to Kinbote undeliberately) a fragment, possibly tampered with; compared with Kin­
bote's wild prose it does indeed seem, with its modesty in both form and theme, boring - and 
pale: it is not Shade's work but Kinbote's frantic fable which absorbs the reader into a world of 
shadows and mirrors and even though we do not believe a word of it as his autobiography, Kin­
bote's novelistic narrative wins a willing suspension of disbelief. 3 If Shade, to remain with 
Shakespeare's imagery, grants the sun's light (reality), the pale fire (the reflection) of Kinbote's 
commentary unveils a light-the colour of Zembla-that overpowers the original source. No 
"My needles have teased out its sculptured sex; 
corroded tissues could no longer hide 
that priceless mote now dimpling the convex 
and limpid teardrop of a lighted slide. 
Smoothly a screw is turned; out of the mist 
two ambered hooks symmetrically slope, 
or scales like battledores of amethyst 
cross the charmed circle of the microscope" (Poems and Problems: ISS). 
I Many interpretations have given in to the pressure to have to decide in favour of one text: Stegner 
(Escape Into Aesthetics: 61f) and Pearce ("Nabokov's Black (Hole) Humor": 81), for example, assume 
the existence of an overarching narrative voice, while Bader (Crystal Land: 35) and Elisabeth Bruss 
(Beautiful Theories: The Spectacle of Discourse in Contemporary Criticism) determine Shade as the 
author of the whole text. 
2 Cf. Shakespeare (Timon ofAthens: IV, iii, 435-36). 
3 Couturier argues similarly: "the parallel is doubly relevant: Kinbote's writing shines with the glow 
borrowed from Shade's poetry [ ... ]; besides, Kinbote lives in a world apart, like Timon in his cave" 
C'Nabokov's Per formative Writing": 168). 
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supplement in the sense of an interpreting doubling of Kinbote's text, but supplement as reflec­
tion: a manifold mirroring which creates a distortion, a new image: 
The poem, rather than a perfect mirror reflecting his Zemblan past, becomes for Kinbote a de­
fiection, a scattering of signs and clues to be regathered in the commentary's autobiography. 
(O'Donnell, "Watermark": 389) 
The novel Pale Fire plays with a disseminating inversion (a distorted mirror image) of the hier­
archic opposition of the original literary work and its parasitic commentary. Origin and imita­
tion, reality and reflection are inverted and eventually suspended as opposition: 
The Shakespearean metaphor of 'Pale Fire' suggests that there is no 'authoritative' text in Pale 
Fire, no ultimate front or source of significance just as in nature there is no beginning to the 
cycle that transfers power from sun to moon to sea and back again. [ ... ] So as Shade and Kin­
bote are sun and moon to each other, every text in Pale Fire-Foreword, Poem, Commentary. 
and Index-is supplementary to the others, a corruption and thieflike translation. (ibid.: 391) 
The disseminating 'meaning' is created only in the difference between the novel's four parts, 
i.e. between foreword, poem, commentary and index. 
In Pale Fire, the reflection on the representational power of art produces a self-reflexive 
text that constitutes the rules of its immanent significance for itself out of itself. The index in 
Pale Fire, as the paradigm of such an autonomous play, retraces in itself the non-referentiality 
of discourses: 1 several entries do not have a point of reference in the actual text, neither in the 
poem nor in the commentary, but refer exclusively to other entries;2 the cross-references remind 
of a game Shade and Kinbote often play word golf. 3 A mystery of the Kinbote-tale-the hiding 
place of the crown jewels-remains, if one follows the indications of the-literally non­
referential-index, unsolved; according to hints made by Nabokov elsewhere (Strong Opinions: 
92) it is their absence in the text that marks the place of their presence. The keyword "Kobal­
tana" appears explicitly only in the index, not in the text (Pale Fire: 243), and creates the gap in 
the chain "crownjewels"-"hiding place"-"Potamyk"-"Taynik" in the index. 
The text semantics' state of uncertainty between absence and presence brings the reception 
act, Le. the process of the constitution of meaning, to the surface of the text. 4 At the same time, 
it is here where the impossibility of the constitution of a final meaning is located: the synchro-
I I am referring here to Donald B. lohnson's analysis of the function of the index ("The Index of 
Refraction in Nabokov's Pale Fire"). Cf.also Packman (Vladimir Nabokov: The Structure of Literary 
Desire: 89). 
2 Characters that are named in the text, but who are missing or contradictory (Botkin) in the index, 
or conversely, those who only exist in the index, support the suspicion that Kinbote is identical with Bot­
kin. Botkin's presence is brought about by his 'conspicuous absence'. 
3 Cf. the entry 'word golf' in the index (Pale Fire: 248). 
4 I am referring here to Iser's reception aesthetics (The Implied Reader; The Act ofReading). 
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nous plurality of offered meanings on the syntagmatic level, the ruptures between the separate 
discourses and the layering of possible levels of reality in the paradigmatic dimension equal an 
infinite oscillation between a meaning and its negation in the moment of the realisation of an­
other potential. 
In the act of reading, the synchronicity of meanings is accomplished as the sequence of 
mutually conditioning suspensions of meanings, i.e. as a sequence of annulled and new consti­
tutions of meanings. 
The self-deflection of the meaning-generating act, which in Pale Fire appears merely as the 
negation of reference and of signification dimension, is further doubled by its thematisation in 
the text, namely by Kinbote's inability to actualise readily presented meanings in Shade's poem. 
Pale Fire shares this complete dismantling of the quest scheme-even the process of under­
standing becomes its victim-with many (post)modern texts. The scheme of the detective novel, 
paradigm of rationality and comprehensibility of the world, is brought up only to be entirely 
sabotaged. 
The semantic labyrinth of interconnectedness reproduces, on a higher level, the "correlation 
theme" developed by John Shade, not, however, without subjecting it to a displacement of 
meaning. 
The totality of meaning, which resembles the weaving pattern of a cosmic order, is opposed 
by the complete text's overly complex construction of cross-references and meaning exploding 
which cannot be conquered by an attempt at order-endowment of a Shadeian manner. 
Indeed, the correlation model has been designed as the artist's last mimetic refuge. It is the 
vision of man's life as based on a network of inherent correlations: a systematic emphasis on the 
interrelatedness between diverse points in time, or a belief in the essential comprehensibility of 
human existence through its latent patterns. 
Nabokov himself has described the aesthetic-mimetic quality of his autobiography similarly: 
[ ... ] the autonomous roller that pressed upon my life a certain intricate watermark whose 
unique design becomes visible when the lamp of art is made to shine through life's foolscap. 
(Speak, Memory: 15) 
However, the extraordinary over-complexity of the novel's internal referential play, the multi­
layeredness of the reflections which thematise the relationship of art and imagination, start a 
process of metafictionalisation which runs counter to the originally mimetic intention to imitate 
the world's complexity. The act of reading dictates the experience of the non-constitutability of 
a consistent meaning. Both Shade and Nabokov's perception of the correlation of single experi­
ences and their focusing in the centre of subjective consciousness melt away in the plurality of 
voices and signifieds of the literary discourse (ef. Couturier, "Nabokov's Performative Writ­
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ing": 177), whose II correlated patterns II eventually turn into pure meta fiction .J The artistic sub­
ject, centre of Nabokov' s aesthetics, dissolves itself in the act of the invention of an own world 
into textuality2 the text becomes de-subjectivised. Nabokov's Pale Fire is the paradigm of a 
novel that deconstructs its own aesthetic premises. 
2.3.5. Ada, or Ardor: A Family Chronicle 
Toward the end of his monumental (family) chronicle and document of the incestuous love affair 
of the siblings Ada and Van Veen, Ada, or Ardor: A Family Chronicle (first published in 1969), 
Nabokov lets his extraordinary protagonist Van say: 
My purpose in writing my Texture of Time [ ... ] is to purify my own notion of time. I wish to 
examine the essence of time, not its lapse [ ... ]. I delight sensually in Time, in its stuff and 
spread, in the fall of its folds, [ ... ]. I wish to do something about it; to indulge in a simulacrum 
of possession. (Ada. or Ardour: 536) 
In Van Veen's essay on "The Texture of Time", we can find the essence of Nabokov's poetics 
compressed; it is determined by the apotheosis of subjectivity and temporality. 
The novel Ada, or Ardor does indeed once again focus on Nabokov's central themes and 
motives: objective, pure reality on the one hand, and the subject's auctorial will to reign lin­
guistically over an unattainable on the other. Other constituent themes, already known from his 
earlier fiction, link up to these; the idea of the (writing) subject's power of disposal over its past 
is central. The novel's numerously refracted self-reference has to be understood, however-and 
this poetic legitimisation is thematised more precisely here than in Pale Fire-as an approxima­
tion to the essence of time via the multilinearity of visual recollection and imagination in the 
subjective consciousness. The following interpretation will proceed exactly inversely to the 
novel's structure insofar as it takes its point of departure in the central theme-temporality­
which in the novel gets only thematised at the very end. The analysis of the conception of time 
will help us to determine the status of subject and language. 
I This is why this, then, for Couturier is the paradigm of self-reflexive performative wntlng: 
"Nabokov's writing [ ... J is truly performative: since it does not claim to create a real world connected 
with, or similar to, our own' real' one, but rather a completely imaginary world which exists only in the 
novel, the process of writing is the same one that produces the imaginary world, and the writing itself is 
the very flesh and blood of the fictitious characters" ("Nabokov's Performative Writing": 179). - Cf. 
also 2.3.5. Ada, or Ardor. 
2 With an analysis of traditional 'reality-producing' aspects, Couturier has demonstrated that catego­
ries of realism such as consistent space-time co-ordinates are relinquished ("Nabokov's Performative 
Writing": 167f). 
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Van Veen's novel-immanent discourse about temporality does not double with a discursive mise 
en abyme level of reality or of narration, but with the thematisation of the underlying poetics it­
self. Hence, "The Texture of Time" has to be seen as a reading instruction as well as an illus­
tration of the novel itself. In the act of reading, however, this insight occurs relatively late - af­
ter 400 pages of semantic confusion. 
"My aim was [0 compose a kind of novella in the form of a treatise on the Texture of Time 
[ ... J, with illustrative metaphors gradually increasing, very gradually building up a logical love 
story, going from past to present, blossoming as a concrete story, and just as gradually revers­
ing analogies and disintegrating again into bland abstraction." (ibid.: 562t) 
In Ada, or Ardor, the epic, or more precisely the paradigm of the epic: the family chronicle 
(which it then is not) becomes the theme of the novel itself - the chronicle of the family history 
is simultaneously the chronicle of the history of the novel. 1 
Temporality-the genre's central point of reference since Tristram Shandy-becomes itself 
a theme. The novel "echoes the preoccupations and interrogations which accompanied the rise 
and growth of modern fiction" (Couturier, "Nabokov's Performative Writing": 196). Van's 
conception of time is discursively explicated in his essay, and at the same time it is the deter­
mining narrative means of design and thematic motif of his chronicle: the character's lineage of 
descent-the pedigree that no family chronicle can do without-is the translation of temporality 
(temporal succession) into an ideal semantic context of family-related identity. In the novel's 
genealogical dimension the motifs of the doppelganger and of incest therefore acquire a tempo­
ral dimension in a negative, i.e. deconstructive, sense: incest connotes the negation of father­
hood, the suspension (or denial) of temporality in favour of an atemporal synchronicity. While 
traditional temporal priority is transformed into a metaphysical one-this would be the semantic 
basis of the patriarchy which deducts from a temporal (fatherhood) relation a hierarchic one2-, 
this principle of the "genealogical principle" survives in Ada, or Ardor only "in parodic dis­
grace", "as a family tree riddled with incestuous scandal" (Tobin, Time and the Novel: 133). 
Van Veen's complete text is indeed, in spite of all nostalgia that acknowledges the past's ir­
retrievability (cf. Tobin, Time and the Novel: 161ft), an attempt to create an artificial space of 
atemporality in the apotheosis of love and life - the Ardis of Ada and Van symbolises the 
deathlessness which Van throughout his life tries to keep up in the negation offuture as tempo­
ral category. Therefore the death of the loving siblings Ada and Van at the end of the novel is 
only conceivable as a textual death: "One can even surmise that if our time-racked, flat-lying 
Maddox calls Ada, or Ardor "a kind of burlesque history of the evolution of the form [of the 
novel]" (Vladimir Nabokov's Novels in English: 120). 
2 Cf. Tobin (Time and the Novel: 10ft). 
I 
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couple ever intended to die they would die, as it were, into the finished book [ ... ]" (Ada, or Ar­
dor: 587).1 
Absolute, pure (i.e. distinguished or abstracted from the category of space, according to 
Van) experience of time is only possible as a difference between two successive states of con­
sciousness, as difference between the no-longer and the not-yet. In an almost Derridean manner, 
Van utilises "gap" or "span" between two instants for his description of time: "Maybe the only 
thing that hints at a sense of Time is rhythm; not the recurrent beats of the rhythm but the gap 
between two such beats [ ... ]: the Tender Interval" (ibid.: 538).2 
Van deconstructs the understanding of a continuous flow of objective moments of presence; 
the past exists exclusively as an accumulation of visual images in the subjective consciousness. 
It is only in the form of the novel, which allows the exploding of 'false' temporal linearity , that 
temporality can be represented. The seeming chronology of the narrated story transforms into a 
non-linear dimension of the epic dimension; retrospectively, the assumption of objective chro­
nology is deconstructed in favour of the 'true' subjective recollections of Van and Ada. What 
Van seeks do ist;eveal story time, as opposed to discourse time, as ultimately false: 
The Past, then, is a constant accumulation of images. It can be easily contemplated and listened 
to, tested and tasted at random, so that it ceases to mean the orderly alternation of linked events 
that it does in the large theoretical sense. (ibid.: 545) 
With this, Nabokov's narrator Van invalidates the separation of narrative and story time that is 
fundamental to narrative theory. 3 
Temporality disappears in the metaphysical narrator subject Van Veen. Ironically, the epic 
structure which he utilises attains the character of a quote. While being the carrier of obsolete 
conceptions of the possibility of linear narration of time, it is already marked by the moment of 
its own exploding; especially in turning away from a mimetic poetics, the epic is for Nabokov 
the paradigm of a narrating SUbject, encompassing past and present, which controls the world 
through its narrative act. It is, according to Van Veen, exactly the possibility of temporal and 
spatial juxtaposition of the disparate, or of the non-chronological, which elevates the novel over 
other art forms (ibid.: 425). 
Against the background of his poetics (as already developed in the preceding two chapters) 
which oscillates between the poles of deconstructive, non-mimetic textuality and unconditional 
I Cf. Tobin (Time and the Novel: 135t). - Elsewhere Tobin criticises that by doing so, Nabokov is 
cutting off synchronicity from the erotic and death (ibid.: 162t). 
2 In the Enchanter, Nabokov uses an even stronger metaphor: "the hiatus of a syncope" (The En­
chanter: 92), which then reminds of Cincinnatus' dilemma of expressing himself: "the pause, the hiatus, 
when the heart is like a feather. .. " (Invitation to a Beheading: 47). 
3 Cf. Rimmon-Kenan's discussion of various narrative approaches (Narrative Fiction: 42ft). 
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subjective certainty of reality and truth, Nabokov does not start his family chronicle with an 
original, authentic beginning, but with a parody of Tolstoy's Anna Karenina: 
'All happy families are more or less dissimilar; all unhappy ones are more or less alike,' says a 
great Russian writer in the beginning of a famous novel (Anna Arkadievitch Karenina, transfig­
ured into English by [ ... ]. (ibid.: 3) 
The narrator hastens to add misleadingly that that which will follow does not relate to the pre­
ceding 'quote'. The chronicle of the family Veen not only increasingly focuses on predomi­
nantly one generation (Ada, Van and Lucette) but is also overshadowed by ambiguities and lit­
erary allusions. Right from the beginning, the narrative situation dismantles its own logical 
foundation: the observance of chronological succession. Equally distorted is the story's geogra­
phy: Ada's and Van's fantastic home is a crossbreeding of America and pre-Revolutionary Rus­
sia. 1 Its inhabitants and personalities, such as "Dr. Froid" (ibid.: 27) and "Dr. Sig Heiler" 
(ibid.: 28)2 are doppelganger of real persons. Antiterra's time is temporally displaced: in 1884 
there are already cars on Antiterra (cf. ibid.: 21). What the narrator of the unreal story links up 
here are images, recollections, recollections of recollections, and other people's recollections of 
recollections, etc, of different times. 3 '" Stupidly exaggerated, "' comments Van on a passage of 
the narrative. '" Also, I suppose, artificially recolored in the lamplight of later events as revealed 
still later "' (ibid.: 112). 
Ada, or Ardor is not a faithful chronicle of events but, in the sense of Van's conception of 
temporality, of superimposed states of consciousness. What belong together are the elements 
which are consciously perceived of as a unity. Simultaneity, objectively immeasurable, is a state 
of consciousness: "Perceived events can be regarded as simultaneous when they belong to the 
same span of attention" (ibid.: 543). 
Thus the actual past is controlled by the writing subject, and in this Ada, or Ardor can be 
distinguished from Proust's A la recherche de temps perdu, to which Nabokov's novel con­
stantly recurs as an intertextual point of reference. It consists, however, of fragments of various 
temporal levels which conceal the originary event: 
When, in the middle of the twentieth century, Van started to reconstruct his deepest past, he 
soon noticed that such details of his infancy as really mattered (for the special purpose the re­
construction pursued) could best be treated, could not seldom be only treated, when reappear-
I See about this Nabokov (Ada, or Ardor: 222). - On Antiterra, 'Russia' and 'Estoty' are American 
provinces. The 'British Commonwealth' roughly equals the Great Britain of Terra, and 'Tertiary' resem­
bles Terra's Africa. Antiterra's names of places are often slightly disfigured: there is, for example, 
'Cannady' . 
2 About the semantic decoding of proper names and book titles, cf. Clancy (The Novels of Vladimir 
Nabokov: 149f). 
3 Cf. the account of present documents and recollection aids (Ada, or Ardor: 109). 
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ing at various later stages of his boyhood and youth, as sudden juxtapositions that revived the 
part while vivifying the whole. (ibid.: 31) 
Literature's claim for truth or realism of the representation of the temporal experience is not re­
linquished, as in Pale Fire, and central focus of these temporal superpositions is the gifted nar­
rator's quasi-metaphysical consciousness. 1 The novel's macro-structure now faithfully mirrors 
the altered perception of time in Van's life: as for Van and Ada in old age time seems to be 
'flowing' faster, the textual structure imitates this 'speeding-up' process. While Van's first 
summer with Ada (1884) takes up approximately a quarter of the novel, the following four years 
until 1888 (in which Van does not see Ada until the last three months) another quarter, the re­
maining years up to Van's 97th birthday increase, in the dimension of narrative time,2 their 
speed. Temporal and narrative structure are linked by the narrator's 'superhuman,3 conscious­
ness. Just as the past is always only the recollection of a shadow, never of the original image, 
the narrator's discourse is not centred but follows various tracks: Van appears as a personal as 
well as a hidden auctorial narrator4 and, at times, the narrator's identity cannot be determined at 
all. 5 Tone and style change between poetic accounts of an Edenic state (of love),6 and the nar­
rator's patronising in the best eighteenth century manner7 and his unwanted wittiness and styli­
sation8 to pure literariness, does not allow the reader to draw conclusions about the 'real' events 
on the story level. 
It is in contrast to Van's scientific and literary genius that he has to be regarded as an unre­
liable author. The story underlying the plot is not only concealed by the superimposition of 
various levels of recollection, but also by Van's weaknesses in memory and his confusion of art 
with reality. His analogising of a real event with a painting-his uncle's death is associated with 
a Hieronymus Bosch painting (ibid.: 343)9-places the discourse in the grey zone between de­
scription and unfathomable fabulation. Equally, the frequent literary allusions open up semantic 
I Van Veen is first described as a "prodigy child", later as a "genius". 
2 When Couturier claims that the novel Ada, or Ardor is marked by the fact that no story time un­
derlies the narrative time, then he neglects exactly this speeding-up effect in the novel's macro-structure 
("Nabokov's Performative Writing"). 
3 Pifer speaks of a mythological "divine" of Van and Ada (Nabokov and the Novel: 136). 
4 Cf. especially the following passage: "Van, kneeling at the picture window, watched the inflamed 
eye of the cigar recede and vanish. The mUltiple departure ... Take over II That multiple departure really 
presented a marvellous sight against the pale star-dusted firmament of practically subtropical Ardis [ ... ]" 
(Ada, or Ardor: 116). 
5 Cf. the following passage: "[ ... ] She [Ada] turned to him and the next moment he [Van] was kiss­
ing her bare shoulder, and pushing against her like that soldier behind in the queue. II First time I hear 
about him. I thought Old Mr Nymphobotomos had been my only predecessor. 1/ Last Spring. Trip to 
town. French theatre matinee. Mademoiselle had mislaid the tickets [ .. .]" (Ada, or Ardor: 117). 
6 Cf. Van's description of Ada (Ada, or Ardor: 199). 
7 Cf. for example "our lovers" (Ada, or Ardor: 161). 
8 Cf. Nabokov (Ada, or Ardor: 220). 
9 Bader compares the whole novel with a Bosch scene (Crystal Land: 147). 
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fields which, as the narrator knows, distort the picture of the actual events. Van challenges the 
reader's already strained memory by incorporating mistakes into the narrative logic that signal 
his disinterest in portraying the true happenings. Details of the events are irrelevant in compari­
son with the intensity of recollected visual images. Indeed, that which is only truly present is the 
narrator's consciousness (and that of his commentator Ada) which almost shifts the siblings I 
story into the background: 
The status of both narrators and characters in Ada is somewhat reminiscent of that of Marcel 
and his characters in Remembrance o/things past. Van and Ada are not dummies; they may be 
the only true people we have met in Nabokov's novels, if by 'true' we mean truly present in 
our imagination. Still, we never know for sure which Van (and which Ada) is actually present 
in any given page of the novel; young Van who seduced, or was seduced by, Ada, or the old 
man who is writing his memoirs with the help of nonagenarian Ada, and embellishing the past 
in the process? (Couturier, "Nabokov's Performative Writing": 166) 
But the story itself does not slip from Van's hands as much as language might elude him. Con­
cerning his self-perception, Van loosens his grip over his discourse only insofar as the ruptures 
and implausibilities remain products of his 'genius' creativity. It is not for nothing that he, like 
Nabokov, prefers the novel to the drama as it is only the written word that completely retains 
the author's intention,! and like his author Van suffers from insomnia and fear of loss of con­
sciousness that would rob him of his control over the events. 2 
The shifting of plot and fable, of objective and subjective time into a grey zone with indis­
tinct boundaries corresponds with the dual geography of the novel's world: time and geography 
of Antiterra, Ada's and Van's planet, is a 'shadow' of the planet of the lunatics, Terra. 3 Van 
displays an interest in his mad patients' pathological problem of consciousness who talk about 
the planet Terra. Terra refers to a reflected and distorted image of Antiterra, which then again, 
due to its name's semantics, defines itself as an Other-Antiterra-to the other planet. For the 
reader who uses his own planet's conventions of time and geography, Antiterra appears more 
unreal than the planet of the lunatics, i.e. his own Terra. As the seemingly real, the world of 
Ada, or Ardor dismantles itself. In this connection, Albright speaks of "a kind of shock of dis­
illusion, the sabotage on which Auden dotes, [which] can be made up by piling two self­
canceling illusions on each other" (Representation and the Imagination: 75). 
I About this it says: "For him the written word existed only in its abstract purity, in its unrepeatable 
appeal to an equally ideal mind. It belonged solely to its creator and could not be spoken or enacted by 
mime (as Ada insisted) without letting the deadly stab of another's mind destroy the artist in the very lair 
of his art. A written play was intrinsically superior to the best performance of it, even if directed by the 
author himself" (Ada. or Ardor: 425). 
2 Ross reads Nabokov's "insomnia and fear of loss of consciousness entailed by sleep" as symptom 
of his "preoccupation with control" (in special Nabokov issue of Modem Fiction Studies: 460. 
3 cf. description of Terra (Ada, or Ardor: 170. 
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The destruction of realistic time-space co-ordinates, enabled by this doubling, is repeated in the 
incestuous relationship of Ada and Van Veen which represents the culmination of Nabokov's se­
ries of doppelganger. (Ada, or Ardor is indeed populated with a whole colony of doppel­
ganger.l) 
The supposed cousins, both gifted with fantastic intelligence, literary talent and near­
immortality, are in reality brother and sister. 2 With their congenial personalities, they closely 
resemble each other. But as siblings, they are not identical, but mirror images of each other: 
their incestuous love is the metafictional expression of the mutual attraction of both the identical 
and the other: 
Doubling, in other words, need not be considered as a psychological process but may be 
viewed as a literary technique that serves to foreground the ontological separation of self and 
other. (Boyd, The Reflexive Novel: 153) 
The text parallels this dialectic of difference and identity, the naIve unity of lovers and the 
knowledge of incest-taboo, with the biblical Exodus: Ardis in the year 1884 is for Ada and Van 
the Garden of Eden. Their expulsion from the paradise begins with the violation of the incest­
taboo, which is explicitly compared with the children eating from the 'forbidden tree' (Ada, or 
Ardor: 94ff). 
In the siblings' erotic paradise there is neither death nor moral; Lucette, Ada and Van's 
half-sister, whose love Van can never return even though-and because-she is Ada's double,3 
is the victim of this ¢ unconditionality. More colourful than her sister (ibid.: 478ff) and yet 
fading next to her, 4 she does not find space in this deathless space. Eventually it is the lovers' 
thoughtlessness in repeatedly rejecting Lucette that drives her then to find solace only in death.5 
To the expulsion from paradise belongs that only through the confrontation with Lucette's 
death, the atemporal, amoral condition of the 'aesthetic bliss' is finally caught by moral reflec­
tion and guilt. The return to a second Eden, Ada and Van's unification in old age, becomes only 
possible against the background of their reflections, in which ageing and the loss of beauty 
(ibid.: 567ff)-the irreversibility of objective time-are brought back from exile. The progres­
sion of time proves Van's idealistic conception of time as untenable. 
I E.g. Demon and Daniel Veen, Marina and Aqua, Demon and Dan with their identical birthday, 
Lucette and Aqua both succumb to madness, commit suicide and wear the same clothes. The doppel­
ganger motif is continued in the sequence of Ada's real or imaginary lovers who Van can distinguish. 
2 In both literal as well as metaphorical meaning, Van calls Ada his "pale fatal sister". 
3 The short erotic scene between Ada, Van and Lucette (Ada, or Ardor: 418) lives off the play of its 
multiple doublings. Cf. also Couturier's interpretation of the intertextual dimension of this scene 
(" N abokov' s Performati ve Writing ": 171 f). 
4 Cf. Van's visual description of Lucette's physical charms and the sudden disruption in his percep­
tion when he watches a film together with Lucette - in which Ada features as the worst actress (Ada, or 
Ardor: 478ff). 
5 Cf. the threesome scene (Ada, or Ardor: 420). 
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The visual recollection of an originary paradise- It Ada, our arbor and ardors" -remains not as 
such but is literarinised with the help of literary quotes I and is self-reflexively refracted and 
freed from its uniqueness. It is a symptom of this reflexive mediacy that Van's (and Nabokov's) 
descriptive narrations repeatedly take up their images from the outer form of language itself. 
Like their author, the characters have the ability of synaesthetic perception, like that of the 
"colored hearing" and the visual imagination of letters, etc. 2 
It is no coincidence that Ada excels in Scrabble (cf. ibid.: 174ff, 298ff)3 and other word 
games such as word golf-her anagramrnatic combinations consist of Nabokovian motives such 
as "Insect-Incest" (ibid.: 85)-as well as invented shadow games, in which for the children 
shadows are autonomous figures; physical laws are suspended for these games. If the shadow 
game is the spatial variant of the doppelganger motif, then it simultaneously anticipates Van's 
later developed theory of subjectivity transcending time and space: 
[Their shadow game] prefigures Van's concept of the composite self moving freely and mul­
tidirectionally through time as opposed to the conventional image of the self moving through 
linear, one-way time (Domerque, "Vladimir Nabokov: Mixed Doubles": 286) 
The thematic link of incest and language games forms the meeting point of Ada's paralleling of 
sexuality and art, or of textual self-referentiality;4 with its wealth of parodies and (true or false) 
literary allusions,5 especially to the motif of incest in the literary tradition,6 the novel contains 
itself in itself again as the history of the genre. Ada, or Ardor, as much as its characters, is at 
the same time also a double, a shadow, of the novel: here we find united the subgenera of the 
family chronicle, the 'novel of love and marriage', the pornographic novel, the utopian novel 
and the Kiinstlerroman with references to Nabokov's earlier novels, and, last but not least, a 
misleading synopsis of the novel in the blurb. Nabokov lets Lucette's governess, Mlle 
Lariviere, write a narrative of supreme triviality which is then incorporated into the novel (Ada, 
or Ardor: 83f). 
1 In Van's poem that would be quotes from Chauteaubriand (Ada, or Ardor: 138f). 
2 E.g. the following images: "She lay curved away from him, with nothing beyond the opened pa­
renthesis" (Ada. or Ardor: 416), and "her special V monogrammed silver spoon" (ibid.: 47). - for a 
more detailed analysis of the letter motif, see Donald B. Johnson ("The Index of Refraction"). 
3 According to Donald B. Johnson, the Scrabble motif works as Ita physical playing field for the ex­
pression of Lucette's sexual obsession with Van ("Scrabble Games in Ada": 293). 
4 McHale demonstrates that the paralleling of art and sexuality is a typical phenomenon of the post­
modem. As further example he names Fowles' The French Lieutenant's Woman and Mantissa (McHale, 
Postmodemist Fiction: 222). 
5 Cf. the following passages (Ada, or Ardor: 350, 61). 
6 Donald B. Johnson names as references Pushkin (Eugene Onegin: XIV), Chateaubriand and Byron 
(Manfred and Cain) (Worlds in Regression: 132ff). 
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Intertextual references, only partly decoded in the fictitious commentary of Vivian Darkbloom,l 
parodies of literary traditions and cliches all superimpose the 'actual' elements of the narrative 
discourse, which in itself is already staggered, and fray it to disappearance. The following pas­
sages will prove this as exemplary demonstrations: 
They found a convenient clearing, and the principals, pistols in hand, faced each other at a 
distance of some thirty paces, in the kind of single combat described by most Russian novelists 
and by practically all Russian novelists of gentle birth. (ibid.: 310) 
And: 
[ ... ] but for yet another immortal moment they stood embraced in the hushed avenue, enjoying, 
as they had never enjoyed before, the 'happy-forever' feeling at the end of never-ending fairy 
tales II That's a beautiful passage, Van. I shall cry all night (late interpolations). II At last a 
sunbeam struck, Ada, her mouth and chin shone drenched with his poor futile kisses [ ... ]. 
(ibid.: 287) 
Thus the text's lack of origin is thematised by the text's character's lack of origin through their 
reflections on their recollections, and is built thematically into the discourse and is then once 
more caught up in the novel's self-reflexive structure. However, the blending of art and life is 
not at all only to be found on the level of characters and events, as Stegner wrongly suggests 
(Escape Into Aesthetics: 133). 
The superimposition and incongruity of most diverse multilingual and fragmentary textual 
elements produces a plurality of narrative voices which show neither an original plot nor a co­
herent self-reflexive discourse. This exploding of auctorial control exceeds Ada's 'marginal 
notes' on Van's manuscript, the instructions for the secretary, annotations by the editor and 
Darkbloom's most dubious commentary/index. Parody and intertextuality turn this novel almost 
into the centre of its genre: i.e. of all texts of the literary tradition that have found entrance as 
quotes into the novel: 
All these micro-Tl:>cits hold their share of truth, but no simple one can claim to be the real one, 
except perhaps the hypothetical redt that would combine all the imaginable micro-recits. There 
being not end to the process, we can safely conclude that the final redt will never be written 
and therefore does not exist; all we can do is to enjoy the fragmentary or fictitious one at our 
disposal: it is the only reliable fact in the here and now of the book. (Couturier, "Nabokov's 
Performative Writing": 177) 
The fact that the plurality of discourses in Ada. or Ardor is not ordered, or staggered, destabi­
lises the tex t' s referential semantics: 
1 Detailed analyses of the literary references can be found, among others, in Bader (Crystal Land: 
chap. 7). 
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We are forced to admit that everything in the novel, whether it be reported speech, an interior 
monologue, a dialogue, a description, or an authorial note, is on the same level of writing, and 
that the question of authority, of spoken vs. written scenes, of showing vs. telling, of haple 
diegesis versus mimesis, is irrelevant in the context of Nabokov's novels. (ibid.: 177) 
Couturier's interpretation of the non-hierarchic textual structure lays bare two aspects: first, the 
plurality of recits, i.e. narrative discourse elements, makes a distinction between story and nar­
rative level impossible. Second, the over-complexity of the (inter)textual game erases the para­
digm of epic realism, i.e. that the plot is the skeleton of the story, and leads the text to a level 
of multiple narrative discourses of a general artificiality and fictitiousness. Equally, the co­
ordinates of time and space, which in Ada, or Ardor exist only as imaginary constructs, cannot 
constitute a realistic, 'objective' reality (ibid.: 160). I The dissolving of the 'plot' vs. 'story' dif­
ferentiation projects the abandonment of mimetic language in the formal dimension of the novel. 
Language in Ada, or Ardor does not represent a world, but is this world: Ada, or Ardor, a posi­
tively non-mimetic text, materialises what Couturier, following the terminology of speech act 
theory, calls peiformative writing (ibid.: 157), i.e. a text that produces its own reality but which 
does without a 'worldly' logic for the narrated story (ibid.: 171). 
Nabokov's doctrine of a realism "within its own terms",2 the truth of art whose complex 
referential play imitates the indiscernibility of objective reality, creates in Ada, or Ardor a new, 
fully aestheticised, multilingual world which can only be a shadow or distorted mirror image­
simulacrum-of the real one. 3 Simultaneously, the immanently inter textual play of the 
discourses, the multitude of references, motives and themes, but also the images, achieves a 
degree of complexity that can no longer be controlled by the reader (and by the author to whom 
the authorship of the complete text cannot be attributed), i.e. it becomes semantically impossible 
to decode the text. The novel resembles the complicated code of Ada and Van's love letters 
which, in the end, they themselves can no longer read. 4 At the same time, the degree of 
intertextual literariness can barely be surpassed: Ada, or Ardor is the end of a poetic 
development that leads to unreadability, to pure disseminating self-reflexivity. With this, the 
novel has attained the controversial attribute of either an intelligent slip or a masterpiece. The 
former is a judgement that fails to realise the inevitability of this poetic evolution. The complete 
aestheticisation of the novel world is the end of Nabokov's conception of realism that finally 
deconstructs itself. 
An exception is Nabokov's handling of the . speeding-up , effect mentioned above. 
2 Cf. Nabokov's essay on Anna Karenina (in Lectures on Russian Literature: 142, 163). 
3 Inversely, Maddox believes that the function of the visual in Nabokov's language is the clear dis­
tinction of reality and art (Vladimir Nabokov's Novels in English: 114). She is forced to neglect 
Nabokov's aestheticisation of 'world' in her interpretation, though. 





For it is precisely that original ground of all harmony of the subjective 
and the objective, which in its original form could only be presented by 
the intellektuelle Anschauung, that is completely removed from the sub­
jective by the work of art and becomes quite objective. 
-FRlEDRlCH SCHLEGEL 
Werke III, p. 628. 
3.1. DECONSTRUCTION IN THE NOVEL 

My main hypothesis was that there are specifically literary forms of (selj)deconstruction in texts, 
and it is my belief that this claim can only substantiated with an extensive confrontation of de­
constructive theory with the aesthetics and novels of, in this dissertation, Nabokov. I am aware 
that the presentation of the theoretical side might produce "loose ends" which I was not able to 
connect to Nabokov's aesthetic practice, but it seems to be the price for a fully developed back­
ground. To me, this appears to be the only possible way to exceed some academics' rather 
vague and abstract analogies that imply, but never really attempt to explain, the difficult relation 
between the theory of deconstruction and self-deconstructive literary texts. 
Now the confrontation of theory and literary practice, which is indeed aimed at the differ­
entiality of the aesthetic, is in the sense of deconstruction already a methodological contradic­
tion, as deconstruction denies the possibility of distinguishing types of discourses, hence also of 
theoretical/analytical and literary discourse. In the critical representation of its argument I 
could, however, demonstrate that deconstruction itself cannot maintain the levelling of the dif­
ferences of discourse types: de Man attributes to literature a special, self-deconstructive, alle­
gorical reflection on its unreadability; Derrida contemplates specific poetological aspects of 
Mallarme's modern literature. I Thus 'above' the basic assumption that a systematic discourse 
typology is not legitimate, deconstruction operates with a heuristic unstable quasi­
differentiation. Similarly, my interpretation of Nabokov's novels did not have to recur to a pre­
deconstructive, essentialist conception of literature, but assumed the existence of specific narra­
tive conventions that are inherent to the diegetic. These are by no means constant but subject to 
the semantic flow's displacement in the intertextual space. Without having to refer to a fixed 
narratological model, these narrative conventions were detectable insofar as the texts explicitly 
established their pre-texts (which deconstruction requires for its operation2). The 'presencing' of 
the pre-text in the novel serves to displace the convention; the parody produces a (partially) 
identical duplicate of the model, or to speak in an Derridean manner, a minimal remainder 
which guarantees identification in order to immediately pass it on to the process of semantic 
displacement. 
The analysis' perspective on self-reflexivity and its narrative realisation in the novels re­
sulted from the discussion with deconstruction. Against the background of my methodological 
considerations about the possibility of its transferral to literary theory, I tentatively drew the sil­
houette of a self-deconstructive novel (cf. 1.2.4. The Aesthetic Code): 
I I noted in the margins that the other Yale Critics work anyway with a considerably more conven­
tional model of literature. Indeed, they lack the methodological rigidity that is required for the reflection 
on the possibility of deconstruction's transferral to the theory of literature. 
2 Derrida's (and de Man's) texts are always readings of other texts. 
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• 	 The theoretically claimed levelling of discourse types-i.e. the differentiation of 
analytical and literary discourse as well as of object language and metalanguage­
can be created deconstructively with the utilisation of narrative structures. 
• 	 The result of such a dismantling is the exploding of meaning, as it becomes impos­
sible to distinguish plot and story, narrator and events, reflection and narration, 
etc. 
• 	 The self-deconstruction of meaning, which is not equal to the revealing of the dis­
course's fictitiousness (cf. 1.3.3. Metafiction and Postmodernism), can be reflex­
ively caught up with again on the semantic surface, and can thus be thematised. 
Derrida, too, seeks a representation of his quasi-transcendental structures in the 
semantic dimension of the text (cf. 1.1.8. Text and Textuality and 1.2.1. Defini­
tions). 
As Nabokov holds on to the autonomy of an intentionally writing SUbject, he cannot discursively 
thematise the dissemination of meaning, of language that slips away from his narrators' control. 
It is only in Pale Fire, his most self-deconstructive novel, that the writing subject's authoritative 
power is questioned. 
The reading of the self-presentation of the wntmg subject in Nabokov's autobiography 
(Speak, Memory) and of his protagonist Van Veen (Ada, or Ardor) marks the contradictory 
space of the non-referential play: Nabokov's texts read like an aesthetic affirmation of the de­
constructive postulation that the freedom of the speaking subject is revealed in non-referentiality 
(cf. 1.1.5. Iterability of the Sign and Grammar of the Text and 1.2.3. Literariness of Dis­
course). This means that Nabokov seeks, in spite of-or because of-his high language­
philosophic level of reflection, the authenticity of the self within language. 
Nabokov's discursively formulated ideas do not reach the subversive structures of his own 
text and are eventually deconstructed by them. Paradoxically, it is Nabokov' s incompetent nar­
rators who lead to a discourse about writing: the question 'who speaks language' could not be 
answered, in spite of the author's self-conception, more clearly than by Nabokov's texts. Thus, 
Boyd's formulation of the central question of the self-reflexive novel is affirmed: 
Perhaps the great theme of the reflexive novel is provided by the question 'Who is writing?' As 
efforts at self-definition, such novels provide a commentary on all writing. (Boyd, 11le Reflex­
ive Novel: 39) 
Nabokov's texts constitute the literary model of a semantically uncontrollable text deconstruc­
tively overtaking its own author; the plurality of voices that do not have access to their texts' 
meaning in Pale Fire and Ada, or Ardor represent an extreme novelistic form of self­
deconstructive literature. For Nabokov, language and the discourse's fictitiousness seem to be 
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the guarantors for an omnipotent, autonomous author (or narrator) subject. That this presumably 
text-controlling subject is eventually lost in the textuality of its discourses is not the product of 
the thematisation of the language problematic, but rather the effect of the (semantically overly 
complex) textual structure's inherent dynamism. I Nabokov's reflection on the non-referentiality 
of discourse draws increasingly nearer to the de constructive notion of language; he appropriates 
the meaninglessness of language as a creative force for textual worlds. For him, the non­
referentiality of the aesthetic game is the ultimate attestation of authentic individuality. The de­
constructive other side of the coin of his linguistic world of reflections, whose foundations are 
lost in the complexity of its fabulation, is that subjectivity finally reveals itself as a textual ef­
fect. With the last, highest confirmation of its self, Nabokov's narrator subject throws itself into 
the abyss of textuality, as the analysis of his late novels has demonstrated. 
Thus Vladimir Nabokov cannot be clearly situated either on the side of the idealistic think­
ing of presence or beyond the deconstructive threshold. What is so appealing about his novels is 
their inherent battle of the contradiction between the affirmation of non-reference as guarantor 
of autonomous subjectivity and the exploding of the text-immanent subject. This effect is based 
in the structure of his narrative strategy - which brings about the dissemination of meaning. 
To a certain degree, Nabokov's novels repudiate a general description, or condensation, 
as-and in this lies deconstruction's critique of structuralism and narratology-the narrative 
strategy is always an individual one. Therefore, in the interpretative part of this dissertation I 
gave preference to a thematic perspective over specific analyses of singular texts: it was only 
thus that I could pay respect to the structural idiosyncrasies. Moreover, it was only thus that the 
novels' immanent logic of development could be retraced. 
J Packman's interpretation of the textual effects is similar: "The text is dislodged from the individual 
author and located in relation to an intertextual network" (Vladimir Nabokov: The Structure of Literary 
Desire: 15). Packman fails to realise, however, that Nabokov's emphatic insistence on the artistic sub­
ject's autonomy as the centre of the text is in stark contrast to his textual practice. 




The critical investigation of deconstructive theory discloses the methodological problem: to what 
extent the deconstructive postulation of a constant, epoch-transgressing self-reflexivity of all 
texts is in contrast to the novel-theoretical differentiations with regard to historical genre types 
and the distinction of self-reflexive and other forms. Hypothetically, it was argued that although 
a systematic, formal, all-embracing typology of forms is impossible, we can still attest a mod­
ern-postmodern increase of self-reflexivity/metafiction. 
I am referring here to my-even if somewhat vague-sketching of postmodern codes (cf. 
1.3.3. Metafiction and Postmodernism). As points of convergence of the disparate theories of 
postmodernism, we named the following: the loss of the extra-discursive possibility of a dis­
course's legitimisation, the abandonment of the representational model of language and the criti­
cal questioning of the category history. Applied to literature, the first two aspects appear to be 
becoming autonomous (which in itself would not be postmodern) and becoming problematic of 
the literary discourse and of language in general. With such scepticism toward language and the 
writing subject, the mimetic literature converts necessarily to self-reflexivity. 
Characteristic of postmodern metafiction must be the structural (and semantic) reflection of 
the texts that their self-reflexive movement does not produce a semantic totality. In postmod­
ernism, the circle cannot be closed anymore (cf. 1. 3.3. Metafiction and Postmodernism). The 
specifically postmodern is thus the question of being conscious of the fact that the traditional 
conventions and semantic directions no longer adequately apply as such. Such a self-reflexive 
de-centring, or dismantling, is contained within the notion of self-deconstruction; Nabokov's 
novels are examples of such a strategy. Structural characteristics of their exploding of textual 
identity are, as the analysis of the texts revealed, the distorted reflections and the image of the 
spiral. 
The strategic techniques servmg the texts' self-deconstruction were already summarised; 
with the deconstruction of subjectivity and meaning, Nabokov therefore displays his affinity to 
(post)modern thinking. In his works, exactly those categories which, according to the theory of 
postmodernism and deconstruction, have become problematic prove to be no longer legitimate. 
Simultaneously, with this ascription to a historical and theoretical (or language philosophical) 
frame, a metacritical dimensions opens up. The utility value of the notion aesthetic postmod­
ernism as a historical one is insufficient: even though Nabokov can be read as an advocate of 
postmodernism, his late work is equally deeply rooted in modernism. It is this fundamental pre­
dicament in the differentiation of postmodernism and modernism which makes, for example, 
Samuel Beckett for Hassan a purely postmodern author, while inversely for Adorno, the very 
same author is a prime example for modernism. 
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In contrast to Beckett, though, Nabokov, whose deconstructive development is probably less 
stringent and radical, celebrates exactly the postmodern freedom brought about by the loss of 
centre and origin about which Beckett complains. Nabokov' s historical situation thus would 
seem at first easy. The model of phases in his work that was briefly sketched in the beginning of 
this dissertation is plausible; the intensely modern affirmation of the subject, inflated to a gen­
ius, however, ruptures this image. 
In itself, Nabokov's work carries elements of modernism as well as of postmodernism and 
from a historical point of view, he would have to be regarded as an author on the threshold. 
This ambivalence is apparent in his development which, although it displays a radicalisation of 
deconstructive theories and increases its postmodern aspects, will always remain indistinct in 
this respect. The testing of the notion postmodernism with a paradigmatic example of Nabokov's 
texts thus confirms the doubts which the criticism's lack of coherence in the adoption of the no­
tion already implied (cf. 1.3.3. Metafiction and Postmodernism). Modernism and postmodern­
ism cannot be separated from each other; however, they gain a heuristic value insofar as they 
offer a way of describing the rift of texts, their dialectic of affirmation and negation, or of self­
transcendence. Such a dialectic pairing resembles Lyotard' s aesthetics 1 but is rather outdated as 
a literary-historical phase model: postmodernism is modernism in the phase of self-criticism and 
self-transcendence. The notion is not autonomous, because it cannot be thought of without the 
notion of modernism; it characterises identity and difference: "Postmodernism is an extension of 
Modernism. Extending something, however, can mean crossing its boundaries, changing its 
identity" (Nagele, "Modernism and Postmodernism": 7). 
This view does not deny that specifically postmodern elements can be detected in 
Nabokov's texts. For the becoming-problematic, or the loss of legitimisation of history, which 
places Nabokov on this side of the threshold to postmodernism, he is an example that can de­
termine a possible field of self-reflexive self-dismantling. Two dimensions of his critique, re­
sulting from the textual analysis, have to be attested: first, the all-encompassing fictionalisation; 
second, the exploding of history. 
History appears, like a novelistic affirmation of its textualisation in deconstruction, only as 
fac;ade of plot. With this, Nabokov follows (or, maybe, initiates) the predominant theme of lit­
erary postmodernism: one should remember the formerly less radical thematisation of history' s 
fictitiousness; its displacement into the metalinguistic-discursive domain in the dialogues and 
scenes of the so-called campus novel; the emphasis of the virtuality and contingency of history 
in the contemporary British novel;2 the hidden thematisation of fictitiousness' functioning 
through the analogisation with other semantic fields; the calculated displacement of the text into 
I Cf. 1.3.3. Metafiction and Postmodernism. 

2 E.g. in Fowles' The French Lieutenant's Woman. 
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a mythical/unreal time or world that breaks with the understanding of a real time. I Nabokov 
links the fictionalisation-in the widest sense-of history with a problematisation of temporality 
as a worldly and narrative category. Ada, or Ardor, for example, displays a timeless space of a 
purely narrative temporality through the blending of the temporal differentiation into the plural­
ity of narrative discourses, which allows only for the narrator discourses' own temporal dimen­
sion. 2 The elimination of story time marks the transition to pure metafiction. 
Nabokov dismantles aesthetically the principle of the self-explaining history which formerly 
was the centre of a post-Hegelian modernism: almost all his texts utilise the scheme of the de­
tective novel, or of the quest, in a parodistic-deconstructionist sense. If one differentiates the 
different types of the 'anti-detective-novel',3 then Nabokov works with deconstructive (e.g. in 
Pale Fire) but even more so with metafictional types in which the solution is suspended. To put 
it differently: N abokov parallels the narrative structure with the reception act (Pale Fire and The 
Real Life of Sebastian Knight). The thematic and narrative motif of the research, of the paper 
chase, is projected onto the author-text -reader relationship in an act of an aU-encompassing 
textualisation (Lolita).4 In the latter novel, the doubling teChniques that explode the semantic 
identity are particularly deconstructively virulent. 5 In fact, it seems that Nabokov defines a se­
mantic field of the literary postmodernism with his parodistic variations of exactly that literary 
pattern that represents the possibility of explanation, i.e. of a decoding, of a story.6 
The place of deconstruction is the narrator's consciousness. In Nabokov, the dissolving of 
the meaning-generating principle of story does not appear as a reflexive dissolving but as a play 
with the difference of narrated past and narrative present the Russian novel Despair would be 
the last, probably most telling example of a Nabokovian text that still (playfully-parodistically) 
confirms the principle of self-explanation: it is only in the moment in which narrative present 
and narrated story become one that the key to understanding the story is revealed to the reader 
(the flaw in the perfect crime). Artistic inspiration to the conclusion of the story, the choice of 
the novel's title Despair and the narrator's self-explanation of the happenings all become identi­
cal in the temporal analogisation. In Lolita, the personal narrator holds sway over his story only 
under deconstructive conditions: without the narrator developing his story truly open toward the 
future, its conclusion is reflected upon only as a disseminating factor, as a semantic gap; the 
I Cf. Pynchon's Gravity Rainbow. 
2 The aspect of temporality is a typical example for Nabokov's idealistic-deconstructionist ambiva­
lence. Turned (by Van Veen) as a category of consciousness into the last affirmation of subjectivity, the 
temporal dissemination eventually ruptures the discourse's unity. 
3 Cf. 1.3.3. Metafiction and Postmodernism. 
4 Cf. a similar analogising technique of story and reception act in Calvino (If a Traveller on a Win­
ter's Night). 
5 Cf. especially the doppelganger constellation in Despair and, even more pronounced, the Hum­
ben-Quilty constellation in Lolita. 
6 Cf. also Eco's narrative strategy (The Name of The Rose). 
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possibly mad narrator displaces, as the analysis of the narrative strategy revealed, openness into 
the reception act by consciously keeping the reader in the dark, or by misleading him. 
It is thus no coincidence that Nabokov can generally forego techniques of 'presentic' repre­
sentations of consciousness, especially that of the personal narrator perspective, in favour of 
perspectives, or situations, in which the intrusion of reflection is revealed (auctorial and per­
sonal perspectives that are subsequently de-limited offer this opportunity - in Nabokov's work 
that would be the textualisation of the narrative consciousness (cf. 2.3.4. Pale Fire and 2.3.5. 
Ada, or Ardor). 
Regarding temporality, the moment of reflection requires the differentiation and the subse­
quent levelling of story and plot time, but not their mimetic concealment in synchronicity. This 
aesthetic option's significance (and calculation) can be found in Nabokov's reworking of the no­
vella The Enchanter, whose personal narrative perspective hinders all narrative self-reflection, 
to the narratively complex Lolita with its highly self-reflective narrator Humbert. The reflection 
on language, too, becomes only aesthetically credible as Nabokov transcends subject-bound 
world experience and narrative perspective. 
It appears that Nabokov' s self-dismantling, working with structural doublings and dis­
placements, finds its conclusion in the aesthetic dilemma of the necessity to infinitely increase 
complexity. In the sense of real radicalisation and innovation, Ada, or Ardor can hardly be sur­
passed in radical textuality (not regarding Finnegan's Wake, which was already written). In fact, 
Nabokov himself obviously realised himself that Ada, or Ardor could not be exceeded stylisti­
cally: the narrative strategy's complexity of his last two texts, Transparent Things and Look at 
the Harlequins! is, in comparison, radically reduced; the multitude of metafictional elements, 
i.e. the play of imagination, is relinquished for a simple deletion of the real world. Once more, 
the subjective consciousness attempts, in an inversion of the conventional mimetic world­
relations, to become transparent in an "inverse Platonism", the centre of the totality of mean­
ing. In Look at the Harlequins! the intertextual references to the author's own previous works 
seem less autObiographical than self-plagiarism. The abstract simplicity of metafictional narra­
tion in Nabokov's last two texts does not reduce the impression that he had little new to say af­
ter Ada, or Ardor. In this sense, Nabokov's work reaches a logical, but fatal end in its own self­
deconstruction. 
3.3. DECONSTRUCTION AS INTERPRETATION THEORY 

I read Nabokov's texts as examples of self-deconstructive literature-or Derridean literature. 
The perspective toward language critique, subject critique and text critique in the self-reflection 
of the novels was only to a certain degree determined by the theoretical frame of deconstruction. 
The thematic structures were supplied by the texts and put into relation to the theory. Simulta­
neously, my interpretative practice showed the impossibility °fefraining from using phenomenal 
structures in the demonstration of literature, as demanded by Gasche: deconstruction of mean­
ing functions, at least this is the result of my reading, only through an interplay of structures be­
fore any thematisation. 
The interpretative part of this dissertation was also devised as a reflection on the theory, or 
the testing of its applicability in literary criticism. A problem was that here the exploding of the 
identity of meaning was only anchored in the text; especially the double exploding of unity, or 
identity, of meaning in the text and in the perceiving subject cannot be represented in the writ­
ten form of the first reception act and in the subsequent reflected textual analysis how then 
could the texts' dissemination and the perceiv ing subject's instability be demonstrated? Derrida 
attempts to achieve this with a highly subjective and 'leaping' reading practice that operates with 
multiple associations and which then becomes almost unreadable. In this work, I refrained 
from such a deconstructive style as simulacrum of the disseminating literary pre-text in favour 
of clarity in my argument - at the cost that, first, I had to generally neglect the pragmatic di­
mension because otherwise the de-limitation of the problem of non-identity of the perceiving 
subject would have been untenable, and, second, that I indirectly presumed a stable perspective 
for the textual analysis. This was unavoidable for my endeavour, and I am aware of it. The 
paradox of self-deconstructive literature is indeed that it can, or has to be, demonstrated non­
deconstructivistically. The theory has to remain reciprocal to the literary text and only as long 
as the poetic text (or its author) remains indebted to an intentional (polyvalent) totality of 
meaning, can he be read against the grain. However, a deconstructive reading loses its critical 
function and becomes superfluous where the text itself is deconstructing meaning. More pre­
cisely: every assumption of a text's self-deconstruction is a hermeneutic presumption of meaning 
(and this is, paradoxically also its negation) which the analysis of the novel then demonstrates 
non-deconstructivistically. If the interpretation pays attention to the impossibility of an attainable 
meaning, then this occurs within the frame of a discursive-coherent, critical argument. It is only 
from a stable perspective that deconstruction can be located within texts themselves. (On another 
metalevel, this would then prompt the question, whether it is still correct to be talking about de­
constructive literature.) If literary texts accomplish in themselves a deconstruction-and this was 
my hypothesis for Nabokov's novels-then deconstruction cannot aid as a theory for interpreta­
tion but as language philosophical and subject philosophical theory horizon to which the litera­
ture-immanent deconstructive strategy can refer. 
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To what extent can we now make general statements about the possible utility value of decon­
struction as an interpretation theory? 
In his discussion of the specifically German problems (due to hermeneutics) with the recep­
tion of deconstruction, Gumbrecht suggests to adopt the American theory of pragmatism and to 
utilise deconstruction only when necessary (with regard to my dissertation, that would be espe­
cially for the interpretation of (post)modern texts). If one sees literary criticism's task as both to 
initiate extra-critical readings and to legitimise literature critically, then deconstruction could be 
useful for literary criticism in aiding to perform these assignments (Gumbrecht, "Who is Afraid 
of Deconstruction?": ItO). A second supporting role, according to Gumbrecht, could be the in­
sight into the impossibility of scientific truth which can be used so that "der besondere Stel­
lenwert von 'Kunst' und 'Literatur' als Kommunikationsraum genutzt wird, innerhalb dessen 
Erfahrungen eben nicht hinterfragbar sind" (ibid.: 112).' Thus, he does not try to legitimise de­
construction as a theory but rather attempts to deal with it as an unavoidable phenomenon by in­
corporating it pragmatically. 
However, it seems to me that with this suggestion Gumbrecht does not deal sufficiently 
with deconstruction. A deconstructive argument for bringing reading in line with interpretation 
has little credibility if one does not accept the theory's premises (and this seems to be the case 
for most hermeneuticists); to use literature as a subjectivist 'deconstructive special space' is it­
self based on a thinking (the differentiation of discourse types) which deconstruction attacks. 
The fact that Gumbrecht' s option for a pluralistic-pragmatic appropriation of deconstruction 
(following the Anglo-American model) has little utility value indicates to a certain degree, how­
ever, the impossibility of successfully applying the theory in literary criticism: to restrict decon­
struction to a few special fields of literary criticism contradicts its claim of universality. 
The interpretative part of my dissertation makes use of deconstruction's mode of thinking in 
this way. Retrospectively, the results and the theoretical, or metacritical, perspective justified 
such an approach. I had to bear in mind, though, that by doing so I had left the ground of de­
construction. What is required is the distinction of deconstruction as an interpretation technique 
and deconstruction as a literary theory; this is what is missing in Frank and Gumbrecht's works. 
The confrontation of the theory of deconstruction with Nabokov's self-deconstructive novels re­
vealed that the application of a deconstructive reading is especially problematic for 
(post)modern texts. It is my assumption that it is more conducive for non-deconstructive texts to 
be read against the grain with a deconstructive interpretation technique, i.e. against the intended 
meaning. (A realist novel of the nineteenth century could therefore be read deconstructively as 
its semantics attempt to be 'stable'.) The literature of modernism and postmodernism, in con­
"the special status of 'art' and 'literature' is utilised as a communicative space within which expe­
riences simply cannot be questioned. [my translation]" 
I 
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him mimetically correct.} Fundamentally, we have to expand-in contrast to prevailing inter­
pretations-the doubt about the truthfulness of the narrated to include the whole character of 
Pnin, or the complete plot: the truth of his experience in the fusion of past and present is-at 
least the reader has to consider this possibility as well-a fictional construct, a pure invention of 
the author. In a spiralling self-reference, the circular structure of the novel re-interprets the 
seemingly conventionally narrated into the narrative of many narratives. The last word is not 
given to the narrator but to Cockerell who refers back to the first scene of the novel: 
'And now,' he said, 'I am going to tell you the story of Pnin rising to address the Cremona 
Woman's Club and discovering he had brought the wrong lecture.' (Pnin: 191) 
For the reader, it is impossible to determine the source of this knowledge on Pnin's inner life. 
Even though Pnin, on the plot level, escapes from the narrator's auctorial tyranny (he refuses to 
work under him in the department and departs without having met the narrator), his autonomy is 
finally eclipsed by the novel's narrative structure: the individual's freedom in suffering is an in­
vention of the narrator-author whose mimetic truthfulness is questionable. 
In Nabokov's Pnin the structural ambivalence of the text produces the deconstruction of 
exactly that thematic complex which the text seeks to positively develop. The indeterminacy of 
the source of deconstructive consciousness interdicts the conclusion of an author-intended self­
deconstruction. Indeed, Nabokov's autobiographical writings and aesthetic texts, in which the 
autocratic pose of individualism is postulated as the prime principle of artistic creation, suggest 
rather the opposite: in Pnin, Nabokov's epitome of artistic individuality for the first lime be­
comes the victim of its own creativity. 
2.3.4. Pale Fire 
The deconstruction of a consistent perspective, as demonstrated by the narrative situation in 
Pnin, determines as aesthetic principle the macro-structure of the novel Pale Fire. Here the 
meaning-exploding-disseminating-moment exceeds the narrator's unreliability or its perspec­
tival limitations. The separation into two narrative voices in Pnin re-appears in Pale Fire much 
more radically as a madman's discourse2 and as multiple, transindividual authorship to which 
recourse as a source of intentional speaking and intended meaning is no longer possible. The 
I Field concludes that Pnin "as a serious character" could be distinguished from Pnin "the campus 
'character'" (Vladimir Nabokov: His Life in Art: 135f). 
2 Maddox sees in the theme of madness the influence of Gogol's Diary of a Madman (Vladimir 
Nabokov's Novels in English: 21). 
108 Vladimir Nabokov 
thus produced extreme self-referentiality of the text has occupied literary criticism like no other 
of Nabokov's novels. I The following analysis will demonstrate that psychological and thematic 
interpretations, especially concerning the Kinbote character, have to fail, as these critical works 
usually do not recognise the importance of the text's metafictional dimension. 2 
In its external form, Pale Fire barely follows the norm of the genre 'novel': the text con­
sists of four parts, a foreword by the editor Kinbote, a neo-classicist poem of 999 verses (the 
lOOOth was cut short by the arrival of Shade's murderer, Gradus), a commentary and an index. 
This does not even suggest fictitiousness - the novel pretends to be a literary critical edition of 
Shade's last work. It is obvious that Nabokov, who was simultaneously working on his monu­
mental translation and commentary of Pushkin's Eugene Onegin, works with the parody of phi­
lological conventions. 
The apparent choice of genre induces us to anticipate a referential relationship between the 
four parts of the novel; but as early as in the foreword such expectations are disappointed. Al­
ready on the first page the biographical atmosphere is interrupted by the editor's textual intru­
stOn: 
( ... ] he (Shade] preserved the date of actual creation rather than that of second or third 
thoughts. There is a very loud amusement park right in front of my present lodgings. [my em­
phasis] (Pale Fire: 13) 
The present report about the poem's genesis and the simultaneously developing friendship be­
tween the poet and the subsequent editor Kinbote increases the impression of the editor's in­
competence to abstract both himself and his writing position. He narrates irrelevant details of 
his rather one-sided friendship with Shade that have little or nothing to do with the poem itself 
(ibid.: 23ft). At the same time, he Claims-consciously breaking with the aesthetic premises of 
Shade (and of Nabokov)-the priority of interpretation over the literary work of art: 
Let me state without my notes Shade's text simply has no human reality at all [ ... ]. To this 
statement my dear poet would probably not have subscribed, but, for better or worse, it is the 
commentator who has the last word. (ibid.: 25). 
However, in the foreword, Kinbote's madness is still relatively coded. The account of his talk 
with the head of the department, Professor Nattochdag (ibid.: 22) reveals, at least retrospec­
1 The interpretations of Pale Fire are so numerous and different that I cannot repeat them here in 
detail. 
2 Pifer (Nabokov and the Novel) and Clancy (The Novels of Vladimir Nabokov) present two inter­
pretative approaches that attempt to do the novel justice within their own mimetic concepts of literature. 
Clancy's accusation of aesthetic inconsistency of the Kinbote character can only be voiced as long as the 
interpreter assumes both a possibility of a clear distinction and a realistic design of the narrators and their 
texts; however, the novel's self-reflexive character, which also becomes evident in the blurring of char­
acters, contradicts this view vehemently. 
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trast, requires a discursively coherent analysis of their deconstructive, disseminating aesthetic 
strategy and not a deconstructive reading. Although, or maybe exactly because, (post)modern 
texts undoubtedly show a special affinity to deconstruction (and this was demonstrated by 
Nabokov's metafiction), it is in exactly these texts that deconstruction's limitations as an inter­
pretation theory are revealed. 
The legitimacy of a deconstructive reading practice can therefore only be justified by the 
literary text's degree of aesthetic or discursive self-reflexivity. A rigidly deconstructive inter­
pretation, however, carries the peculiar mark that it usually loses its insight through intertextual 
liquefaction: for one, because it can hardly be perceived and also maybe because in practice the 
deconstructive discourse tends to forget the pre-text's differentia specijica, i.e. its individuality, 
through the metaphysical patterns of thought and their involuntary self-dissolution. It is the 
paradoxical consequence of a text theory which emphatically rejects static and general semantic 
models that in its readings it most often discovers variations of the same (the thinking of pres­
ence, the illusion of mimetics, etc.). As the pre-text is only a pre-text, with which then the de­
constructive discourse unfolds itself, it never comes clearly to the fore. The choice of literary 
criticism, if one thinks deconstruction through, does not exist: it is between a limited decon­
struction which therefore is always vulnerable to the charge that it falls behind its own theory, 
and a radical deconstructive practice which lacks a critical motivation, an epistemological inter­
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